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Vorwort 
Empirische Untersuchungen zum Financial Risk Management leiden trotz umfangreicher 
Offenlegungen beispielsweise nach IFRS 7 immer noch unter Datenproblemen, weil diese 
weitgehend auf Nominalwerte (notional amount), nicht Marktwerte beschränkt sind oder nur 
saldiert ausgewiesen. Daher kann die entscheidende Frage, ob Unternehmen Derivate einsetzen, 
um das Risiko zu mindern oder zusätzliche Erträge zu generieren, mit den Daten im 
Jahresabschluss i.d.R. nicht untersucht werden. Die Mehrzahl empirischer Arbeiten konzentriert 
sich daher auf anonyme Befragungen über den Einsatz von Derivaten, Fallstudien oder arbeiten 
mit einem über 20 Jahren alten Datensatz, der sich mit den Hedging-Aktivitäten von Goldminen 
beschäftigt. Der Arbeit von Dr. Andreas Hecht kommt daher eine besondere Bedeutung zu.  
Im Rahmen der Vorschriften der französischen Kapitalmarktaufsicht wird das sogenannte 
‘registration document’ als optionale Beilage, ergänzend zu den vorgeschriebenen Dokumenten, 
erwähnt, in dem Unternehmen, die an französischen Börsen notiert sind, umfassendere 
Informationen offenlegen als in anderen Ländern der EU. Anhand eines individuellen 
Datensatzes der größten Unternehmen an der Pariser Börse (CAC Index) ist Andreas Hecht in 
der Lage, die bisher nur anhand von Befragungen oder Fallstudien untersuchten Fragen zum 
Financial Risk Management von Foreign Exchange (FX) und Interest Rate (IR) Risiken zu 
untersuchen. 
Die einzelnen Fragestellungen der drei Arbeiten zeigen eine hohe Praxisrelevanz, weil auch die 
Frage untersucht wird, inwieweit Unternehmen durch den Einsatz von Derivaten Risiken 
vermindern oder eventuell steigern. Die Ergebnisse zeigen aber auch, die Schwierigkeit der 
Einordung von selektivem Hedging, Market Timing und Spekulation in der praktischen Analyse. 
Die Ergebnisse können aber auch überzeugen, weil sie einem Regulierer sinnvolle Hinweise 
geben, welche Informationen der Kapitalmarkt mindestens braucht, wenn er angemessen die 
Risikoposition der Unternehmen aus den Offenlegungen beurteilen will. Es geht hier aber nicht 
um mehr Offenlegung, sondern vielmehr um die Offenlegung von wichtigen und relevanten 
Informationen für Analysten. 
Frühlingsanfang 2019 in Hohenheim 
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1 Introduction 
 “Academics know remarkably little about corporate risk management practices, even though almost three-fourths 
of corporations have adopted at least some financial engineering techniques to control their exposures to interest 
rates, foreign exchange rates, and commodity prices.” 1 
In 1996, Tufano expressed concern about the state of knowledge of how firms manage their risk 
exposures. Since then, a lot of academic research has been dedicated to corporate risk 
management that documents the relevance of derivative instruments (e.g., Bodnar, Giambona, 
Graham, Harvey, & Marston, 2011; Brown, 2001; Brown & Toft, 2002; Guay & Kothari, 2003). 
The majority (64%) of firms use derivative instruments in their risk management programs 
(Bodnar et al., 2011), with the most material risk categories of non-financial firms being foreign 
exchange (FX) and interest rate (IR) risk. As the survey of Bodnar et al. (2011) further illustrates, 
FX is the only category that is more commonly managed with financial contracts than 
operational structures and decisions. The second category in this respect is IR risk, for which the 
derivative contracts are almost equally important as operational risk measures.  
Although FX and IR risks are identified as the most important categories, the majority of the 
recent empirical literature on corporate risk management focuses on commodity risks using the 
famous ‘gold data set’ based on a confidential survey2 (e.g., Adam & Fernando, 2006; Adam, 
Fernando, & Golubeva, 2015; Adam, Fernando, & Salas, 2017; Brown, Crabb, & Haushalter, 
2006; Tufano, 1996). The limited data availability for IR and FX risk contributes to this fact: In 
the case of interest rate risk, the complexity of IR risk3 makes it difficult to identify a firm’s 
interest rate exposure (Faulkender, 2005) and most “studies rely on survey data and/or 
alternative indicators of derivative usage” (Oberoi, 2018, p. 71). Similarly, investigations of 
foreign exchange risk are predominantly based on anonymous insider information from surveys 
(e.g., Glaum, 2002; Géczy, Minton, & Schrand, 2007) or case studies (e.g., Brown, 2001; Brown 
& Toft, 2002) due to a lack of publicly reported empirical data. One of the rare studies that 
                                                 
1  As appeared in the Journal of Finance article “Who manages risk? An empirical examination of risk 
management practices in the gold mining industry” by Tufano (1996, p. 1097). 
2  The equity analyst Ted Reeve compiled the comprehensive, private survey in the North American gold 
mining industry in the 1990s. Tufano (1996) was, to our knowledge, the first user of this dataset. 
3  Interest rate risk consists of two types of risk: While the cash flow risk describes the direct impact of 
interest rate changes on payments for floating-rate financial assets and liabilities, the fair value risk 
represents the effect of interest rate fluctuations on the market value of fixed-rate financial assets and 
liabilities. 
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examines corporate FX risk management based on openly available empirical data is Beber & 
Fabbri (2012), who rely on disclosed notional values of currency derivatives. However, Beber & 
Fabbri (2012) note that the use of notional values has limited utility since the net position (short 
or long) and the concerned currency remain unknown. This thesis addresses the problem of data 
limitation and the use of proxy variables for derivative usage in corporate FX and IR risk 
management by exploiting a unique regulatory setting with publicly reported FX and IR 
accounting information of unprecedented data granularity.  
In the extant literature on corporate risk management, two overriding research questions emerge: 
First, whether firms hedge or speculate with derivative instruments, i.e., if firms decrease or 
increase their risk exposure, respectively.4 The stated data limitation in terms of FX and IR risk is 
illustrated by e.g., Hentschel & Kothari (2001) and Allayannis & Ofek (2001), who both analyze 
whether non-financial firms reduce or take risk with derivatives with conflicting results. While 
Hentschel & Kothari (2001) base their analysis on stock-return volatility as proxy for FX, IR and 
commodity risk exposure, Allayannis & Ofek (2001) use the sensitivity of a firm’s stock return to 
unanticipated FX rate changes as alternative indicator for FX exposure. Second, the literature is 
particularly interested in the determinants of speculative behavior (e.g., Adam et al., 2015, 2017; 
Brown et al., 2006; Géczy et al., 2007; Glaum, 2002), where the lack of public data is once more 
visible. To our knowledge, almost all studies rely on insider information from survey outcomes, 
whereby most examinations again analyze commodity risks using the aforementioned ‘gold data 
set’ (Adam et al., 2015, 2017; Brown et al., 2006). Similarly, the data for FX and IR risk rely on 
access to the Bodnar et al. (1998)-Wharton survey (Géczy et al., 2007) or they are based on an 
own survey study on the risk management of German non-financial firms (Glaum, 2002).5 As 
only conflicting evidence emerges, Adam et al. (2017) conclude that the empirical evidence on 
why firms engage in speculative activities “remains a puzzle” (Adam et al., 2017,  p. 269) and 
Géczy et al. (2007) deduce that investors are not able to identify speculation based on public 
corporate disclosures.  
We are able to tackle these two research questions as to whether firms hedge or speculate with 
derivative instruments and what the potential determinants and identifiers of speculation might 
                                                 
4  The relevant literature defines hedging as activity that reduces risk (e.g., Allayannis & Ofek, 2001; Géczy et 
al., 2007; Hentschel & Kothari, 2001), while selective hedging refers to the incorporation of individual 
market views in risk management decisions that leads to sizing and timing of derivative transactions (e.g., 
Glaum, 2002; Stulz, 1996). Speculation, as opposed to hedging, denotes risk-increasing activities, or 
following Zhang (2009) derivative activities that fails to reduce a firm’s risk exposure.  
5  Only the study of Chernenko & Faulkender (2011) examines exclusively IR risk. To do so, they only 
analyze debt positions and assume an optimal stable hedge ratio of their sample firms.  
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be by means of two new, innovative and public datasets – one for FX and one for IR risk – that 
contain advanced disclosures on risk management activities. In the unique and unexplored 
regulatory environment of France, the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF), supervisor of the 
French financial markets, recommends additional FX and IR disclosures in excess of the 
prevailing International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). In form of an optional 
supplement to annual disclosures, the so-called ‘registration document’, the regulating authority 
advises firms to state actual exposure data before and after hedging together with corresponding 
hedged amounts from derivative instruments. This, to our knowledge unprecedented data 
granularity, allows us to overcome the data limitation in corporate FX and IR risk management 
and to avoid using alternative indicators for derivative usage with potential estimation errors. We 
address the two research questions on the relevance and the determinants (together with the 
identification) of speculative elements in corporate FX and IR risk management in three 
chapters, where every chapter refers to an empirical paper.6  
Following the importance of financial contracts for FX risk management, we first concentrate on 
how firms use derivative transactions to handle their FX risk. Using the additional information 
reported in the registration documents, we are able to investigate the unexamined composition 
of FX exposure, i.e., whether it is mainly long or short, and how the exposure is managed. We 
then focus on the relevance of speculative elements with the central question of whether firms 
use derivatives to decrease, increase or keep their FX risk exposure constant by analyzing the 
actually reported exposure before and after hedging instead of using proxy variables. Further, the 
extant literature provides substantial evidence that firms consider previous derivative cash flows 
when managing their current exposure (Adam et al., 2015; Beber & Fabbri, 2012; Thaler & 
Johnson, 1990; Weber & Zuchel, 2005). Using our unique FX-dataset, we address the 
documented impact of prior hedging outcomes on present hedge decisions and complement the 
literature when testing whether this impact differs for risk-decreasing and risk-increasing 
strategies. Chapter 2 “How do Firms Manage Their Foreign Exchange Exposure?” 7 summarizes the 
findings of this examination.  
Following the relevance of speculative elements, we turn our focus to the identification and the 
determinants of speculation in FX risk management. We build upon chapter 2 to define 
                                                 
6  The content of each paper coincides with the papers, but they are formally revised for the thesis.  
7  This paper is joint work with Niklas Lampenius. I identified the regulatory environment with the advanced 
disclosures on FX risk management as prerequisite for this paper. Further, I suggested the initial idea and I 
was responsible for data collection, preparation and analysis. Moreover, I contributed to this paper by co-
writing every chapter.  
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speculation as risk-increasing/-constant strategy and separate it clearly from hedging. We then 
examine whether – in contrast to the existing literature – the unique regulatory environment in 
France allows investors and further stakeholders to quantitatively or qualitatively identify 
speculative activities reading public corporate disclosures. In the following, we investigate the 
determinants of speculation, where we test if the relevant theories for speculative behavior are 
empirically supported in FX risk management. We note that the extant empirical evidence is at 
variance and see the varying assumptions and definitions for speculation as major reason. Instead 
of employing proxy variables for derivative usage or relying on survey data, we use the 
informational advantage of our dataset to separate hedgers from speculators according to their 
share of risk-decreasing vs. risk-increasing/-constant strategies and examine whether certain firm 
characteristics are critical to speculative behavior. Chapter 3 “Identifying Corporate Speculation 
Reading Public Disclosures – Why Firms Increase Risk“ presents the outcome of this analysis.  
Subsequent to an isolated FX risk contemplation, we concentrate on corporate IR risk 
management as well as its combination with FX risk to analyze potential interdependencies. 
Interest rate risk is more complex compared to foreign exchange risk (Faulkender, 2005). A 
major reason for this is that interest rate risk comprises two different types of risk – the cash 
flow and the fair value risk. The extant literature addresses this complexity by assuming a target 
fixed/floating ratio and analyzing the mix of fixed- and floating-rate debt. Anecdotal evidence 
from interviewed treasury executives, however, indicates that non-financial firms concentrate on 
the cash flow risk (Backhaus, 2018) instead of working with a target fixed/floating mix. In terms 
of IR risk reporting, the additional disclosures advocated by the French’s financial markets 
authority (AMF) provide the information of the IR exposure before and after hedging separately 
for fixed- and floating-rate positions. This unprecedented data granularity allows us to put the 
emphasis on the cash flow risk and to analyze how non-financial firms manage their IR risk from 
new analytical perspectives. Besides the composition and the maturity structure of IR exposure, 
we are particularly interested in the relevance and determinants of speculative, i.e., risk-
increasing/-constant, elements in IR risk management. To round off the thesis as a final step, we 
combine the FX and IR dataset to explore potential interrelations between speculative activities 
in both fields. Chapter 4 “How Do Firms Manage Their Interest Rate Exposure?” reports the results 
of this investigation.  
Finally, we summarize our key findings in chapter 5 to illustrate how the new empirical findings 
of this thesis contribute to the discussion and literature on corporate risk management. 
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2 How Do Firms Manage Their Foreign Exchange Exposure?8 
Andreas Hecht a and Niklas Lampenius a 
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We examine how firms manage their foreign exchange (FX) exposure using 
publicly reported data on FX exposure before and after hedging with 
corresponding hedging instruments. Based on calculated firm-, year-, and 
currency-specific hedge ratios, we find that about 80 [20] percent of FX firm 
exposure are managed using risk-decreasing [risk-increasing/-constant] strategies. 
Further, we find that prior hedging outcomes affect the management of current 
FX exposure, where the exposure is reduced and management adjusts the hedge 
ratio closer to its benchmark average hedge ratio following prior benchmark 
losses. When separately evaluating risk-decreasing and risk-increasing positions, 
we find that prior benchmark losses are only relevant for risk-increasing but not 
for risk-decreasing positions, i.e., hedging decisions are independent of prior 
benchmark losses if the intention is to reduce FX exposure. 
 
 
Keywords:  Foreign Exchange; Corporate Risk Management; Selective Hedging; Speculation 
JEL: G11, G32, G39 
 
                                                 
8  We gratefully acknowledge access to Bloomberg and Compustat Global Vantage database provided by 
DALAHO, University of Hohenheim. We are especially indebted to Dirk Hachmeister for extensive 
discussions and valuable feedback. We further thank the participants of the EFIP-seminar at the Paris 
School of Business (PSB), the attendees of the seminar of the Cooperative confederation of Volks- and 
Raiffeisen banks in Bavaria as well as the participants of the Controlling Forum Pforzheim for their 
precious comments. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The literature provides substantial evidence on the relevance of foreign exchange (FX) derivative 
instruments for the management of corporate FX exposure, either related to the structure of a 
FX risk management program (Brown, 2001), the optimal derivative hedging strategies (Brown 
& Toft, 2002), or generally the importance of derivative instruments (Guay & Kothari, 2003). 
Further, the survey of Bodnar, Giambona, Graham, Harvey, and Marston (2011) illustrates that 
FX risk is commonly managed with financial contracts.9 In general, the purpose of risk 
management or hedging is the reduction of risk that results from future movements in market 
variables, where Hentschel and Kothari (2001) investigate, based on stock returns as central risk 
measure, whether corporations reduce or take risks with derivative instruments. Similarly, 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001) evaluate whether non-financial firms use FX derivatives for hedging 
or speculative purposes, i.e., reduce or increase FX exposure, based on the sensitivity of a firm’s 
stock return to unanticipated FX rate changes as proxy of FX exposure.  
Using a new dataset that contains actual firm-, year- and currency-specific exposure before and 
after hedging of a firm, we relate to the latter topic and evaluate how firms manage FX exposure 
and weather firms decrease or increase FX exposure using derivatives. The latter question is of 
particular interest given that a line of research illustrates that individual views on future market 
developments influence corporate risk management activities (Adam et al., 2015; Beber & Fabbri, 
2012; Bodnar et al., 1998; Brown et al., 2006; Faulkender, 2005; Glaum, 2002; Tufano, 1996), 
where the terms selective hedging, market timing, and speculation are used interchangeably 
(Adam et al., 2017). In this context, the selective hedging literature also documents the relevance 
of previous hedging outcomes and indicates that management refers to prior outcomes in 
present hedge decisions when managing FX exposure (Adam et al., 2015; Beber & Fabbri, 2012).  
In this paper we evaluate a hand-collected dataset from publicly available sources containing data 
from French firms with unprecedented FX-data granularity. The reported data provides 
information on the composition of the firms’ exposure before hedging, the utilized hedging 
instruments, as well as, the resulting exposure after hedging. This granularity allows us to 
determine firm-, year-, and currency-specific hedge ratios and to classify currency positions as 
risk-decreasing [risk-increasing] {risk-constant} if they reduce [increase] {keep constant} the 
firm’s FX exposure per year and currency. This differentiation is in line with the recent survey in 
                                                 
9  Following Bodnar et al. (2011), all other examined risk categories, such as interest rates, commodities, or 
energy, are more commonly managed with operational risk measures as opposed to derivatives/financial 
contracts.  
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France of Gumb, Dupuy, Baker, and Blum (2018) that indicates that corporate treasurers differ 
in risk appetite: some are willing to increase volatility, while others refuse to do so. Further, this 
differentiation allows for an in-depth analysis of the influence of prior hedging outcomes when 
managing FX exposure, and enables us to provide unique new evidence on the management of 
the FX exposure of non-financial firms.  
We find that the FX exposure of our sample firms before hedging is mainly long and driven by 
FX-receivables and forecasted FX-sales. This long exposure is on average [median] hedged to 
about 90 [49] percent with predominantly short derivative instruments. Further, our findings 
reveal that about 61 percent of the taken currency positions can be classified as risk-decreasing 
and about 39 percent as risk-increasing/-constant positions. However, a position with an 
exposure of 0.1 million Euros should not be equally important as a position with an exposure of 
100 million Euros. When relating the exposure before hedging per position to overall firm 
exposure, we find that approximately 20 percent of total firm exposure are managed using risk-
increasing/-constant strategies and 80 percent of total FX exposure are managed using risk-
decreasing strategies. Further, we address the documented impact of prior outcomes on hedging 
decisions and test whether management considers prior hedging outcomes when managing its 
current exposure. Following Brown et al. (2006), we evaluate past performance relative to a 
benchmark scenario defined as the firm- and currency-specific average hedge ratio and 
denominate positive [negative] deviations as benchmark gains [losses]. This approach is in line 
with the methodology used in the selective hedging literature, who attribute deviations from a 
benchmark scenario to selective hedging (Adam et al., 2015; Brown et al., 2006). We find 
evidence that supports the hypothesis that management is impacted by prior outcomes when 
managing FX exposure. In particular we observe a significant exposure reduction following prior 
benchmark losses, where the adjustment results in a hedge ratio that is closer to the benchmark 
of the average hedge ratio. Further, we complement the literature by analyzing the impact of 
prior outcomes separately for risk-decreasing and risk-increasing strategies. We find that prior 
benchmark losses are only relevant for risk-increasing strategies, where the exposure is decreased 
in response to previous benchmark losses, but not for risk-decreasing strategies. Thus, if the 
managerial focus is on decreasing risk, we find that prior hedging outcomes are not incorporated 
in current hedge decisions.  
We contribute to the literature on corporate risk management in three ways. First, based on the 
granularity of the dataset we contribute to the understanding of how firms manage their FX 
exposures. Second, the data allows for the calculation of a hedge ratio that captures FX 
exposures before hedging and the corresponding hedging instruments per firm, year, and 
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currency. The hedge ratio allows for a classification of derivative positions into risk-decreasing, 
risk-increasing, and risk-constant strategies, where we illustrate their respective relevance in FX 
risk management. Third, we complement the literature with our analysis of the impact of prior 
hedging outcomes on present hedge decisions. We first confirm the findings from extant 
literature that management is impacted by prior outcomes when managing FX exposure, where 
we show that management adjust the hedge ratio closer to the benchmark of the average hedge 
ratio in response to prior benchmark losses. Further, when risk-decreasing and risk-increasing 
positions are evaluated separately we find that prior benchmark losses are only relevant for risk-
increasing but not for risk-decreasing strategies.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the structure and format of the reported 
data on FX exposure and corresponding hedging instruments and introduces the hedge ratio 
measure. Section 2.3 describes our sample, discusses descriptive statistics, and provides an 
analysis of the hedge ratio. Section 2.4 investigates the influence of prior outcomes on hedging 
decisions and section 2.5 concludes.  
2.2 Information Provided in the Registration Document 
2.2.1 Registration Document  
We utilize a sample of French firms, since the unique regulatory recommendations in France 
facilitate the publication of detailed information regarding risk management of foreign exchange 
exposure. Here the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF), supervisor of the French financial 
markets, has established a so-called ‘registration document’.10 As optional supplement, this 
registration document provides additional information for various stakeholders. In position 
paper n°2009-16 the AMF supplies detailed guidelines regarding corporate disclosures on the 
management of FX risks. These guidelines by far exceed the requirements of IFRS 7, §33 and 34 
(AMF, 2009), as they advice firms to state their actual FX exposure before and after management 
by year and currency at the reporting date, however, at this point in time the provision of data is 
voluntary. Table 1 provides a template of the recommended format of the data with regard to 
FX exposure and its management provided by the AMF with a proxy currency to illustrate a 
potential outcome.  
                                                 
10  For details on the registration document refer to http://www.amf-france.org/en_US/Acteurs-et-
produits/Societes-cotees-et-operations-financieres/Document-de-reference.html. 
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Table 1: Template of Information Requested in the Registration Document  
This table presents the recommendation detailed by the supervisor of the French financial markets, Autorité des 
Marchés Financiers (AMF), in position paper n°2009-16, including a numerical example currency position. In this 
guideline document, the AMF has established a so-called ‘registration document’, which as optional supplement, is 
intended to provide additional information regarding risk management of foreign exchange exposure for various 
stakeholders. The original document is in French language and not available in English. 
Year  
Assets* 
[a] 
Liabilities* 
[b] 
Forecasted Exposure 
(Sales (+) and Purchases 
(-)) 
[c] 
Exposure 
Before 
Hedging 
[d] = [a] - [b] + 
[c] 
Hedging Instruments 
(Long (+) and Short (-)) 
[e] 
Exposure 
After Hedging 
[f] = [d] + [e] 
Currency 1 120 30 10 100 -50 50 
Currency 2             
Currency n             
…       
Total … … … … … … 
* Mostly in form of FX-trade receivables and FX-trade payable, respectively 
 
In the registration document firms typically specify their FX exposure of assets (column [a]) and 
liabilities (column [b]), mostly in form of FX-receivables and FX-payables, together with the 
forecasted FX exposures (column [c]), which some firms further divide into forecasts of FX-
sales and FX-purchases, as illustrated in Table 1. In the aggregate, these figures add up to the net 
position of exposure before hedging (column [d]), where all data is firm-, year-, and currency-
specific and also includes information on outstanding FX debt as well as the data of the 
exposure of foreign subsidiaries.11 In addition, the registration document provides information 
on the employed hedging instruments (column [e]) and the resulting exposure after hedging 
(column [f]). To illustrate the level of detail provided, assume the following reported 
information: A firm reports, for instance, 120 units of FX-receivables and 30 units of FX-
payables at a particular reporting date for a respective currency. The netted figure of 90 units is 
amended with forecasted FX-sales of 20 units and forecasted FX-purchases of 10 units. Overall, 
the firm then reports an exposure before hedging ( Ebt ) of 100 units 
(     120 30 20 10 100btE ), as well as a corresponding net amount of hedging instruments 
( tH ) of –50 units in the respective currency. The exposure after hedging ( E
a
t ) is then specified 
with 50 units, i.e., E 100 50at   . Appendix 1 provides examples of the reported FX information 
from the registration documents. In general and given its voluntary nature, firms mainly specify 
the net amount of hedging instruments, however, in some instances firms also specify the 
utilized hedging instruments, such as forwards/futures, options, or swaps, either separately in 
tabulated form or verbally in the accompanying notes. Overall, the reported data in the 
                                                 
11  Appendix 2 provides examples of FX debt and foreign subsidiaries included in exposure.  
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registration document covers existing and estimated FX exposure and associated hedging 
positions at the reporting date and, thus, provides a new level of granularity so far unrevealed to 
the public, which allows for a novel evaluation of how firms manage their FX exposure.  
2.2.2 Hedge Ratio Definition 
To evaluate how firms manage their FX exposure we are interested in whether firms decrease or 
increase their FX risk when employing FX hedging strategies, where we utilize the information 
on positions before and after hedging provided in the registration document. In line with Zhang 
(2009), who analyzes firms that reduce their risk exposure with derivative instruments and those 
who fail to do so, a hedge ratio allows to separate strategies that are risk-decreasing from those 
that are risk-increasing or from those that do not affect risk exposure. Similarly, others have 
evaluated this distinction in the context of corporate risk management activities (Allayannis & 
Ofek, 2001; Hentschel & Kothari, 2001; Zhang, 2009), where Allayannis and Ofek (2001) and 
Hentschel and Kothari (2001) use the term ‘hedging’ and ‘speculation’ for risk-decreasing and 
risk-increasing strategies, respectively. Zhang (2009) employs similar expressions, given that 
firms that reduce their risk exposure compared to an expected level are classified as ‘effective 
hedgers’ and firms that increase their risk exposure as ‘ineffective hedgers/speculators’.  
Based on the new level of granularity, we can evaluate FX activities using firm-, year- and 
currency-specific hedge ratios ( HR ) that denote the percentage of FX exposure covered by 
derivative instruments. Thus, a hedge ratio in t  ( tHR ) is defined as  E
b
t t tHR H , where tH  
denotes the hedging instruments and btE  the exposure before hedging in t . In general, the 
exposure before hedging, as reported in the registration document, can be either long (positive), 
or short (negative). For the utilized hedging instruments we identify a long [short] position 
through a positive [negative] sign. Consequently, the hedge ratio is either positive or negative, in 
dependence on the FX exposure and utilized hedging instruments, where a positive [negative] 
FX exposure combined with a short position in a FX hedging instrument results in a negative 
[positive] hedge ratio. On the other hand, a long position in a FX hedging instrument in 
combination with a positive [negative] exposure defines a positive [negative] hedge ratio. To 
illustrate the concept we include the following numerical example that demonstrates the 
combination of FX exposure before hedging (denominator) and the hedging instruments 
(numerator) in the hedge ratio. Imagine a firm with an assumed exposure before hedging in a 
particular currency of 100 units, i.e., 100bE  . That firm can now take one out of six 
exemplarily, fundamentally different positions, as illustrated numerically in Table 2, that differ in 
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the amount of hedging instruments ( H ) utilized and the resulting exposure after hedging ( Ea ). 
Here two of the six positions result in a decrease in risk: Hedging short e.g., 50 units with 
derivative instruments ( 50H   , 0.5HR   ) implies that the hedging instruments lower the 
firm’s FX exposure from 100 to 50 units12, and hedging short e.g., 150 units ( 150H   , 
1.5HR   ) implies that the hedging instruments lower the firm’s FX exposure from 100 to     –
50 units, which is now a short exposure.13 Further, two positions result in an increase in risk: 
Hedging short e.g., 250 units using derivative instruments (  250H , 2.5HR   ) indicates that 
the hedging instruments ‘increase’ the firm’s FX exposure from 100 to –150 units and hedging 
long e.g., 50 units ( 50H  , 0.5HR  ) indicates that the hedging instruments increase the firm’s 
FX exposure from 100 to 150 units. Finally, two positions change the direction of the exposure, 
while the size of the risk position of the firm remains constant: Doing nothing ( 0H  , 
0.0HR  ) and hedging short e.g., 200 units using derivative instruments ( 200H   , 
2.0HR   ). Overall, Table 2 demonstrates the different positions, including the discontinuous 
nature of the hedge ratio when interpreted according to the categories of risk-increasing and risk-
decreasing. Consequently, the hedge ratio has to be interpreted with care, given that the 
interpretation is range-dependent.  
Table 2: Hedge Ratio Properties 
This table illustrates properties of the hedge ratio ( HR ) and contains a numerical illustration to demonstrate the 
combination of FX exposure before hedging (denominator) and the hedging instruments (numerator) in the hedge 
ratio using the column references introduced in Table 1. For illustrative purposes we assume as base scenario a firm 
with an exposure before hedging in a particular currency of 100 units, i.e.,  100bE . That firm can now take one 
out of six fundamentally different positions that differ in the amount of hedging instruments ( H ) and the resulting 
exposure after hedging ( E a ), where two of the six positions result in a decrease in risk, two in an increase in risk and 
two keep the risk at a constant level. Further, it illustrates the hedge ratio range given the six fundamentally different 
positions.  
Hedge Ratio Range: 
 Risk-
increasing 
strategy 
 Risk-
decreasing 
strategy 
Risk-
decreasing 
strategy 
 Risk-
increasing 
strategy 
 Risk-
constant 
strategy 
Risk-
constant 
strategy 
Exposure Before Hedging [d] 100  100 100  100  100 100 
Hedging Instruments [e] -250  -150 -50  50  -200 0 
Exposure After Hedging [f] -150  -50 50  150  -100 100 
Hedge Ratio (HR = [e] / [d]) -2.5  -1.5 -0.5  0.5  -2 0 
HR: 
 
 
 
                                                 
12  Similarly, if a firm reports a short (negative sign) exposure of -100 units that is hedged long (positive sign) 
with 50 units, the hedge ratio also equals 50/-100 = -0.5 and indicates a risk-decreasing strategy. 
13  In the latter case, the overhedging changes the sign of the exposure, which could indicate underlying 
speculative intentions. However, the descriptive statistics in Table 3 Panel B show that firms are only 
slightly overhedging with a HR mean of -1.18, which can rather be attributed to imperfect hedge 
conditions in the real world (Hull, 2015), and hence we can classify such positions as risk-decreasing.  
∞ -2 0 -1 -∞ 
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In summary, a hedge ratio of –1.5 decreases the exposure (risk-decreasing strategy), while a 
hedge ratio of –2.5 increases the exposure (risk-increasing strategy), where the hedge ratio of –2 
marks the lower limit between the strategies and the hedge ratio of 0 marks the upper limit. 
Thus, all positive hedge ratios ( 0HR  ) as well as hedge ratios below –2 ( 2HR   ) increase 
risk, while negative hedge ratios bigger than –2 and smaller than 0 ( 2 0HR   ) decrease risk. 
Finally, within the thresholds of 2 0HR    market views in the context of selective hedging 
(e.g., Adam et al., 2015, Beber & Fabbri, 2012, or Glaum, 2002) may also be incorporated in the 
hedging decision, but due to the overall exposure reduction, we categorize this strategy as risk-
decreasing and, hence, clearly differentiate it from a risk-increasing or a risk-constant strategy. 
Overall, the utilized classification scheme of risk-increasing, risk-decreasing, and risk-constant 
positions sets us apart from prior studies.  
2.3 Sample Description and Analysis 
2.3.1 Sample Selection 
Our dataset contains panel data of listed firms in France for the period 2010 to 2015. The initial 
sample contains all 333 French firms quoted in the CAC All-Tradable index as of April 2016. 
Given that the position paper on the preparation of the registration document was made public 
in December 10th, 2009, the initial year of our sample is 2010. We drop 18 firms from the 
financial industry, provided their unique business model. For the remaining 315 firms we hand-
collect the reported annual disclosures on FX exposure and hedging activities from the 
registration document separately for year, currency, exposure, and hedging activity. 183 firms 
voluntary report that they are not facing any (or no significant) FX exposure; a plausible number 
of firms since the CAC-All-Tradable index consists of a significant amount of small and medium 
sized enterprises (SME) that might not be exposed to FX risks. 70 firms do not follow the 
recommendations of the AMF and do not voluntary disclose information on FX exposure. Thus, 
we are not able to collect the relevant data, and our results are subject to a potential selection 
bias due to the voluntary disclosure of these items. However, as the direct cost of compliance 
with the guidelines of the registration document of the French financial markets’ supervisor 
seem to be high14, we believe that some firms are not willing to bear this high cost of reporting 
even if they manage exposures similarly. In line with Adam, Fernando, and Golubeva (2015) we 
                                                 
14  In accordance with French regulations, the registration document is an additional document to be filed 
with the AMF. Exemplary, one group illustrates as difference between its annual report and registration 
document that the registration document provides further details on the activity, financial situation and 
prospects of the company (see section 2.2.1).  
How Do Firms Manage Their Foreign Exchange Exposure? 
15 
include only active hedgers in the analysis to avoid a bias towards firms that simply ‘do nothing’ 
about their FX risks, i.e., we exclude firms that are exposed to FX risk but do not use FX 
derivatives. Our final sample consists of 1,814 firm-year observations across 62 firms from 53 
industries (according to the four digit SIC code) that voluntarily disclose information on FX 
risks. Each year a firm has an average FX exposure in approximately 4.9 currencies, where we in 
total observe 48 different foreign currencies in the sample.  
In terms of financial instruments, firms mainly report the utilization of forward or future 
contracts; options and swaps are mentioned less frequently. In line with Allayannis and Ofek 
(2001) and Beber and Fabbri (2012), we exclude foreign currency swap positions whenever their 
utilization is explicitly mentioned in the context of a particular FX exposure in the registration 
document. We include firms if they, amongst forward, future, or option contracts, also mention 
the utilization of swaps but the hedged amount and information stated in the registration 
document does not allow for a separation of swap positions. Overall, the inclusion of firms that 
utilize swaps in hedging FX exposure should not lead to a large bias, since FX forward contracts 
are by far the most important hedging instrument (Bodnar et al., 1998; Giambona, Graham, 
Harvey, & Bodnar, 2018), which also holds for French firms, as the survey of Albouy and Dupuy 
(2017) confirms. We ignore all transaction costs related to hedging activities and assume that FX 
markets are efficient in the weak sense of informational efficiency (Fama, 1970).  
2.3.2 Description of the Reported Data on FX Exposure and its Management 
To answer the question how firms manage their FX exposure, we first evaluate the composition 
of exposures and then analyze the associated hedging activities. Table 3 Panel A presents 
descriptive statistics of the FX exposure before and after hedging, the utilized hedging 
instruments, and the resulting hedge ratio, where the number of observations captures the 
frequencies of occurrences in the registration document.  
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of FX Exposure, Hedging Instruments, and Hedge Ratio 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the FX exposure before and after hedging and the corresponding hedging 
instruments in Panel A and the resulting hedge ratios ( HR ), defined as the percentage of FX exposure before 
hedging covered by hedging instruments, in Panel B. The entries in Panel A correspond to the information 
requested in the registration document as illustrated in Table 1. In addition, we separate hedging instruments into 
long and short positions if identifiable in the registration document. Descriptive statistics on HR  in Panel B are 
presented separately based on risk-decreasing, risk-increasing, and risk-constant strategies.  
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of FX Exposure and Hedging Instruments  
 No. Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Assets 1,316 260.220 852.425 -282.200 15,554 
Liabilities 1,225 238.961 675.692 -7.000 10,157 
Forecasted Exposure 441 30.003 111.585 -570.300 629 
Exposure Before Hedging 1,814 44.353 402.824 -3,992 5,937 
Hedging Instruments Long 265 174.025 432.049 -13.586 2873 
Hedging Instruments Short 575 -118.331 492.460 -29.092 4908 
Hedging Instruments Net 1,328 -39.873 322.901 -3,186 2,873 
Exposure After Hedging 1,814 15.162 241.030 -2,015 2,606 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of Hedge Ratio  
Strategy Hedge Ratio No. Obs. Cum. Obs.  Mean      SD  Min P25   P50 P75 Max 
           
Risk-decreasing 
2 1HR     260 260 -1.188 0.250 -1.956 -1.270 -1.075 -1.016 -1.000
1HR    82 342 -1.000 0.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 
1 0HR    759 1101 -0.626 0.314 -1.000 -0.919 -0.714 -0.365 -0.001 
Risk-increasing a  
2HR     65 1166 -16.320 65.960 -521.000 -5.551 -3.680 -2.924 -2.007 
0 HR  159 1325 1.796 4.856 0.000 0.083 0.358 1.200 42.000 
Risk-constant 
2HR    3 1328 -2.000 0.000 -2.000 -2.000 -2.000 -2.000 -2.000 
0HR   486 1814 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
a
 The descriptive statistics, particularly the standard deviation of risk-increasing strategies, are driven by few very 
extreme outliers that are predominantly excluded in the reduced sample of 880 observations utilized in the 
regression analysis, as these outliers are denoted in Euro or unspecified ‘Other Currencies’, thus, benchmark gains 
or losses cannot be determined (see section 2.4.2).  
 
Overall, 62 firms provide the voluntary FX-data according to the recommended format of the 
registration document, as detailed in Table 1. Our dataset contains 1,814 firm-year observations, 
i.e., 1,814 observations for the exposure before hedging. Firms mainly report the information in 
the registration document in Euros, if not we converted the values to Euros using the relevant 
spot rates stated in the registration document. The exposure before hedging consists of assets 
minus liabilities plus the amount of forecasted positions. FX-assets (column [a]) and FX-
liabilities (column [b]) are specified in about 73 percent and 68 percent of the observations and 
average at 260.22 and 238.96 million Euros, respectively. Further, with an average of the 
forecasted positions of 30.00 million Euros, firms also report forecasted exposure (column [c]) as 
separate item in about 24 percent of the observations, of which 66 [34] percent are positive 
[negative], i.e., forecasted FX-sales [FX-purchases]. Instead of indicating forecasted exposure 
separately, firms often specify assets together with projected assets or firms only state the values 
for net exposure before hedging, which are then often elaborated on in the accompanying notes 
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to include forecast net exposure as well. Hence, we cannot retrieve the forecasted exposure 
separately at all times. As Table 3 Panel A further illustrates, the average exposure before 
hedging equals 44.35 million Euros, with a minimum of -3,992 and a maximum of 5,937 million 
Euros.15 Overall, the exposure before hedging is positive (long) in 70 percent of the 
observations, i.e., FX exposure is mainly driven by FX-receivables and forecasted FX-sales. On 
firm level, we also find that 45 of our 62 sample firms (73 percent) have a positive average 
exposure before hedging, which confirms that the exposure is predominantly long. A breakdown 
of the exposure before hedging by year reveals that it grows constantly from 33.80 million Euros 
in 2010 to 55.09 million Euros in 2014 and then slightly decreases to 52.75 million Euros in 
2015. Further, our dataset allows for a currency-specific analysis of FX positions, where we 
observe for the exposure before hedging 36 positive and 12 negative balances for the 48 
currencies in our sample. The top-5 currencies of the exposure before hedging of on average 
44.35 million Euros are in decreasing order the SEK, CNY, USD, ARS and GBP with the 
biggest positive (long) balances, and the EUR16, PGK, CZK, UAH, and AED with the biggest 
negative (short) balances.17  
How do our sample firms manage this – on average – long FX-exposure? Conventional theory 
on risk management would imply the usage of short derivative instruments, i.e., hedging in the 
opposite direction to the long exposure. The average amount of net hedging instruments does 
indeed account for -39.87 million Euros, ranging from -3,186 to 2,873 million Euros, where in 
68 percent of the observations the net value of hedging instruments is negative, i.e., short 
positions dominate. On firm level, 45 of our 62 sample firms (73 percent) have a negative 
average amount of hedging instruments, thus, also on firm level short hedges dominate. In 
addition to supplying the net amount of hedging instruments, some firms also separate their 
hedging activities into long and short positions. In around 15 percent [32 percent] of the 
observations, firms report long [short] FX hedging positions separately, with an average value of 
174.03 [-118.33] million Euros. These values do not add up to the average amount of net 
hedging instruments of -39.87 million Euros, since most firms only state the net amount of 
utilized hedging instruments, but the number of observations illustrates once more that our 
sample of French firms take more short than long hedging positions. During the sample period, 
                                                 
15  Determining the average exposure before hedging based on the averages (260.22 – 238.96 + 30.00) does 
not lead to 44.35 million Euros, provided some firms only specify the exposure before hedging directly 
without stating assets, liabilities, or forecasted positions separately.  
16  In general, the functional currency of our sample firms is the EUR, however, a few firms also report the 
EUR exposure of subsidiaries with a different functional currency (72 observations).  
17  Appendix 4 explains all currency codes.  
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the average net position of hedging instruments, in analogy to the exposure before hedging, 
decreases constantly from -24.63 million Euros in 2010 to -36.52 million Euros in 2014 and then 
slightly increases to -34.88 million Euros in 2015. Here, the top-5 hedging instruments in 
decreasing order are mainly driven by the negative balances of the USD, CNY, ARS, JPY, and 
SEK, and for positive balances of the EUR, CZK, DKK, AED and BHD. In total, for the 48 
currencies in our sample, we observe balances of hedging instruments that are positive in 9 
instances, negative in 31 instances, and zero in 8 instances, where the latter illustrates that the 
exposure in some currencies is not hedged.  
The average exposure after hedging of 15.16 million Euros, with a minimum of -2,015 and a 
maximum of 2,606 million Euros, illustrates that the long exposure before hedging has been 
significantly reduced with hedging instruments.18 While the exposure after hedging is positive 
[negative] in 59 [36] percent of the 1,814 observations, in 5 percent we observe an exposure after 
hedging equal to zero, i.e., firms fully hedged their initial FX exposure. On firm level, we also 
find that 37 of our 62 (60 percent) sample firms have a positive average exposure after hedging. 
Overall, the exposure after hedging increases constantly from 9.25 million Euros in 2010 to a 
peak value in 2013 of 21.38 million Euros and decreases subsequently to 17.87 million Euros in 
2015. A breakdown according to currencies shows that we have 18 negative, 1 zero, and 29 
positive balances of exposure after hedging. The top-10 currencies that drive the exposure after 
hedging differ from the currencies that are identified in the context of exposure before hedging, 
where now top-5 currencies in the context of exposure after hedging are the SEK, DKK, COP, 
GBP, and CNY with the greatest positive balance and the PGK, UAH, CZK, CHF and CLP 
with the greatest negative balance. Thus, firms seem to hedge the exposure in particular 
currencies to eliminate FX risk while the exposure in other currencies seems to be acceptable, 
i.e., is not hedged. 
2.3.3 Hedge Ratio Analysis  
To further analyze how firms manage their FX exposure, we summarize descriptive statistics of 
the hedge ratios in Panel B of Table 3. According to the six fundamental and empirically 
observed positions, the hedge ratio captures (a) risk-decreasing strategies that lower the FX 
exposure with   2 0HR ; (b) risk-increasing strategies that increase the FX exposure with 
                                                 
18  Due to the fact that not all positions of the exposure before hedging (1,814) are covered with hedging 
instruments (1,328), the average exposure after hedging of 15.16 million Euros is not simply the sum of the 
exposure before hedging (44.35 million Euros containing 1,814 non-zero positions) and hedging 
instruments net (-39.87 million Euros containing 1,328 non-zero derivative positions).  
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2HR    or 0HR  ; and (c) risk-constant strategies that keep the FX exposure on a constant 
level with  2HR  or  0HR . Further, a position with  1HR  is not necessarily identical to 
a full hedge position as known from the literature, e.g., Hull (2015), given that we do not exactly 
know time-to-maturity of the derivatives. When evaluating the data in Panel B of Table 3 we find 
that in approximately 61 percent (1,101 observations) of all aggregate currency positions (1,814 
observations) firms pursue a risk-decreasing strategy, of which less than 5 percent (82 
observations) represent a full hedge. These 5 percent of observations correspond to the cases 
where the exposure after hedging equals zero as described in section 2.3.2. Further, a risk-
increasing strategy accounts for approximately 12 percent (224 observations) of the sample and a 
risk-constant strategy accounts for approximately 27 percent (489 observations) of the sample.  
Overall, these findings are in line with the survey outcome of Gumb, Dupuy, Baker, and Blum 
(2018), who indicate that some treasury officials are willing to increase volatility, while other 
refuse to do so. Further, our findings relate to Zhang (2009), who distinguishes between 
effective hedgers and ineffective hedgers/speculators according to the development of their risk 
exposures compared to an expected level in the area of interest rate, foreign exchange rate, and 
commodity risk management. Out of 225 sample firms, Zhang (2009) classifies 125 firms (55 
percent) as effective hedgers and 87 firms (39 percent) as ineffective hedgers/speculators. The 
remaining 13 firms (6 percent) are categorized as neutral due to ambiguity, which leads to an 
overall 55 percent to 39 percent proportion of risk-decreasing vs. risk-increasing/neutral. 
Evaluating our sample with exclusively FX risk based on hedge ratios, we find that about 61 
percent of all currency positions can be classified as risk-decreasing and around 39 percent as 
risk-increasing/-constant. To account for the possibility that various risk-increasing positions in 
different currencies could aggregate to an overall hedged position we combine all risk-increasing 
positions per firm and year. We find no evidence of the existence of an overall hedged position. 
Further, solely evaluating the number of occurrences of risk-increasing or decreasing positions 
does not provide a detailed picture of the FX exposure of a firm given that a position with an 
exposure of 0.1 million Euros should not be treated as equally important as a position with an 
exposure of 100 million Euros. Thus, we evaluate the exposure before hedging per position to 
overall firm exposure and find that approximately 20 percent of firm exposure relate to risk-
increasing/-constant and 80 percent relate to risk-decreasing strategies.  
The fact that we find an increase in risk in 224 observations (12 percent) and that in 260 
observations (14 percent) firms take positions where the hedged FX amount is above the FX 
exposure but with an overall decrease in risk, i.e., where the hedge ratio is within the range of 
2 1HR    , deserves further scrutiny. First, we evaluate whether the data extracted from the 
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registration documents contain the relevant information, given that anecdotal evidence from 
indicative interviews with treasury executives suggests that hedge ratios that indicate an increase 
in risk could stem from missing forecasted transactions.19 In this context, the AMF requests 
firms to include forecasted exposure in the registration document, as illustrated in Table 1. While 
some firms specify assets together with projected assets or state the net before hedging, which is 
then often elaborated on in the accompanying notes to include forecast net exposure as well, 
others even state the forecasted exposure separately. Since the exposure before hedging also 
contains information on outstanding FX debt and the data on the exposure of foreign 
subsidiaries, the bias generated from an incomplete exposure before hedging should be limited. 
Second, the recent study of Gumb et al. (2018) provides interesting insights on the topic of risk-
increasing positions. In their survey, that covers the same time period and about 30 percent of 
the sample firms overlap with our sample, they interviewed 48 corporate treasurers and find that 
the behavior of treasurers is not uniform: while some managers refuse to increase volatility, 
others accept to do so. This evidence might explain the surprisingly high number of risk-
increasing observations.  
Across all observations, we find an average hedge ratio of about -0.90, that indicates that on 
average 90 percent of the FX exposure is hedged using a risk-decreasing strategy.20 The median 
hedge ratio of -0.49 indicates that in the median about 50 percent of the exposure are hedged. 
Further, we examine hedge ratios by firms where the average [median] hedge ratio of our 62 
sample firms is -0.77 [-0.42], i.e., on average [median] firms follow a risk-decreasing strategy in 
their positions and on average [median] firms do not hedge the entire exposure, but about 77 
[42] percent of it.21 When evaluating the descriptive statistics, we find that few very extreme 
outliers across our 1,814 hedge ratio observations affect particularly the standard deviation of the 
hedge ratio, i.e., lead to an overall standard deviation of 12.85, while for the subsample of risk-
decreasing positions the standard deviation ranges from 0.25 to 0.31. In general, the standard 
deviation for risk-increasing positions is by definition higher than for risk-decreasing positions, 
given that the range for risk-increasing positons potentially covers +/- infinity whereas the range 
for risk-decreasing positions is limited to a range of   2 0HR . However, when evaluating the 
                                                 
19  We interviewed four treasury executives of major German corporations, including two DAX-30 firms, to 
include professional opinions to validate our results. The main concern stated by the executives related to 
whether forecasted transactions were included in the reported information.  
20  This average hedge ratio of about 90 percent also corresponds to the observed average amount of 
exposure before hedging of 44.35 and average net hedging instruments of -39.87. 
21  The differing number of observations per company explains why the overall average hedge ratio (-0.90) is 
not equal to average hedge ratio per company (-0.77).  
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25th and 75th percentile it is visible that the majority of hedge ratios are within plausible ranges. 
Further, it should be noted that the few very extreme outliers are predominantly denoted in Euro 
or unspecified ‘Other Currencies’. Thus, they are excluded in the reduced sample of 880 
observations for the regression analysis as benchmark gains or losses cannot be determined (see 
section 2.4.2 for details and Table 4 for descriptive statistics related to the dependent variable in 
the regressions).  
Further, we evaluate whether firms hedge differently in specific years or in specific currencies. 
When breaking down the hedge ratio on a year-by-year basis, we find that, with the exception of 
the average hedge ratio in 2014, the average and median hedge ratios imply risk-decreasing 
strategies each year. Similarly, in terms of currencies, we note that the average and median hedge 
ratios per currency during the entire sample period display risk-decreasing strategies, with minor 
exceptions for a few currency averages. On firm level, we observe that overall 47 of our 62 
sample firms (76 percent) are responsible for the risk-increasing positions. Further, we find that 
11 of our 62 (18 percent) sample firms have an average hedge ratio that indicates a risk-
increasing strategy, i.e., these firms – on average – increase their exposure using derivative 
instruments. These 11 firms account for almost 16 percent of our total observations, but for 41 
percent of the total risk-increasing positions. In terms of industry classification, we find that the 
11 firms belong mainly to business service (4 firms, two digit SIC Code 73) and manufacturing (4 
firms, two digit SIC Code 23 and 36-38).  
In summary, we identify that the predominantly long FX exposure is hedged – on average 
[median] – to 90 [49] percent using predominately short derivative instruments. Further, we find 
that the majority of the taken positions decrease FX exposure with derivative instruments, but a 
non-negligible part of positions lead to an increase in FX exposure, with a very few extreme 
positions. We do not observe that firms hedge their FX exposure differently in specific years or 
in specific currencies. 
2.4 Influence of Prior Outcomes on Hedging Decisions 
2.4.1 Hypothesis 
Thus far, the paper has evaluated the FX exposure of our sample firms and how firms employ 
hedging instruments to manage the FX exposure. In addition, we provided evidence that firms 
pursue both risk-decreasing and risk-increasing strategies with derivative instruments. When 
evaluating extant literature, it has been documented that individual market views are 
incorporated into corporate risk management activities in the context of selective hedging (Adam 
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et al., 2015; Beber & Fabbri, 2012; Bodnar et al., 1998; Brown et al., 2006; Faulkender, 2005; 
Glaum, 2002; Tufano, 1996), where Adam and Fernando (2006) and Brown et al. (2006) 
compare cash flows from derivative transactions with benchmark cash flows to investigate 
whether firms gain or lose money from selective hedging. Moreover, the literature also 
documents the relevance of these prior outcomes on risk attitudes and decision-making. While 
Thaler and Johnson (1990) as well as Weber and Zuchel (2005) provide evidence from 
experimental settings, Adam et al. (2015) and Beber and Fabbri (2012) substantiate this evidence 
with empirical analyses on the impact of prior outcomes in an FX and commodity context. 
Beber and Fabbri (2012) focus on the influence of prior outcomes on corporate FX risk 
management practices and find that managers adjust FX derivative holdings in response to prior 
foreign exchange returns. Adam et al. (2015) evaluate the impact of prior selective hedging gains 
and losses in the context of commodity (gold) risk management and document that managers 
alter their FX hedging behavior in response to prior outcomes.  
Overall, the above findings suggest that management considers prior hedging outcomes when 
managing its current exposure. Thus, using our unique FX-dataset, we re-evaluate the hypothesis 
that prior outcomes influence present FX hedge decisions. Since the data granularity allows for 
the calculation of firm-, currency-, and year-specific hedge ratios and, hence, the differentiation 
of risk-decreasing and risk-increasing strategies, we also evaluate the impact of prior outcomes 
on present FX hedge decisions for risk-decreasing and risk-increasing strategies separately and, 
thus, complement the work of Adam et al. (2015) and Beber and Fabbri (2012). 
2.4.2 Definition of Benchmark Gains and Losses and Methodology 
To test whether FX hedging decisions are affected by prior outcomes, we develop a measure to 
quantify the past performance of hedging activities. In analogy to Brown et al. (2006), we 
measure past performance relative to a benchmark scenario based on the average hedge ratio, 
which is interpreted as proxy for a firm’s hedging policy. In our case, this benchmark value is 
calculated using a firm- and currency-specific average hedge ratio for the sample period.22 Similar 
to Adam et al. (2015) and Brown et al. (2006), we attribute deviations from the firm’s hedging 
policy to the incorporation of market views, i.e., selective hedging, and determine based on this 
deviation the benchmark gains and losses. To determine benchmark gains and losses, we rely on 
                                                 
22  In unreported robustness checks, we replace the benchmark scenario using the firm- and currency-specific 
average hedge ratio with the respective median hedge ratio. As further alternative, we use the firm-specific 
average hedge ratio across all currencies. Our results are robust to the different specifications of 
benchmark scenarios.  
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the mechanism of currency forwards given that the recent study of Albouy and Dupuy (2017) 
indicates that for French non-financial firms FX forwards are by far the most utilized hedging 
instruments. Further, we are not able to determine maturities of the FX derivative contracts and 
assume an average of one-year maturities, given that most firms report times to maturity that 
approximately correspond to this time frame in the registration document.23  
The following numerical illustration describes the calculation of these benchmark gains or losses. 
Assume, a firm reports its USD exposure before hedging with 100 USD in t  and hedges 80 
USD short. The corresponding hedge ratio for this USD exposure in t  equals 
  E 80 100 0.8bt t tHR H . Further, assume that the firm’s average hedge ratio ( HR ) for the 
USD for the entire sample period is 50 percent (  0.5tHR ), where we attribute the deviation of 
30 percentage points (80 percent minus 50 percent) to selective hedging. This difference between 
the average hedged amount and the actual hedged amount, here 30 USD (100 USD   0.30), is 
used to determine benchmark gains or losses. The amount of 30 USD could be converted to 
EUR by either hedging the entire 30 USD, i.e., an application of the actual hedge ratio of the 
transaction (  0.8tHR ), or leaving the amount unhedged, i.e., implicitly assuming the 
application of the average hedge ratio of the firm (  0.5tHR ) and leaving 30 USD unhedged. 
Thus, if the forward rate of USD to EUR in t  is 1.5 and the spot rate in 1t   is 1.2, the cash 
flow resulting from hedging 30 USD equals 20 EUR (30/1.5 = 20), and the cash flow from not 
hedging the 30 USD results in 25 EUR (30/1.2 = 25). Thus, the decision to deviate from the 
hedging policy and hedge not only 50 but 80 USD yields a benchmark loss of -5 EUR (20 EUR 
minus 25 EUR). Generally speaking, benchmark gains and losses depend on the deviation in 
hedge ratios (actual hedge ratio vs. benchmark hedge ratio) and the currency development. To 
determine benchmark gains and losses, we match our sample with FX spot and 1-year forward 
rates corresponding to the particular reporting dates in the appropriate currency, obtained from 
Bloomberg. Further, we match firm characteristics as controls, obtained from the Compustat 
Global Vantage database.  
To evaluate the impact of prior outcomes, i.e., benchmark gains and losses, on FX hedge 
decisions we rescale the hedge ratio ( HR ) according to  
                                                 
23  For instance, some firms state that their instruments mature within a year, others state that they hedge over 
a period not exceeding one year unless a longer period is justified by probable commitments. Other firms 
also indicate in the registration document that their forward transactions do not exceed maturities of 2 
years, or that they are hedging at year-end for the following year. Taken together, we deem the compromise 
of assuming one-year maturities as appropriate. Appendix 3 provides examples on the maturity of FX 
derivatives from registration documents.   
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  * 1  t tHR HR   . (1) 
Rescaling converts the discontinuous scale, in terms of risk-increasing and risk-decreasing, to a 
continuous and interpretable scale with a minimum of zero and a maximum of infinity. Now, an 
increase [decrease] in *tHR  implies an unambiguous increase [decrease] in FX risk exposure, 
unlike for the raw hedge ratio detailed in Table 2. Further, the range between 0 and 1 of *
t
HR  is 
associated with risk-decreasing and the range between 1 and   represents risk-increasing 
positions. Exemplary, a FX position resulting in * 0
t
HR  relates to a full hedge (according to 
our definition of full hedge), * 1
t
HR  is equal to a zero hedge, i.e., FX exposure remains 
constant, and * 1.5
t
HR  denotes a 50 percent increase in the FX exposure.  
To evaluate the impact of prior benchmark gains and losses on FX hedging decisions we 
evaluate the change in *
t
HR  according to 
 * * * 1t t tHR HR HR      . (2) 
We estimate OLS regression with and without fixed effects on firm and firm-currency level. The 
regression model is specified according to  
                 
*
1 1 1 2 2 1 3t t t t t tHR I BGL I BGL FXEvo Controls   ,  (3) 
where t  identifies time and we omit firm- and currency-specific identifiers to increase 
readability. Following Adam et al. (2015), we include dummy variables ( 1I  and 2I ) to separately 
evaluate the impact of prior benchmark gains and losses ( 1tBGL ) in t , where 1I  [ 2I ] is equal to 
one if the benchmark gain/loss in the prior period was positive [negative] and zero otherwise. 
Benchmark gains and losses are scaled with the absolute value of the exposure before hedging to 
control for size effects and converted to positive values to allow for easy interpretation of the 
estimated regression coefficients. We include a lagged dummy variable ( tFXEvo ) that takes the 
value of 0 [1] if the FX rate developed in favor of [against] the FX position of the firm, where we 
define a positive [negative] exposure in a currency that depreciates [appreciates] as being against 
[in] a firm’s favor.24 Further, we include in tControls  several variables to control for alternative 
                                                 
24  For example, the spot exchange rate between the USD and the EUR in t  is 1.2 and in 1t   1.3. Then, an 
exposure of 100 USD can be translated into EUR in t  with 100/1.2 = 83.33 and in 1t   with 100/1.3 = 
76.92. Since the value of the FX position in EUR decreased, the FX rate developed against the firm.  
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explanations. We control for financial distress using the Debt Ratio , given that that firms in 
financial distress are more prone to speculate on financial markets (Campbell & Kracaw, 1999; 
Stulz, 1996). We define the Debt Ratio  as total liabilities over total assets, similar to Beber and 
Fabbri (2012). In addition, firms with less growth opportunities might be inclined to speculate 
since they are supposed to suffer less from speculative losses, whereas firms with multiple 
investment opportunities might be better off with hedging to prevent becoming financially 
constrained and, as a consequence, suffer from underinvestment (Campbell & Kracaw, 1999; 
Froot, Scharfstein, & Stein, 1993). In line with the arguments of Géczy, Minton, and Schrand 
(2007) 25 we do not use the book-to-market ratio as measure for growth opportunities but follow 
Beber and Fabbri (2012) and use the ratio of capital expenditures over total revenues (Growth ). 
Finally, financial strength might endow firms with excess cash that could be used for speculative 
purposes if appropriate control mechanisms are missing (Jensen, 1986). Also, possessing a cash 
cushion generates higher tolerance for volatility in results (Stulz, 1996). Thus, we control for firm 
liquidity using the Quick Ratio , defined as cash, short-term investments, and total receivables 
over total current liabilities, similar to other studies (Beber & Fabbri, 2012; Géczy et al., 2007). 
All variables are defined in Appendix 4. We winsorize Debt Ratio , Quick Ratio , and Growth  to 
the 1st and 99th percentile to eliminate the effect of outliers. All other variables are not winsorized 
given that that this data is hand-collected and all data points are meaningful. Finally, we drop 
risk-constant positions to avoid a ‘do-nothing’ bias and drop all observations where control 
variables are missing, as well as, all currency positions originally denoted in Euro and unspecified 
‘Other Currencies’, where benchmark gains or losses cannot be determined26, which leaves a 
sample of 880 observations across 57 firms and 35 currencies.  
2.4.3 Empirical Results  
2.4.3.1 Main Regression Findings 
Table 4 illustrates descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression for the reduced 
sample and the subsamples of risk-increasing (RI-subsample) and risk-decreasing (RD-
subsample) positions, where the difference between the means in *tHR  of the two subsamples is 
                                                 
25  Géczy et al. (2007) state that off-balance sheet correlations with speculation could lead to potential 
misinterpretations.  
26  In general, the functional currency of our sample firms is the Euro, however a few firms also report the 
Euro exposure of subsidiaries with a different functional currency (72 observations). Similarly, some firms 
do not specify the currency of their exposure explicitly but label it ‘Other Currencies’ (82 observations). 
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highly significant with RD - RI = -5.09 (t-statistic = -10.08). The standard deviation, minimum, 
and maximum values of *tHR , especially for the RI-subsample, indicate that some decision-
makers attempt to take advantage of individual market views and that few extreme views exist. 
Further, we find that average benchmark gains and losses differ between the subsamples. Risk-
increasing strategies on average yield a benchmark gain [loss] of 0.10 [0.16], compared to a 
benchmark gain [loss] of 0.02 [0.02] for risk-decreasing. The maximum benchmark gain [loss] in 
risk-increasing positions amounts to 1.93 [5.51] and is substantially higher than the maximum 
benchmark gain [loss] of risk-decreasing positions with 0.83 [1.12]. Further, the standard 
deviation of both benchmark gains and losses is substantially higher for the risk-increasing than 
for the risk-decreasing sample.  
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables  
This table reports summary statistics for the regression model across our reduced sample with a total of 880 
observations for the dependent and independent variables separately for the overall sample (ALL), risk-increasing 
(RI), and risk-decreasing (RD). HR  is defined as Ebt t tHR H , where tH  denotes hedging instruments and 
b
tE  
denotes the exposure before hedging in t .The dependent variable *HR  is the result of the standardization 
* 1  t tHR HR  , where now 
*
tHR  can only take positive values from 0 to   and the range between 0 and 1 is 
associated with risk-decreasing and range 1 to   represents risk-increasing strategies. Benchmark gains and losses 
are defined in section 2.4.2. Debt Ratio  is defined as total liabilities over total assets, Quick Ratio  is cash, short-term 
investments, and total receivables over total current liabilities, and Growth  is capital expenditures over total 
revenues. FXEvo  is a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 [1] if the FX rate developed in favor of [against] the 
FX position of the firm, where a positive [negative] exposure in a currency that depreciates [appreciates] is against 
[in] a firm’s favor.  ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively, with 
t-statistics in parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix 4. 
 
 
  
 
  No.Obs Mean SD Min p25 p50 p75 Max 
ALL  *HR   880 0.979 5.424 0.000 0.042 0.247 0.701 128.375 
  Benchmark Gains  441 0.030 0.122 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.014 1.926 
 
 Benchmark Losses   439 0.042 0.278 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.023 5.513 
 
 Debt Ratio   880 0.142 0.104 0.000 0.070 0.133 0.214 0.448 
 
 Quick Ratio   880 1.031 0.446 0.349 0.750 0.946 1.216 2.965 
 
 Growth   880 0.045 0.026 0.006 0.026 0.041 0.058 0.124 
 
 FXEvo   880 0.470 0.499 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
RI  *HR   120 5.374 13.936 1.001 1.169 1.739 3.020 128.375 
  Benchmark Gains  60 0.103 0.293 0.000 0.001 0.008 0.053 1.926 
  Benchmark Losses   60 0.159 0.723 0.000 0.001 0.014 0.060 5.513 
  Debt Ratio   120 0.137 0.087 0.000 0.082 0.120 0.214 0.379 
  Quick Ratio   120 0.923 0.320 0.349 0.773 0.879 1.008 1.905 
  Growth   120 0.041 0.028 0.006 0.019 0.035 0.058 0.124 
  FXEvo   120 0.492 0.502 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
RD  *HR   760 0.285 0.301 0.000 0.026 0.165 0.500 0.999 
  Benchmark Gains  381 0.018 0.055 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.013 0.828 
  Benchmark Losses   379 0.023 0.073 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.018 1.119 
 
 Debt Ratio   760 0.143 0.106 0.000 0.058 0.135 0.214 0.448 
 
 Quick Ratio   760 1.048 0.461 0.349 0.746 0.953 1.278 2.965 
 
 Growth   760 0.045 0.026 0.006 0.026 0.041 0.058 0.124 
 
 FXEvo   760 0.467 0.499 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
  Difference *HR (t-Statistic): RD – RI : -5.089*** (-10.084) 
 
Following our hypothesis, we test whether management refers to prior hedging outcomes when 
managing its current exposure, i.e., we examine the relationship between prior hedging outcomes 
and subsequent hedge ratio variation. Our main findings are detailed in Table 5, where we 
evaluate our hypothesis based on OLS regression models (models (1) to (3)) with and without 
firm fixed effects (models (4) to (6)) and firm-currency fixed effects (models (7) to (9)) with 
cluster-robust standard errors. We focus on the impact of prior benchmark gains and losses on 
 *
t
HR . Model (1), (4), and (7) report the results for the overall sample (ALL-sample), consisting 
of 880 firm-year-currency observations without a distinction between risk-decreasing and risk-
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increasing strategies. For the ALL-sample, we find that  *
t
HR  decreases, i.e., *HR  decreases, 
following prior benchmark losses. Thus, after benchmark losses management hedges more of its 
exposure. Further, when focusing on the RI-subsample, i.e., model (2), (5), and (8), we observe 
very similar results, where prior benchmark losses decrease  *
t
HR  and the magnitudes of the 
estimates for the RI-subsample are similar to the estimates of the ALL-sample. However, when 
evaluating the RD-subsample, i.e., model (3), (6), and (9), we find that prior benchmark losses 
have no significant influence on  *
t
HR . With regard to prior benchmark gains, we observe weak 
significant reactions for models (7) to (9) on a 10 percent significance level, where we control for 
firm-currency fixed effects. Overall, we only find a reaction following prior benchmark losses for 
the ALL- and RI-subsample.  
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Table 5: Effect of Prior Outcomes on the Hedge Ratio Variation 
This table reports the estimation results of the OLS regression (models (1) to (3)) with and without firm fixed effects (models (4) to (6)) and firm-currency fixed effects (models (7) 
to (9)). The dependent variable is the difference in standardized hedge ratios ( * * * 1t t tHR HR HR    ) with standardization 
* 1  t tHR HR  . As a result of the standardization, 
*
tHR  can only take positive values from 0 to  , where the range between 0 and 1 is associated with risk-decreasing and range 1 to   represents risk-increasing strategies. 
Independent variables include prior benchmark gains and losses defined in section 2.4.2. Debt Ratio  is defined as total liabilities over total assets, Quick Ratio  is cash, short-term 
investments, and total receivables over total current liabilities, and Growth  is capital expenditures over total revenues. FXEvo  is a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 [1] if the 
FX rate developed in favor of [against] the FX position of the firm, where a positive [negative] exposure in a currency that depreciates [appreciates] is against [in] a firm’s favor. 
Model (1), (4), and (7) refer to the results for the entire sample (ALL), model (2), (5), and (8) and (3), (6), and (9) separately evaluate risk-increasing (RI) and risk-decreasing (RD) 
strategies. All models are estimated using cluster-robust standard errors, where we cluster on firm level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
level, respectively, with t-statistics in parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix 4. 
    (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
 
 ALL RI RD  ALL RI RD  ALL RI RD 
VARIABLES  *tHR  
*
tHR  
*
tHR  
 *
tHR  
*
tHR  
*
tHR  
 *
tHR  
*
tHR  
*
tHR  
Benchmark Gains  10.159 12.071 -7.507  9.035 12.150 -7.057  -14.436* -11.474* -17.588* 
 
 (0.742) (0.690) (-1.490)  (0.681) (0.648) (-1.446)  (-1.790) (-1.669) (-1.786) 
Benchmark Losses  -13.273*** -14.357*** -8.550  -13.876*** -15.712*** -7.916  -28.517*** -27.979*** -17.139* 
 
 (-3.526) (-4.409) (-1.251)  (-3.773) (-7.493) (-1.077)  (-7.268) (-7.920) (-1.870) 
Debt Ratio   0.525 2.166 0.211  0.741 20.924 2.291  4.286 31.044 3.165 
 
 (0.404) (0.158) (0.272)  (0.180) (1.016) (0.831)  (1.474) (1.287) (1.545) 
Quick Ratio   0.366 6.953 0.122  0.048 9.102 0.088  -0.167 9.687 0.175 
 
 (1.292) (1.665) (1.227)  (0.063) (1.257) (1.054)  (-0.375) (1.228) (1.116) 
Growth   -5.155 -29.599 -0.239  0.752 -9.646 8.261  0.650 -19.479 8.219 
 
 (-1.056) (-0.827) (-0.095)  (0.064) (-0.186) (1.304)  (0.073) (-0.358) (1.053) 
FXEvo   0.073 0.584 -0.004  -0.008 1.683 0.028  0.124 3.777 0.074 
 
 (0.310) (0.355) (-0.071)  (-0.031) (0.951) (0.675)  (0.375) (1.530) (0.725) 
No. Obs.  880 120 760  880 120 760  880 120 760 
Adjusted 2R   0.197 0.218 0.107  0.207 0.278 0.093  0.513 0.594 0.143 
Firm FE  NO NO NO  YES YES YES  NO NO NO 
Firm-Currency FE  NO NO NO  NO NO NO  YES YES YES 
Number of Groups         57 36 54  246 66 235 
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In line with the extant literature, our overall results indicate that management is impacted by 
prior outcomes when managing its FX exposure. In detail, we find that previous benchmark 
losses induce a subsequent exposure reduction. Further, the granularity of our dataset allows for 
a differentiation of risk-decreasing and risk-increasing strategies (RD- and RI-subsample). 
Evaluating these subsamples separately, we provide evidence that prior outcomes are only 
relevant for risk-increasing, but not for risk-decreasing strategies. While we find that the FX 
exposure is decreased following prior benchmark losses for risk-increasing strategies, prior 
benchmark gains and losses have no impact on the hedging decision when evaluating risk-
decreasing strategies.  
In addition to the evidence that previous benchmark losses induce a subsequent exposure 
reduction for the ALL- and RI-sample, we evaluate whether management adjusts the hedge ratio 
closer to the average hedge ratio ( HR ) in response to benchmark gains and losses, i.e., reverts 
back to the hedging policy. We construct a dependent variable that captures the change of the 
deviation of the absolute difference of the actual hedge ratio to the average hedge ratio per firm 
and currency from 1t   to t  according to 
 1t t tBenchmark HR HR HR HR       . (4) 
Thus, an increase in  tBenchmark  implies a larger deviation from the average hedge ratio in the 
current period than in the prior period, a decrease implies a smaller deviation from the average 
hedge ratio in the current period than in the prior period. The estimates are presented in Table 6, 
where we estimate OLS regression models with cluster-robust standard errors in analogy to the 
main analysis from Table 5. We find that prior benchmark gains and losses are significant for the 
ALL-sample and RI-subsample and that the estimated coefficients are negative. Our results 
indicate that after benchmark losses the difference to the average hedge ratio is smaller 
compared to the previous period. Thus, in response to benchmark losses, management adjusts 
the hedge ratio to a value closer to the average benchmark hedge ratio for the RI-subsample. 
When evaluating the risk-decreasing subsample, however, we find that prior benchmark losses 
have no impact on  tBenchmark  except for model (9), where we find a weak significant impact 
for prior gains and losses. Overall, we find evidence that in response to benchmark losses 
management adjusts the hedge ratio to a value closer to the average benchmark hedge ratio for 
the RI-subsample, this is not the case for the RD-subsample. 
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Table 6: Effect of Prior Outcomes on the Deviation from the Average Hedge Ratio 
This table reports the estimation results of the OLS regression (models (1) to (3)) with and without firm fixed effects (models (4) to (6)) and firm-currency fixed effects (models (7) 
to (9)). The dependent variable  tBenchmark  captures the absolute deviation of the actual hedge ratio to the average hedge ratio per firm and currency in t  minus the absolute 
deviation in 1t   and is defined in (4). Independent variables include prior benchmark gains and losses defined in section 2.4.2. Debt Ratio  is defined as total liabilities over total 
assets, Quick Ratio  is cash, short-term investments, and total receivables over total current liabilities, and Growth  is capital expenditures over total revenues. FXEvo  is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 0 [1] if the FX rate developed in favor of [against] the FX position of the firm, where a positive [negative] exposure in a currency that depreciates 
[appreciates] is against [in] a firm’s favor. Model (1), (4), and (7) refer to the results for the entire sample (ALL), model (2), (5), and (8) and (3), (6), and (9) separately evaluate risk-
increasing (RI) and risk-decreasing (RD) strategies. All models are estimated using cluster-robust standard errors, where we cluster on firm level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively, with t-statistics in parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix 4.  
    (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
 
 ALL RI RD  ALL RI RD  ALL RI RD 
VARIABLES   tBenchmark   tBenchmark   tBenchmark  
  tBenchmark   tBenchmark   tBenchmark  
  tBenchmark   tBenchmark   tBenchmark  
Benchmark Gains  -0.378 -0.756 -3.165  -0.906 -1.184 -2.961  -11.158* -9.836 -18.488* 
 
 (0.11) (0.17) (0.71)  (0.28) (0.25) (0.67)  (2.09) (1.84) (2.03) 
Benchmark Losses  -13.940** -14.847** -7.315  -14.194** -15.475** -7.290  -20.259** -19.660** -19.309* 
 
 (4.81) (6.60) (1.17)  (5.01) (9.90) (1.05)  (8.19) (8.18) (2.40) 
Debt Ratio   -0.074 -1.571 0.236  1.573 13.071 2.170  3.597 21.715 2.742 
 
 (0.08) (0.18) (0.34)  (0.52) (1.01) (0.90)  (1.49) (1.25) (1.50) 
Quick Ratio   0.127 3.539 0.075  0.017 6.080 0.081  -0.215 5.515 0.202 
 
 (0.66) (1.28) (0.88)  (0.03) (1.18) (0.98)  (0.61) (0.99) (1.40) 
Growth   -1.410 1.120 -0.908  1.658 -7.842 8.961  2.206 -12.497 8.753 
 
 (0.50) (0.04) (0.44)  (0.21) (0.23) (1.88)  (0.39) (0.36) (1.46) 
FXEvo   -0.027 -0.230 -0.050  -0.081 0.600 -0.045  -0.001 2.620 -0.016 
 
 (0.17) (0.21) (0.87)  (0.41) (0.46) (0.78)  (0.00) (1.62) (0.18) 
No. Obs.  880 120 760  880 120 760  880 120 760 
Adjusted 2R   0.363 0.427 0.088  0.367 0.478 0.087  0.480 0.586 0.227 
Firm FE  NO NO NO  YES YES YES  NO NO NO 
Firm-Currency FE  NO NO NO  NO NO NO  YES YES YES 
Number of Groups         57 36 54  246 66 235 
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2.4.3.2 Robustness of Results  
Our main finding that management is influenced by prior outcomes when managing its 
exposure, where these prior outcomes seem to be only relevant for risk-increasing strategies, 
hinges on two specifications: first on the specification of prior benchmark gains and losses and 
second on the separation of the sample into the RD-subsample and the RI-subsample. To 
illustrate the robustness of our main finding we alter the parameters for both specifications.  
First, we modify the calculation of prior benchmark gains and losses by adjusting the calculation 
of the benchmark hedge ratio: it can be argued that the average hedge ratio includes information 
from 1t   at decision time t  since the average hedge ratio is defined as the average across all 
sample periods independent of the period where benchmark gains and losses are calculated. Now 
benchmark gains and losses are calculated based on an average hedge ratio that is the average of 
all past hedge ratios, i.e., it is time-dependent and includes only hedge ratios from prior periods 
in the calculation of the average hedge ratio. The estimations in Table 7 illustrate that this 
modification of determining prior benchmark gains and losses does not affect our main findings. 
We still observe statistically significant reactions to prior benchmark losses for the ALL-sample 
and RI-subsample, whereas estimated coefficients of prior benchmark losses in the RD-
subsample are statistically not significant. Thus, results in Table 7 support our main findings and 
we conclude that our results do not depend on the particular specification of gains and losses. 
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Table 7: Alternative Specification of Benchmark Gains and Losses  
This table reports the estimation results for an alternative specification of prior benchmark gains and losses for OLS regression (models (1) to (3)) with and without firm fixed 
effects (models (4) to (6)) and firm-currency fixed effects (models (7) to (9)) based on an average hedge ratio that is the average of all past hedge ratios, i.e., the average hedge ratio 
used to determine benchmark gains and losses only includes past hedge ratios. The dependent variable is the difference in standardized hedge ratios ( * * * 1t t tHR HR HR    ) with 
standardization * 1  t tHR HR  . As a result of the standardization, 
*
tHR  can only take positive values from 0 to  , where the range between 0 and 1 is associated with risk 
management (0 refers to a full hedge where the entire exposure is hedged) and range 1 to   represents speculation. Independent variables include prior benchmark gains and losses 
defined in section 2.4.2. Debt Ratio  is defined as total liabilities over total assets, Quick Ratio  is cash, short-term investments, and total receivables over total current l liabilities, and 
Growth  is capital expenditures over total revenues. FXEvo  is a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 [1] if the FX rate developed in favor of [against] the FX position of the 
firm, where a positive [negative] exposure in a currency that depreciates [appreciates] is against [in] a firm’s favor. Model (1), (4), and (7) refer to the results for the entire sample 
(ALL), model (2), (5), and (8) and (3), (6), and (9) separately evaluate risk-increasing (RI) and risk-decreasing (RD) strategies. All models are estimated using cluster-robust standard 
errors, where we cluster on firm level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively, with t-statistics in parentheses. All variables are 
defined in Appendix 4. 
    (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
 
 ALL RI RD  ALL RI RD  ALL RI RD 
VARIABLES  *tHR  
*
tHR  
*
tHR  
 *
tHR  
*
tHR  
*
tHR  
 *
tHR  
*
tHR  
*
tHR  
Benchmark Gains  -1.074 -0.484 -8.151  -1.127 -0.338 -8.304**  -5.578*** -9.254*** -2.776 
 
 (-0.371) (-0.110) (-1.941)  (-0.349) (-0.063) (-2.020)  (-4.458) (-3.355) (-0.467) 
Benchmark Losses  -12.259*** -12.623*** -12.752  -12.227*** -12.289*** -13.564  -15.909*** -15.444*** -13.217 
 
 (-69.899) (-84.532) (-1.960)  (-77.478) (-44.042) (-1.609)  (-40.431) (-47.133) (-1.488) 
Debt Ratio   0.476 1.056 0.920  4.084 31.327 3.562  6.114 47.219 2.545 
 
 (0.338) (0.090) (1.033)  (0.770) (1.383) (1.005)  (1.428) (1.526) (0.932) 
Quick Ratio   0.273 4.672 0.160  -0.099 8.734 0.316  -0.335 14.708 0.534 
 
 (0.944) (1.219) (1.280)  (-0.126) (0.771) (1.566)  (-0.661) (1.087) (1.664) 
Growth   -0.714 -10.931 0.909  -2.812 -81.689 15.532  -5.490 -167.084 18.441 
 
 (-0.238) (-0.379) (0.313)  (-0.150) (-0.562) (1.334)  (-0.328) (-1.118) (1.272) 
FXEvo   -0.037 -0.194 -0.011  0.013 2.077 0.043  0.087 6.565 0.076 
 
 (-0.136) (-0.116) (-0.125)  (0.039) (0.816) (0.606)  (0.214) (1.597) (0.602) 
No. Obs.  662 92 570  662 92 570  662 92 570 
Adjusted 2R   0.479 0.543 0.145  0.476 0.609 0.135  0.491 0.692 0.109 
Firm FE  NO NO NO  YES YES YES  NO NO NO 
Firm-Currency FE  NO NO NO  NO NO NO  YES YES YES 
Number of Groups         56 32 53  204 59 193 
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Further, the result that prior outcomes are only relevant for risk-increasing strategies may be 
dependent on the utilized classification strategy when separating the FX positions into risk-
increasing or risk-decreasing. To test for robustness, we introduce three alternative approaches. 
First, we want to ensure that reclassification on a periodical basis does not induce a bias and, 
hence, eliminate positions that switch classification between two periods, i.e., we eliminate 
positions that are classified as risk-increasing in t  and as risk-decreasing in 1t  , or vice versa. 
Second, we introduce two different classification strategies to classify FX positions as RD- and 
RI-subsample. Here we first assume that extreme benchmark gains or losses (1st and 4th quartile 
of the distribution of benchmark gains or losses) are the result of risk-increasing strategies while 
moderate outcomes – within the 25th and 75th percentile of the distribution of benchmark gains 
or losses – are the result of risk-decreasing strategies. Thus, we calculate for all firms and 
currencies the benchmark gains or losses using the average hedge ratio per firm and currency. 
Then, currency positions are classified as RD [RI]-subsample if firm benchmark gains or losses 
are between [outside] the 25th and 75th percentile of the distribution. Third, we base the 
classification strategy on the firm-specific standard deviation of hedge ratios per year across all 
currencies. This classification strategy captures the magnitude of changes to the hedge ratio of 
each firm. All standard deviation values across all years and firms are then ordered and firms are 
classified in the RD [RI]-subsample if the standard deviation is in the lower [upper] half of the 
scale. Based on these three different classification schemes we estimate the OLS-models in 
analogy to the main findings, where Table 8 reports the results. Estimates from the ALL-sample 
are omitted given that they are reported in Table 5.  
Overall, our results are robust to an adjustment of the classification strategy of our subsamples. 
Dropping aggregate currency positions that switch between the RD- and RI-subsample across 
time, does not alter our main findings (models (1) to (6) in Table 8). The results, in general, are 
very similar to those reported in Table 5, where for the RI-subsample (models (1), (3), and (5)) 
we find a statistically significant effect of prior benchmark losses while for the RD-subsample we 
do not observe this effect. The adjustment of the classification strategy to relate to benchmark 
gains or losses (models (7) to (12) in Table 8) and the adjustment of the classification strategy to 
relate to above-median [below-median] standard deviation of firm hedge ratios (models (13) to 
(18) in Table 8) both support our main findings, where we find that the reaction to prior 
benchmark losses is statistically significant for the RI but not for the RD-subsample. Overall, our 
estimations for modified classification strategies regarding the RD- and RI-subsample support 
our main findings and we infer that our findings are not the consequence of a specific sample 
classification strategy.  
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Table 8: Alternative Specifications of Subsample-Selection into Risk-Increasing and Risk-Decreasing 
This table reports the estimation results of the OLS regression with and without firm fixed effects and firm-currency fixed effects for three alternative classification strategies of the 
risk-decreasing (RD)- and risk-increasing (RI)-subsamples. Models (1) to (6) refer to a specification where a FX position is only classified as RI [RD] if the classification in the prior 
period was also RI [RD]. Models (7) to (12) refer to a specification where the classification as RD- or RI-subsample is based on resulting prior gains or losses. Here we assume that 
extreme gains/losses are the result of RI-activities while moderate gains/losses – within the 25th and 75th percentile – are the result of RD activities. Models (13) to (18) refer to a 
specification where the classification as RD- or RI-subsample is based on the standard deviation of the average firm hedge ratios per year across firm currencies. All standard 
deviation values across all years and firms are ordered and firms are classified as RD [RI]-subsample if the standard deviation is in the lower [upper] half of the scale. The dependent 
variable is the difference in standardized hedge ratios ( * * * 1t t tHR HR HR    ) with standardization 
* 1  t tHR HR  . As a result of the standardization, 
*
tHR  can only take 
positive values from 0 to  , where the range between 0 and 1 is associated with risk-decreasing and range 1 to   represents risk-increasing strategies. Independent variables 
include prior benchmark gains and losses, defined in section 2.4.2. Debt Ratio  is defined as total liabilities over total assets, Quick Ratio  is cash, short-term investments, and total 
receivables over total current liabilities, and Growth  is capital expenditures over total revenues. FXEvo  is a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 [1] if the FX rate developed in 
favor of [against] the FX position of the firm, where a positive [negative] exposure in a currency that depreciates [appreciates] is against [in] a firm’s favor. All models are estimated 
using cluster-robust standard errors, where we cluster on firm level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively, with t-statistics in 
parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix 4. 
  Only AS [RM] if Prior Period was also AS [RM]   Classification Based on Gains/Losses   Classification Based on Standard Deviation (Firm-Level) 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12)  (13) (14)   (15) (16)   (17) (18) 
  RI RD  RI RD  RI RD  RI RD  RI RD  RI RD  RI RD  RI RD  RI RD 
VARIABLES  
*
tHR  
*
tHR   
*
tHR  
*
tHR   
*
tHR  
*
tHR   
*
tHR  
*
tHR   
*
tHR  
*
tHR   
*
tHR  
*
tHR   
*
tHR  
*
tHR   
*
tHR  
*
tHR   
*
tHR  
*
tHR  
Benchmark Gains  -2.166 -1.025  -2.115 -1.207  -9.739*** -1.463  10.003 45.103  9.185 55.558  -14.108* -70.840  9.898 -2.204  9.273 -4.560***  -14.488* -6.087* 
 
 (-0.462) (-1.445)  (-0.406) (-1.462)  (-3.336) (-1.243)  (0.727) (0.485)  (0.687) (0.510)  (-1.716) (-0.639)  (0.716) (-0.766)  (0.678) (-3.118)  (-1.734) (-1.915) 
Benchmark Losses  -16.249*** -0.130  -16.243*** 0.296  -20.048*** 0.339  -13.370*** -32.413  -14.143*** -19.912  -28.505*** -49.438  -13.524*** -5.160  -13.932*** -5.251  -28.615*** -6.439 
 
 (-83.267) (-0.163)  (-62.701) (0.290)  (-42.415) (0.198)  (-3.574) (-0.946)  (-3.945) (-1.016)  (-7.147) (-1.340)  (-3.642) (-1.428)  (-3.742) (-1.624)  (-7.351) (-1.312) 
Debt Ratio   14.760 0.065  100.096 0.230  91.566 0.295  0.967 -0.096  4.050 -1.653  8.523 -1.208  -1.601 -0.020  -0.382 1.259  7.095 1.219 
 
 (1.548) (0.850)  (0.966) (0.941)  (1.224) (0.852)  (0.368) (-0.310)  (0.576) (-1.536)  (1.556) (-1.224)  (-0.613) (-0.085)  (-0.043) (1.144)  (1.069) (1.188) 
Quick Ratio   0.405 0.015  -2.134 -0.026  11.189 -0.009  0.600 -0.040  0.122 0.035  -0.156 0.096  2.227** 0.010  0.063 0.016  -0.433 0.014 
 
 (0.292) (0.949)  (-0.184) (-0.280)  (0.597) (-0.114)  (1.258) (-0.767)  (0.106) (0.191)  (-0.211) (0.505)  (2.369) (0.173)  (0.030) (0.170)  (-0.356) (0.149) 
Growth   -5.767 -0.090  -42.071 -3.002**  -143.744 -3.485  -8.009 -0.418  -4.019 0.529  5.158 1.919  -19.522** -0.598  2.139 0.695  2.197 0.204 
 
 (-0.257) (-0.308)  (-0.547) (-2.475)  (-1.242) (-1.936)  (-0.978) (-0.187)  (-0.120) (0.364)  (0.166) (1.213)  (-2.526) (-0.600)  (0.055) (0.359)  (0.072) (0.086) 
FXEvo   3.063 0.019  4.939 0.016  6.513 0.011  -0.104 0.240*  -0.419 0.224*  -0.175 0.213  -0.032 0.060  -0.083 0.063  0.177 0.057 
 
 (1.533) (1.019)  (1.553) (0.834)  (1.286) (0.501)  (-0.212) (1.885)  (-0.698) (1.701)  (-0.226) (1.413)  (-0.069) (1.181)  (-0.147) (1.277)  (0.245) (1.017) 
No. Obs.  42 506  42 506  42 506  440 440  440 440  440 440  437
*
 434
*
  437
*
 434
*
  437
*
 434
*
 
Adjusted 
2R   0.852 -0.001  0.869 0.010  0.918 0.012  0.196 -0.000  0.211 0.003  0.518 0.006  0.199 0.050  0.202 0.067  0.512 0.066 
Firm FE  NO NO  YES YES  NO NO  NO NO  YES YES  NO NO  NO NO  YES YES  NO NO 
Firm-Currency FE  NO NO  NO NO  YES YES  NO NO  NO NO  YES YES  NO NO  NO NO  YES YES 
Number of Groups       16 50  23 171       51 49  170 177     27 29  129 114 
* For firms with only one aggregate currency position during our sample period, the standard deviation on firm level cannot be calculated.  
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2.5 Conclusion 
Based on a unique hand-collected dataset with unprecedented data granularity, we evaluate how 
firms manage their FX exposures. Based on publicly reported FX exposures before and after 
hedging we determine firm-, year-, and currency-specific hedge ratios that allow for a separation 
of risk-decreasing from risk-increasing/-constant positions. Our findings indicate that about 20 
[80] percent of FX firm exposures are managed using risk-increasing/-constant [risk-decreasing] 
strategies. In addition, we evaluate the impact of prior benchmark outcomes in the context of 
FX exposure management. We find that prior outcomes have an impact on present hedge 
decisions, where following prior benchmark losses, the exposure is reduced and the hedge ratio 
is adjusted closer to the benchmark. Further, when separating risk-decreasing from risk-
increasing positions we complement the literature and find that prior benchmark losses are only 
relevant in the risk-increasing subsample but are irrelevant for the risk-decreasing subsample, 
thus, hedging decisions are independent of prior benchmark losses if the intention is to reduce 
FX exposure. 
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2.7 Appendix  
Appendix 1: Examples of Reported FX Information from Registration Documents 
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Appendix 2: Examples of FX Debt and Foreign Subsidiaries Included in Exposure 
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Appendix 3: Examples on Maturity of FX Derivatives from Registration Documents  
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Appendix 4: Definition of Variables 
Variables Description of variables 
BGL  Benchmark gains and losses, defined in section 2.4.2 
Benchmark  Deviation of the actual hedge ratio to the average hedge ratio per firm and currency defined in (4) 
Debt Ratio  Total Liabilities / Total Assets 
1I  
Dummy variable that is equal to one if the benchmark gain/loss in the prior period was positive and 
zero otherwise 
2I  
Dummy variable that is equal to one if the benchmark gain/loss in the prior period was negative and 
zero otherwise 
E at  Net exposure in t  after hedging 
b
tE  Net exposure in t  before hedging 
FXEvo  
Dummy variable to measure exchange rate evolution: takes the value of 1[0] if the FX rate develops 
in favor of [against] the taken position 
Growth  Capital Expenditures / Total Revenues  
tH  Hedging instruments in t  
tHR  Hedge ratio in t  with E
b
t t tHR H ; percentage of FX exposure covered by hedging instruments 
HR  Average of all hedge ratios across years by firm and currency  
*HR  
* 1  t tHR HR   
*HR  
* * *
1t t tHR HR HR     
Quick Ratio  (Cash + Short-Term Investments + Total Receivables) / Total Current Liabilities 
 
 
 
Currency Codes: 
AED United Arab Emirates dirham 
ARS Argentine peso 
BHD Bahraini dinar 
CHF  Swiss franc 
CLP  Chilean peso 
CNY Chinese renminbi 
COP  Colombian peso 
CZK  Czech koruna 
DKK  Danish krone 
EUR Euro 
GBP  Pound sterling 
JPY Japanese yen 
PGK Papua New Guinean kina 
SEK Swedish krona 
UAH  Ukrainian hryvnia 
USD United States dollar 
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Finance Conference 2017, the CARF-Conference 2017 in Lucerne as well as the 4th Finance Seminar of the 
University of Hohenheim in 2017.  
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3.1 Introduction 
“What is a soap company doing in the swap market speculating with hundreds of millions of dollars?” 28 
Speculation with derivative instruments, as the intentional increase of risk to achieve additional 
profits, is often responsible for countless, endangering corporate losses running into millions and 
billions (Poitras, 2002). Up to present, speculation as risk-increasing activity can barely if at all be 
identified retrospectively with insider information (e.g., from surveys or interviews). Literature is 
in agreement that investors are, most probably, not capable to detect speculation by examining 
openly accessible data (Géczy, Minton, & Schrand, 2007). This paper is motivated by several 
advantages that timely disclosing speculative activities in public documents would entail. First, 
anecdotal evidence from interviewed treasury executives29 suggests that it could raise the 
inhibition threshold for speculation and consequently prevent imperiling corporate losses. 
Further, the interviewed practitioners indicate that such an informational advantage would be 
beneficial for financial analysts [investors] to provide [use] more meaningful analyses and allow 
the corporate environment to benchmark and improve their own risk management, including 
unparalleled competitor analyses given the published FX-data granularity. Beyond that, such data 
granularity would enable new analytic angles for researchers in order to examine corporate risk 
management activities from strategy to execution. For these reasons, it is important to investigate 
the possibility of identifying speculative, risk-increasing strategies based on public corporate 
disclosures and to examine which firms engage in such activities and why they do so.  
Using data from a well-reputed survey and reviewing annual reports as well as relevant footnotes 
in 10-K filings, Géczy et al. (2007) conclude that the available information is insufficient to 
detect whether a firm is speculating, where speculation is denoted as the intention of increasing 
risk and/or making a profit. In this context, we examine the unique regulatory environment of 
France, in which the French financial markets’ authority advocates additional disclosures that 
exceed existing IFRS requirements and that allow us to avoid using alternative indicators for FX 
exposure and derivative usage with potential estimation errors. Due to these recommendations 
by the supervisor of the French financial markets, the publicly available disclosures of listed 
French companies provide FX risk management information of unique data granularity, i.e., data 
on firms’ FX exposures before and after hedging with corresponding hedged amounts. This 
                                                 
28  As appeared in The New York Times article “Procter & Gamble's Tale of Derivatives Woe” by Malkin 
(1994).  
29  We asked for professional judgement of four treasury executives of major German corporations, including 
two DAX-30 firms, to endorse our results. 
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detailed information enables us to determine firm-, currency-, and year-specific hedge ratios, and 
consequently identify speculation as activity that increases or holds currency-specific FX 
exposure constant, and separate it from risk-decreasing positions based on public corporate 
disclosures. This separation of risk-increasing from risk-decreasing behavior follows the ideas of 
Zhang (2009), who separates firms that reduce their risk exposure (‘effective hedgers’) from 
those who fail to do so (‘ineffective hedgers/speculators’), and is corroborated by a recent 
interview study among French firms that indicates that some treasury officials reject to increase 
volatility for any speculative activity, while others accept to do so (Gumb, Dupuy, Baker, & 
Blum, 2018)30. Besides the quantitative identification of speculation31, we find in a qualitative 
analysis that the application of hedge accounting is correlated with a firm’s speculative activities. 
It is a matter of course that this link to the facultative accounting policy of hedge accounting 
cannot be a necessary or sufficient condition, but only an indication of speculative practices.  
In addition to identifying speculation from public corporate disclosures, we focus on the 
unsolved puzzle of which firms speculate and why they do it. Different theories explain why 
firms could engage in speculative activities, but the extant evidence on these determinants of 
corporate speculation is inconsistent (Adam, Fernando, & Salas, 2017; Glaum, 2002). Even when 
we incorporate most recent publications on this topic (Adam et al., 2017; Brown, Crabb, & 
Haushalter, 2006; Géczy et al., 2007), the results of the studies remain conflicting. Adam et al. 
(2017) and Brown et al. (2006) refer to speculation as the sizing and timing of derivative 
transactions based on individual market views, which is often denoted as ‘selective hedging’. In 
contrast, Géczy et al., (2007) refer to speculation as the intention of increasing risk when testing 
theoretical explanations for optimal speculation. We assume that the varying definitions of 
speculative activities trigger the discrepancy in empirical evidence and separate selective hedging 
from risk-increasing practices in accordance with Stulz (1996). Based on the established firm-, 
currency-, and year-specific hedge ratios and in line with Géczy et al. (2007) and Zhang (2009), 
we use the term speculation to describe risk-increasing/-constant strategies and distinguish it 
from hedging (reducing currency-specific FX exposure). The results show that frequent 
speculators are lower in size, possess more investment possibilities and dispose of lower internal 
funds, which taken together indicate unprecedented empirical evidence for the convexity 
theories of Campbell & Kracaw (1999) and Adam et al. (2007) in an FX environment. This 
outcome of our quantitative analysis is in line with Albouy & Dupuy (2017), who find, by means 
                                                 
30  Given that almost 30 percent of the sample firms are identical to those of our study, these results are of 
high relevance for our analysis. 
31  We use the terms ‘risk-increasing/-constant activity’ and ‘speculation’ interchangeably in the paper.   
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of an e-mail and interview survey between 2010 and 2015, that smaller and highly leveraged firms 
tend to take more bets among French non-financial firms32.  
We contribute to the literature on corporate speculation in two ways. First, the granularity of our 
publicly available dataset allows for the calculation of firm-, year- and currency-specific hedge 
ratios and the classification into risk-decreasing, risk-increasing and risk-constant positions. 
Based on this measure, it is, henceforth, possible to identify speculation as risk-
increasing/-constant strategy reading public corporate disclosures. Second, our study adds to the 
growing literature on the determinants of speculation. We help answer the question of who these 
speculators are and provide, to our knowledge, unprecedented empirical evidence for the 
convexity theories in corporate FX risk management. Our results underline the significance of an 
advanced reporting with optional disclosures that might entail various advantages for both share- 
and stakeholders, as the interviewed treasury executives indicate.33  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the new regulatory environment 
together with the sample description. Section 3.3 deals with the identification of speculation in 
quantitative and qualitative respects. Section 3.4 is dedicated to the determinants of corporate 
speculation: We review the relevant literature and develop the hypotheses before we present the 
results of the empirical analysis. Section 3.5 concludes.  
3.2 Data and Sample Description 
3.2.1 Data Description 
To challenge the current restriction that speculation cannot be derived from public corporate 
disclosures, we use openly available accounting data from France for the period of 2010 to 2015 
that enable us to employ actually reported FX exposure and derivative usage information instead 
of relying on proxy variables with potential estimation errors. This dataset is the result of a 
unique regulatory environment that supports enhanced disclosures via an optional supplement, 
the so-called ‘registration document’. This facultative addition to annual reports is endorsed by 
the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF), supervisor of the French financial markets, and is 
                                                 
32  Using the same dataset as Gumb et al. (2017), almost 30 percent of the sample firms are equal to those of 
our analysis. Albouy & Dupuy (2017) do not incorporate the role of growth opportunities in their analysis.  
33  Hecht & Lampenius (2018) further document the importance of such extended disclosures: Using the 
same dataset, they provide evidence that prior hedging outcomes are only relevant for risk-increasing but 
not for risk-decreasing positions. 
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becoming a standard publication by listed French firms.34 Going far beyond the specifications of 
IFRS 7 §33 and 34, the AMF advocates in the position paper n°2009-16 (Autorité des Marchés 
Financiers, 2009) advanced and extended corporate disclosures concerning the management of 
foreign currency risks, where Appendix 5, in analogy to Hecht & Lampenius (2018) illustrates the 
recommended format by the AMF.  
In detail, the registration document provides information about firm-, currency-, and year-
specific FX exposure before and after hedging. Following the proposal of the AMF, firms 
commonly specify their exposed assets and liabilities (column [a] and [b] in Appendix 5, mostly 
in form of FX-receivables and FX-payables), combined with estimated forecasted exposure 
(column [c]), i.e., which might be divided into forecasted FX-sales and FX-purchases. Taken 
together, these figures result in the firm-, year-, and currency-specific exposure before hedging 
(column [d]) In addition, firms state in the registration document the corresponding hedged 
amounts (column [e]) as well as the resulting net exposure after hedging (column [f]). To 
demonstrate the structure of the data, assume the following example: At point t  and for a 
respective currency, a firm possesses 120 units of FX-assets and 30 units of FX-liabilities. These 
are completed with forecasted FX-sales of 20 units and forecasted FX-purchases of 10 units, 
which lead to an exposure before hedging of 100 (120 – 30 + 20 – 10 = 100) units. Exemplarily, 
the firm hedges 50 units of this exposure, and hence reports an exposure after hedging of 50 
units. Appendix 6 provides examples of the reported FX information from the registration 
documents. Hecht & Lampenius (2018) provide further details about this dataset.  
To analyze a firm’s FX activities using the information on exposure before and after hedging, we 
calculate firm-, year- and currency-specific hedge ratios ( HR ), defined as the percentage of FX 
exposure covered by hedging instruments. Similar to Hecht & Lampenius (2018), the hedge ratio 
in t  ( tHR ) is defined as  E
b
t t tHR H , where tH  denotes the hedging instruments and 
b
tE  
the exposure before hedging in t . Given that our data record contains aggregate FX exposure 
that can be positive or negative, which is combined with short (negative) or long (positive) 
hedged amounts, HR  can be both positive and negative. Note that a short [long] derivative 
position is identified through a negative [positive] sign. In analogy to Hecht & Lampenius (2018), 
Appendix 7 illustrates the combination of the hedging instruments (numerator) and the FX 
exposure before hedging (denominator) in the hedge ratio, as well as six exemplary, 
fundamentally different positions and the resulting hedge ratio range. It emerges that the firm-, 
                                                 
34  For details on the ‘registration document’ please refer to http://www.amf-france.org/en_US/Acteurs-et-
produits/Societes-cotees-et-operations-financieres/Document-de-reference.html. 
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year- and currency-specific hedge ratios enable the separation into risk-decreasing, risk-increasing 
and risk-constant strategies. Table 9 summarizes the hedge ratio ranges and classifies the 
currency positions as risk-decreasing, risk-increasing and risk-constant, where risk-decreasing 
positions reduce the exposure with   2 0HR , risk-increasing positions increase the exposure 
with 2HR    or 0HR  , and risk-constant positions keep the exposure stable with 
 2HR 35 or  0HR . Thus, the hedge ratios of –2 and 0 keep the exposure constant and mark 
the lower and upper limit between risk-decreasing and risk-increasing strategies, where hedge 
ratios between –2 and 0 decrease the exposure and hedge ratios greater than zero and below –2 
increase the exposure. Within the hedge ratio range of 2 1HR    , the overhedging flips the 
sign of the exposure, which might indicate speculative purposes. However, we can classify these 
positions as risk-decreasing, since Hecht & Lampenius (2018) show that the positions in this 
hedge ratio range with a mean of HR -1.18 can be attributed to imperfect hedge conditions in 
the real world (Hull, 2015).  
Table 9: Hedge Ratio Classification 
This table reports the hedge ratio classification, defined as the percentage of FX exposure covered by hedging 
instruments ( Ebt t tHR H ), where tH  and 
b
tE  denote the hedging instruments and the exposure before hedging 
in t , respectively. HR  captures risk-decreasing, risk-increasing and risk-constant strategies where technically (a) 
risk-decreasing strategies lower a firm’s FX exposure with   2 0HR  ; (b) risk-increasing strategies raise a firm’s 
FX exposure with  2HR  or  0HR ; (c) risk-constant strategies keep a firm’s FX exposure stable with 
 2HR  or  0HR .  
 
Strategy Hedge Ratio   Impact on Exposure No. Obs Cum. Obs. 
Risk-decreasing  
2 1HR     Decrease 260 260 
1HR    Decrease 82 342 
1 0HR    Decrease 759 1101 
Risk-increasing 
2HR    Increase 65 1166 
0 HR  Increase 159 1325 
Risk-constant  
2HR    Constant 3 1328 
0HR   Constant 486 1814 
 
In the literature, others have assessed whether derivative instruments increase or decrease a 
firm’s risk exposure in the context of corporate risk management activities (Allayannis & Ofek, 
2001; Hentschel & Kothari, 2001; Zhang, 2009). While Allayannis & Ofek (2001) and Hentschel 
& Kothari (2001) use the term ‘hedging’ and ‘speculation’ for risk-decreasing and risk-increasing 
strategies36, Zhang (2009) classifies firms that reduce their risk exposure as ‘effective hedgers’ and 
                                                 
35  For  2HR , the size of the risk exposure remains stable, but the direction of exposure changes.  
36  Hentschel & Kothari (2001) refer to overall stock return risk, and Allayannis & Ofek (2001) measure FX 
exposure as the sensitivity of a firm’s stock return to unanticipated FX rate changes.  
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firms that fail to reduce their risk exposure compared to an expected level as ‘ineffective 
hedgers/speculators’. Similar to the literature, we label positions in which firms do not manage 
to decrease their risk with derivate instruments as speculative, i.e., we denote risk-decreasing 
[risk-increasing/-constant] strategies as hedging [speculation]. Hecht & Lampenius (2018) 
evaluate the number of occurrences of risk-decreasing, -increasing and -constant positions and 
find that in about 61 [39] percent firms pursue risk-decreasing [risk-increasing/-constant] 
strategies.37 Moreover, in their analysis that includes the value of FX positions so that a position 
with an exposure of 0.1 million Euros is not treated as equally important as a position with an 
exposure of 100 million Euros, they find that 20 percent of firm exposure relate to risk-
increasing/-constant and 80 percent relate to risk-decreasing strategies. Hecht & Lampenius 
(2018) provide further details on how firms manage their FX exposure. 
3.2.2 Sample Description 
As the position paper of the AMF with the recommendations and the details on the preparation 
of the registration document dates from December 2009, we start our analysis with the year 
2010. Starting with all 333 French firms listed in the CAC All-Tradable index as of April 2016, 
we drop financial firms (18) due to their differing business model, firms without (significant) FX 
exposure that does not justify risk management measures (183) and firms that do not follow the 
recommendations of the AMF (70). The latter implies a potential selection bias due to the 
voluntary disclosure. We see the high direct cost of compliance38 with the guidelines of the AMF 
as a reason that some firms are unwilling to provide the additional information even if they 
handle their exposures similarly and hence consider the selection bias as not significant. For the 
sample of 62 firms, we hand-collect the reported FX-risk management information, with on 
average a FX-exposure in 4.9 currencies, and match it with firm characteristics obtained from the 
Compustat Global Vantage database. The resulting 1,814 firm-year-currency observations are the 
basis for the regression models detailed in sections 3.3 and 3.4. Further, we winsorize all firm 
characteristics to the 1st and 99th percentile to eliminate data outliers. The firm-specific FX data 
is not winsorized, given that this data is hand-collected and all data points are meaningful.  
                                                 
37  Hecht & Lampenius (2018) also discuss the number of risk-increasing observations to ensure that this is 
not an artifact of some error in reporting.  
38  In accordance with French regulations, the registration document is an additional document to be filed 
with the AMF. Exemplary, one firm illustrates, as difference between its annual report and registration 
document, that the registration document provides further details on the activity, financial situation and 
prospects of the firm (see section 3.2.1) 
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Consistent with the general literature on FX risk management, forward contracts are the most 
important hedging instrument (Bodnar et al., 1998; Giambona et al., 2018) and our French 
sample firms mainly report the utilization of forward or future contracts; options and swaps are 
mentioned less frequently. This observation is also in agreement with Albouy & Dupuy (2017), 
who provide recent survey evidence from France that forward contracts are by far the leading 
category to hedge FX risk. In line with Allayannis & Ofek (2001) and Beber and Fabbri (2012) 
we exclude foreign currency swaps from the analysis whenever explicitly referred to in the 
registration document, since swaps are often not used to hedge foreign sales. If a differentiation 
of FX instruments is not undertaken and hence swaps cannot be separated from other FX 
instruments, we rely on the combined figure. The inclusion of swaps with forward or future 
contracts of a few firms should not lead to a systematic bias, since FX forward contracts, as 
indicated above, are the most important FX hedging instruments. We ignore all transaction costs 
related to hedging activities and assume that FX markets are efficient in the weak sense of 
informational efficiency (Fama, 1970). 
Following the classification according to the convexity theories of Campbell & Kracaw (1999) 
and Adam et al. (2007) (see section 3.4.2) and in line with Géczy et al. (2007), we group the firm 
characteristics into three categories firm size, growth opportunities and liquidity (short- and long-term). 
Similar to Adam, Fernando, & Salas (2017) and Géczy, Minton, & Schrand (2007), we measure 
firm size by the logarithm of total assets (log (total assets)) and alternatively by the logarithm of 
market capitalization (log (mkt value)). Following Géczy, Minton, & Schrand (2007), growth 
opportunities are approximated by the ratio of research and development expenses over total 
revenue (R&D ratio) and as secondary proxy, in line with Beber & Fabbri (2012) by capital 
expenditures to total revenues (capex ratio).39 Our approach to model the corporate liquidity 
situation is twofold. Following Géczy et al. (2007) we first calculate a short- and long-term 
liquidity indicator, i.e., the quick ratio (cash and short-term investments to total current liabilities) 
and  interest coverage ((pretax income + interest expense) / interest expense), respectively. Since 
these ratios represent static balance sheet information, we further use the operating cash flow 
standardized by total revenues as dynamic flow figure that is less vulnerable to accounting policy. 
Second, we investigate the levels of indebtedness. Similar to Beber & Fabbri (2012), we use the 
debt ratio (total liabilities to total assets) to approximate leverage and since we are particularly 
interested in near-term settings, where profitable investments can only be realized due to positive 
outcomes of speculative activities (for details, see section 3.4.2), we further utilize the short-term 
                                                 
39  Please note that we do not employ the book-to-market-ratio due to potential misinterpretations, e.g., off-
balance sheet correlations with speculation, as stated by Géczy et al. (2007).   
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debt ratio with total current liabilities to total assets. All variables are defined in Appendix 8. 
Table 10 presents descriptive statistics of the firm characteristics, where data availability in the 
Compustat Global Vantage database explains the different observation numbers.  
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics of Firm Characteristics 
This table reports summary statistics of the firm characteristics. Log (total assets) is the logarithm of total assets, log 
(mkt value) the logarithm of market capitalization, the R&D [Capex] ratio divides the R&D Expense [capital 
expenditures] by total revenues and the quick ratio captures the sum of cash plus short-term investments divided by 
total current liabilities. Interest coverage is measured by the sum of pretax income plus interest expense, divided by 
interest expense. The operating cash flow is standardized by total revenues and the [short-term] debt ratio captures 
total [current] liabilities in relation to total assets. All variables are defined in Appendix 8.  
 
No. Obs Mean SD Min p25 p50 p75 Max 
Firm size         
     Log (total assets) 1764 7.876 1.598 4.094 6.927 8.020 8.852 11.130 
     Log (mkt value) 1738 7.520 1.684 3.183 6.267 7.679 8.810 10.390 
Growth opportunities         
     R&D ratio 1097 0.085 0.122 0.002 0.020 0.044 0.093 0.643 
     Capex ratio 1763 0.045 0.037 0.005 0.021 0.037 0.058 0.276 
Liquidity (short-/long-term)         
     Quick ratio 1764 0.421 0.039 0.026 0.172 0.298 0.469 2.214 
     Interest coverage 1752 128.900 421.200 -15.060 4.193 8.361 18.310 2234.250 
     Operating CF 1764 0.115 0.077 -0.069 0.060 0.105 0.159 0.388 
     Debt ratio 1764 0.572 0.169 0.257 0.455 0.574 0.702 1.022 
     Debt ratio short-term 1764 0.356 0.142 0.147 0.246 0.303 0.473 0.727 
 
3.3 The Identification of Speculation 
3.3.1 Quantitative Analysis 
“However, the disclosure of notional values limits the information that can be extracted from the data, since we do 
not know in general whether the net position of foreign currency derivatives was short or long, and in which 
currency.” 40 
Beber & Fabbri (2012) well-describe the problem of detecting corporate speculation and point 
out that the informative value of U.S.-company data from publicly available disclosures is 
limited. Further, Géczy, Minton, & Schrand (2007) find that  investors are not able to identify 
speculation on the basis of openly accessible U.S.-company data. Examining a new regulatory 
environment that provides exactly the cited missing information, we test whether the additional 
data allows deducing corporate speculative activities. 
                                                 
40  As appeared in the Journal of Corporate Finance article “Who times the foreign exchange market? Corporate 
speculation and CEO characteristics” by Beber & Fabbri (2012, p. 1069).  
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Identifying speculation in annual financial statements may happen based on reported quantitative 
indicators. In contrast to the financial statement disclosures from the U.S., the publicly available 
data of listed French firms contains actual firm-, year- and currency-specific FX exposure 
together with corresponding hedging instruments, both with the specification of being short or 
long. As illustrated in section 3.2, the resulting firm-, year- and currency-specific hedge ratios 
allow for a classification of FX positions as risk-decreasing, risk-increasing and risk-constant. 
Hence, the reader of these public corporate disclosures is able to identify speculation as practice 
that increases or holds currency-specific FX exposure constant and separate it from hedging 
(reducing currency-specific FX exposure) per reported currency positions. As illustrated by 
Hecht & Lampenius (2018), 39 percent of the currency positions in our sample are classified as 
speculative (risk-increasing/-constant), and the remaining 61 percent as hedging (risk-
decreasing). Measured in relative terms, i.e., when the exposure before hedging per position is 
related to total firm exposure, they find that 20 [80] of FX firm exposure are managed using 
speculative [hedging] strategies. 
3.3.2  Qualitative Analysis 
Another possibility to identify corporate speculation involves qualitative statements in annual 
disclosures. Further to the quantitative FX-risk management information from the annual 
reports, we examine whether qualitative statements in the financial statement – especially the 
notes concerning FX risk management activities – indicate whether a firm engages in 
speculation. Most likely due to its negative connotation and similar to Géczy et al. (2007), we 
find that firms do not specify the intended use of speculation in written form in their annual 
disclosures. However, Zhang (2009) illustrates that changing accounting regulations affect risk-
increasing firms more than risk-decreasing firms, and Gumb et al. (2018) show that accounting 
standards influence the hedging behavior of French firms. In this context, we find that some 
firms explicitly mention that their derivative instruments do not meet hedge accounting 
requirements according to accounting standard of IAS 39 and are hence regarded as ‘speculative’. 
Others state that, while the majority of their derivative positions is in accordance with hedge 
accounting, their hedging policy allows for speculative transactions at the same time. Hedge 
accounting  (HA) is a bookkeeping practice that permits treating underlying positions as well as 
corresponding hedges as one item in order to offset their gains and losses in financial statements. 
Since this accounting policy seems to be associated with speculation and appears to be a specific 
characteristic that differs among firms, we investigate whether the application of hedge 
accounting correlates with speculation. To the best of our knowledge, literature has hitherto 
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never examined this potential connection. We do so by introducing a dummy variable ‘hedge 
accounting’ that equals one [0.5] if a firm [partially] applies hedge accounting and zero otherwise. 
We are aware of the restrictions under IAS 39 to designate certain instruments and contexts as 
hedging relationships, this is why we also characterize a firm as hedge accounting user if it 
predominantly uses this bookkeeping practice. Partial hedge accounting users are characterized 
by only fractional designation of FX derivative transactions as hedge accounting component 
over our sample period. Comments that FX derivatives may serve as hedge but are not always 
eligible for hedge accounting are typical for this subgroup that only contains four firms.  
Literature on hedge accounting shows that in the U.S., 25 percent of corporate survey 
respondents expect to not apply hedge accounting (Kawaller, 2002).41 Glaum & Klöcker (2011) 
confirm this proportion with their survey in Germany and Switzerland and find that 28 percent 
of their non-financial sample firms do not adopt hedge accounting practises. We are unaware of 
such existing data for France, but our analysis reveals that 26 percent (16 out of 62) of our 
sample firms refrain from the application of hedge accounting (including four partial hedge 
accounting users). 
In a multinomial logit regression model with robust standard errors, we examine whether the 
application of hedge accounting is associated with the extent of corporate speculation, where 
speculation refers to risk-increasing/-constant strategies in line with the literature. The 
dependent variable is our dummy variable ‘hedge accounting’ with its three possible 
characteristics. As measure of speculation, we evaluate the exposure before hedging per position 
to overall firm exposure (‘speculation ratio’), i.e., we calculate the value-weighted proportion of 
speculation per firm during our sample period. This means that a position with an exposure of 
0.1 million Euros is not equally important as a position with an exposure of 100 million Euros. 
The ‘speculation ratio’ ranges from zero to one and indicates for a value of for example 0.4 that a 
firm speculates with 40 percent of its total FX exposure during our sample period. Following 
Glaum & Klöcker (2011), we control for firm size, growth opportunities and leverage. We rely 
on the logarithm of total assets (log (total assets)) for size (Adam et al., 2017) and on the capital 
expenditures to total revenues (capex ratio) for growth opportunities following Beber and Fabbri 
(2012).42 Similar to Glaum & Klöcker (2011), we employ the debt ratio (total liabilities to total 
assets) as approximation for leverage. To not bias the regression result, since the variables ‘hedge 
                                                 
41  In the U.S., not IAS 39 but SFAS 133 is applicable.  
42  For this analysis we select the capex ratio as proxy for growth opportunities, as it is more widely available 
in the databases for our sample firm than the alternative R&D ratio. The results with the R&D ratio are 
very similar and only involve fewer observations.  
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accounting’ and ‘speculation ratio’ do not change per firm over time, we drop all duplicate values 
to rely on one observation per firm.43 Due to data unavailability for capital expenditures, we 
further lose one firm.  
According to Table 11, we observe statistically significant correlations between the proportion of 
speculation and hedge accounting. In detail, a one-unit increase in the variable speculation ratio 
is associated with an increase of 3.81 in the relative log odds of being a non-HA-user compared 
to a HA-user, significant at the 1 percent significance level. In other words, non-HA-users are 
more likely to speculate more than HA-users. The same relationship with almost equal 
magnitude is also observable between partial HA-users and HA-users.  
Table 11: Identification of Speculation – Hedge Accounting  
This table reports the multinomial logistic regression results of the application of hedge accounting as a function of 
firm characteristics with robust standard errors, with the case of hedge accounting application as base outcome. The 
dependent variable can take the values ‘hedge accounting’, ‘no hedge accounting’ or ‘partial hedge accounting’ 
according to a firm’s approach on the application of this optional accounting policy. The independent variables are 
defined as follows: speculation refers to risk-increasing/-constant activities and the speculation ratio measures the 
value-weighted proportion of speculation per firm on a metric scale from 0 to 1, where 0 [1] indicates 100 percent 
hedging [speculation] with a firm’s total FX exposure. Log (total assets) is the logarithm of total assets, the capex 
ratio divides the capital expenditures by total revenues and the debt ratio captures total liabilities in relation to total 
assets.  ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. All variables 
are defined in Appendix 8.     
Dependent Variable Independent Variables    Coef.      p-value 
Hedge accounting Base Outcome 
No hedge accounting Speculation ratio 3.806 0.008*** 
 Log (total assets) -0.239 0.486 
 Capex ratio 3.275 0.493 
 Debt ratio 3.144 0.211 
 Constant -3.258 0.178 
Partial hedge accounting Speculation ratio 3.105 0.018** 
 Log (total assets) 0.264 0.529 
 Capex ratio -6.747 0.230 
 Debt ratio 0.261 0.935 
 Constant -5.549 0.254 
Observations  61  
Pseudo R-squared  0.249  
 
As a result concerning the identification of speculation from public corporate disclosures, we 
demonstrate that the unique regulatory environment with its additional FX risk management 
information enables the determination of speculation as well as its separation from hedging via 
firm-, currency-, and year-specific hedge ratios. Further, our analysis of qualitative statements in 
                                                 
43  A firm reports on average FX-exposure data in 4.9 currencies per year, i.e., per firm we possess on average 
almost 30 firm-year-currency observations during the 6-year sample period. Since the variables ‘hedge 
accounting’ and ‘speculation ratio’ do not change over time, we drop the duplicate values and rely on one 
observations per firm for this regression analysis. For the control variables such as firm size or growth 
opportunities, we use the latest reporting data of the sample period, i.e., 2015.  
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the annual reports shows that corporate speculation is linked to the application of hedge 
accounting. This connection, however, is merely an indication and must not be interpreted as 
causal relationship or necessary or sufficient condition for speculation.  
3.4 The Determinants of Speculation 
3.4.1 Status Quo in Literature 
Sufficient evidence of speculative activities in the corporate world has found its way into 
literature (Adam, Fernando, & Golubeva, 2015; Adam et al., 2017; Bodnar et al., 1998; Brown et 
al., 2006; Faulkender, 2005; Giambona et al., 2018; Glaum, 2002), but the determinants of 
corporate speculation remain nevertheless inconsistent. Literature on financial risk management 
offers various theoretical solutions to explain why companies might have an incentive to 
speculate as opposed to hedge (Adam et al., 2007; Campbell & Kracaw, 1999; Stulz, 1996). 
Empirical evidence, however, is ambiguous: Glaum (2002) summarizes in 2002 that most studies 
up to this date are at variance, and Adam et al. (2017, p. 269) recently conclude that it “remains a 
puzzle”.  
Two potential explanations for this disagreement arise. First, the exclusion of potential 
speculation with derivative financial instruments was a weak point of earlier research in terms of 
methodology (Glaum, 2002). Nonetheless, including most recent evidence of studies that 
incorporate speculation reveals a similar picture. With regard to the investigated aspects of firm 
size, growth opportunities and corporate liquidity, we find that inconsistency on the 
determinants on speculation still prevails (Adam et al., 2017; Brown et al., 2006; Géczy, Minton, 
& Schrand, 2007). A second potential explanations for the ambiguous empirical evidence 
originates from Judge (2007), who argues that a mixed outcome could be the result of deviating 
definitions among the studies. In fact, while Adam et al. (2017), similar to e.g., Brown et al. 
(2006) and Adam et al. (2015), refer to speculation as the inclusion of individual market views in 
hedge decisions (‘selective hedging’), Géczy et al. (2007) use the term speculation to describe 
risk-increasing intentions. Further, we detect that even the results of Brown et al. (2006) and 
Adam et al. (2017) do not concur despite the assumption of selective hedging and the mutual 
usage of the gold industry dataset.44 Since their approach on measuring ‘speculation’, which 
serves as dependent variable in both regression models, deviates, we assume that – overall – the 
non-uniform outcomes on the determinants of speculation may be explained by different 
                                                 
44  While Brown et al. (2006)’s analysis covers the years of 1993 to 1998 across 44 gold producers, Adam et al. 
(2017) involves 92 firms from 1989 to 1998.  
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methodologies and definitions of speculation. To address this issue and investigate the 
determining factors of speculative activities, we differentiate between speculation (increasing or 
holding currency-specific FX exposure constant) and hedging (reducing currency-specific FX 
exposure) based on the advanced disclosures of our sample firms. 
3.4.2 Hypothesis Development  
Apart from Modigliani-Miller ideals in which risk management does not increase shareholder 
value, diverse theoretical considerations justify why firms could engage in hedging activities. 
Apart from classical managerial motives such as information asymmetry considerations, tax 
reasons or debt capacity coupled with financial distress costs  (Froot et al., 1993; Judge, 2007; 
Smith & Stulz, 1985), Froot et al. (1993) mention the aspect of underinvestment when external 
financing is more expensive than internal financing. Easing the variability of cash flows through 
risk management measures can prevent underinvestment and increased external financing 
requirements that might be costly to firms.  
Furthermore, the financial literature holds explanations for speculative positions, with a 
differentiation between selective hedging and risk-increasing strategies, where selective hedging 
describes the inclusion of individual market views into risk management programs. From a 
theoretical point of view, Stulz (1996) argues that companies with private information might be 
inclined to engage in selective hedging, rather than speculation.45 That is, companies having both 
private information combined with an adequate financial resilience might benefit from taking 
bets on financial markets. Making use of superior market or industry knowledge such as 
specialized information on e.g., future FX-rates, might lend these firms a comparative advantage 
leading to extraordinary profits in derivative transactions. These, according to Stulz (1996), 
typically bigger firms should have the financial capabilities to withstand losses from erroneous 
market views, which in turn prevents a firm from the underinvestment problem due to high 
costs of external funds. In an FX-environment, however, Stulz (1996) states that most FX 
dealers do not possess specialized information about the future development of foreign 
currencies. Consequently, non-financial firms most likely also lack this expertise. In addition, 
they are supposedly not endowed with an enhanced ability to cope with FX risks and possible 
severe losses (Stulz, 1996). Alternatively, Stulz (1996) illustrates a rationale in favor of selective 
                                                 
45  Stulz (1996) illustrates that selective hedging can also be risk-increasing, where Adam et al. (2017) find that 
selective hedging increases future stock return volatility. However, according to Stulz (1996), the use of 
private information will most likely lead to selective hedging and only occasionally to speculative positions.  
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hedging for firms in financial distress. Having nothing to lose, such firms might be motivated to 
take bets even without superior knowledge in order to generate exceptional, rescuing outcomes. 
This corresponds to the incentive described in Jensen & Meckling (1976), where equity-holding 
managers of indebted, low-rated firms are induced to engage in risky investments with high 
payoffs but low probability of success, also in the absence of private information. This asset 
substitution or wealth transfer problem arises because shareholders capture the gains of such 
risky projects, while debt holders might bear most of the losses.  
Moreover, the convexity theories of Campbell & Kracaw (1999) and Adam et al. (2007) describe 
why speculation may be the optimal risk management decision. Based on a profit function 
convex in investment, the authors build upon the model of Froot et al. (1993) and argue that 
under certain circumstances, firms might perceive speculative, risk-increasing activities as optimal 
strategy. This incentive not to hedge but to speculate arises from the convexity of a firm’s 
investment opportunities leading to the argument that positive outcomes of speculation allow for 
profitable investments that elsewise would not be carried out. Campbell & Kracaw (1999) expect 
that this effect might be empirically verifiable with firms that demonstrate the following features: 
substantial growth opportunities, modest internal funds as well as high cost of asymmetric 
information. Following Adam et al. (2017) and Graham et al. (2001), we assume that smaller 
firms suffer more from the market imperfection of informational asymmetry and are hence 
financially more constrained in raising external funds.  
Given that non-financial firms do presumably not exhibit a comparative advantage in an FX-
context and that Stulz (1996)’s theory rather encourages selective hedging practices while the 
granularity of dataset enables the identification of risk-increasing strategies, we adhere to the 
theoretical foundations of Campbell & Kracaw (1999) and Adam et al. (2007). We test the 
hypothesis that the convexity theories are empirically supported in FX risk management, where 
we expect a negative relation between firm size and speculation, a positive relation between 
corporate growth opportunities and speculation, as well as a negative relation between corporate 
liquidity (short- and long-term) and speculation. To test these hypotheses, we use the calculated 
firm-, year-, and currency-specific hedge ratios that allow us to capture speculation motives and 
separate them from hedging considerations.   
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3.4.3 Empirical Results  
3.4.3.1 Logistic Regression  
We examine the relationship between firm characteristics and speculation in a logistic regression 
model. According to our hedge ratio classification, we construct a dependent variable that can 
take the two categories hedging (risk-decreasing) or speculation (risk-increasing/-constant). The 
independent variables are chosen according to the theoretical basis of the convexity theories 
(Campbell & Kracaw, 1999; Adam et al., 2007) and detailed in section 3.2.2 and Table 10.  
Table 12 reports the results of the logistic regression with robust standard errors, where Panel A 
presents, in line with Géczy et al. (2007), our main regression model with one firm characteristic 
per category firm size, growth opportunities and liquidity combined with one measure of debt. 
To ensure consistency, we substitute each variable in the so-called alternative regression model in 
Panel B.46 The coefficient for the variable log (total assets) in Panel A is -0.31 with a statistical 
significance at the 1 percent level, which means that a one-unit increase in the variable log (total 
assets) is associated with a -0.31 decrease in the log-odds of the dependent variable. In other 
words, firms that increase their exposure, i.e., speculate, are more likely to be smaller than firms 
that decrease their exposure – a finding that confirms our expected negative relation between 
firm size and speculation. Panel B with the variable log (mkt value), the coefficient of  -0.30 and 
again statistical significance at the 1 percent level confirms this finding. Similarly, firms that 
speculate exhibit a higher probability, significant at the 1 percent level, to have more growth 
opportunities than firms that follow hedging motives (Table 12 Panel A). This positive 
relationship between corporate growth opportunities and speculation is in line with Panel B as 
well as our hypothesis. As regards internal funds, we find that speculators are more likely to have 
lower operating cash flows and higher debt levels. Both the operating cash flow as well as the 
interest coverage ratio have a negative sign indicating lower liquidity for speculators, significant 
at the 1 percent level, respectively. As indicated before, we utilize both a static balance sheet 
indicator as well as a more dynamic cash flow indicator, which is less subject to accounting 
policy. For this reason, we use the operating cash flow as short-term liquidity indicator.47 While 
the debt ratio was not significant in the main regression model, the alternative regression model 
illustrates significance at the 1 percent level for the short-term debt ratio. This observed negative 
                                                 
46  We checked for correlations across the firm characteristics. The Pearson correlation coefficients are not so 
high as to represent a problem of multicollinearity.  
47  While the coefficient for the quick ratio is also negative, the relationship is statistically not significant 
(Appendix 9 provides the regression results). 
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relation between a firm’s liquidity situation and speculative activities contributes to a first overall 
impression of empirical evidence for the convexity theories in a currency risk context.  
Table 12: Determinants of Speculation – Logistic Regression 
This table reports the logistic regression results of our classification of FX derivative positions as a function of firm 
characteristics with robust standard errors. The dependent variable ‘HR classification’ can take the values 0 [1] for 
positions classified as hedging [speculation], where hedging [speculation] refers to risk-decreasing [risk-increasing/-
constant] activities. The independent variables are the firm characteristics detailed in Table 10. Panel A details our 
main regression model with one financial characteristic per category firm size and growth, as well as one short-term 
liquidity indicator and one debt measure. In Panel B, we substitute each variable to ensure consistency in an 
alternative regression model. Log (total assets) is the logarithm of total assets, log (mkt value) the logarithm of 
market capitalization, the R&D [Capex] ratio divides the R&D expense [capital expenditures] by total revenues, the 
operating cash flow is standardized by total revenues and interest coverage is measured by the sum of pretax income 
plus interest expense, divided by interest expense. The [short-term] debt ratio captures total [current] liabilities in 
relation to total assets. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 8.    
Panel A: Main regression model  
Dependent Variable Independent Variables Coef.     p-value 
HR classification Log (total assets) -0.305 0.000*** 
 R&D ratio  5.396 0.000*** 
 Operating CF -2.844 0.009*** 
 Debt ratio  0.263 0.630 
 Constant  1.576 0.002*** 
Observations 1,097        
Pseudo R-squared 0.131   
 
Panel B: Alternative regression model 
Dependent Variable Independent Variables Coef.     p-value 
HR classification Log (mkt value) -0.299 0.000*** 
 Capex ratio  2.329 0.092* 
 Interest Coverage -0.001 0.001*** 
 Debt ratio short-term  1.195 0.003*** 
 Constant  1.287 0.000*** 
Observations 1,725        
Pseudo R-squared 0.064   
 
To substantiate this evidence, we examine the relationship between firm characteristics and 
speculation from another perspective. A possible weakness of our analysis is that – depending on 
the respective hedge ratios – one firm might be attributed for one currency to the risk-decreasing 
(hedging) category and for another currency to the risk-increasing/-constant (speculation) 
category within the same year. To meet this objection and ensure robustness, we construct a 
firm-wide homogeneous classification for hedging and speculation.  
3.4.3.2 Firm Classification and Multinomial Logistic Regression  
Following Géczy et al. (2007), we categorize our sample firms as either marginal speculator, 
temporary speculator or frequent speculator to test the theories for optimal speculation. To do 
Identification and Determinants of Speculation  
62 
so, we build upon the ‘speculation ratio’ from section 3.3, where we related the exposure before 
hedging per position to overall firm exposure to not give equal weight to a an exposure of 0.1 
million Euros compared to an exposure of 100 million Euros. The range of the ‘speculation 
ratio’ goes from zero to one, where a value of e.g., 0.5 indicates that a firm speculates with 50 
percent of its total FX exposure. We label firms as marginal speculator (MS) when they speculate 
with less than 20 percent of their exposure, whereas with more than 80 percent of speculative 
activities according to the ‘speculation ratio’, we label firms as frequent speculators (FS). The 
thresholds of 20 and 80 percent originate from the analysis of Hecht & Lampenius (2018), as 
detailed in section 3.2.1.48 Further, we term the group of firms between 20 and 80 percent 
temporary speculators (TS). Since for one firm and one year, the firm characteristics do not 
change for the several employed currencies, we drop all duplicate values to rely on one 
observation per firm and year. Consequently, the dependent variable counts 337 hand-collected 
observations from the annual reports of our sample firms, where the classification scheme on 
firm-level shows 54 percent of our sample firms as MS, 17 percent as FS and the remaining 29 
percent as TS.  
Subject to the firm classification, Table 13 presents univariate statistics of firm characteristics of 
our sample firms. Further, we report the results of a t-test that compares the mean values of the 
marginal speculators with frequent speculators (marginal speculators with temporary speculators) 
[frequent speculators with temporary speculators]. We rely on the Welch’s t-test due to potential 
unequal variances as well as sample sizes. 
                                                 
48  In a robustness check in section 3.4.3.3, we rule out the possibility that our results depend on the 
thresholds of 20 and 80 percent.  
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Table 13: Univariate Statistics of Firm Characteristics According to Firm Classification 
This table reports univariate statistics for the firm characteristics according to our firm classification into marginal 
speculators (MS), temporary speculator (TS) or frequent speculator (FS) subject to their speculative share relative to 
total firm exposure, where hedging [speculation] refers to risk-decreasing [risk-increasing/-constant] activities. Based 
on the limits of 20 percent and 80 percent, firms are labelled marginal speculators [frequent speculator] (temporary 
speculator) when speculating with less [more] (between) than 20 percent [80 percent] (20 percent and 80 percent) of 
their exposure. The MS vs. FS [MS vs. TS] {FS vs. TS} column reports the significance level of a Welch’s t-test 
comparing the mean values for marginal speculators versus frequent speculators [marginal speculators vs. temporary 
speculators] {frequent speculators vs. temporary speculators}. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 
percent and 1 percent level, respectively. For the firm classification, we drop all duplicate values to rely on one 
observation per firm and year (see section 3.4.3.2). Log (total assets) is the logarithm of total assets, log (mkt value) 
the logarithm of market capitalization, the R&D [Capex] ratio divides the R&D expense [capital expenditures] by 
total revenues and the quick ratio captures the sum of cash plus short-term investments divided by total current 
liabilities. Interest coverage is measured by the sum of pretax income plus interest expense, divided by interest 
expense. Total [operating] cash flow is standardized by total revenues and the [short-term] debt ratio captures total 
[current] liabilities in relation to total assets. All variables are defined in Appendix 8.    
 
Marginal Speculator 
(N = 182)     
   Frequent Speculator 
(N = 57) 
 
Temporary Speculator 
(N = 98) 
 
 
 
    Mean SD Mean   SD MS vs. FS   Mean   SD MS vs. TS FS vs. TS      
Firm size          
     Log (total assets) 8.274 1.419 6.640 1.349 *** 7.664 1.645 *** *** 
     Log (mkt value) 8.009 1.489 6.066 1.433 *** 7.206 1.690 *** *** 
Growth opportunities          
     R&D ratio 0.042 0.036 0.239 0.197 *** 0.100 0.111 *** *** 
     Capex ratio 0.046 0.025 0.063 0.071  0.032 0.024 ***  
Liquidity (short/long-term)          
     Quick ratio 0.454 0.396 0.377 0.479  0.367 0.342   
     Interest coverage 205.400 531.100 14.810 37.110 *** 15.500 27.280 ***  
     Operating CF 0.134 0.067 0.071 0.085  0.095 0.082   
     Debt ratio 0.558 0.166 0.618 0.201 * 0.579 0.150   
     Debt ratio short-term 0.333 0.132 0.407 0.134 *** 0.379 0.159 ** *** 
 
First, we focus on the differences between firms that frequently and those that marginally 
speculate: We observe that, according to both measurements of firm size, frequent speculators are 
significantly smaller than marginal speculators. As regards growth potential measured by R&D 
expenditures to total revenues, frequent speculators exhibit significantly more investment 
opportunities compared to marginal speculators. Alternatively, using capital expenditures instead 
of R&D investments seems to confirm the results, where the differences between the groups are 
not significant. The liquidity measures indicate that marginal speculators possess more internal 
funds than frequent speculators, where the differences for interest coverage and the debt ratios 
are statistically significant. The different levels of debt show that frequent speculators have 
significantly higher debt proportions than marginal speculators, where we also find the same 
relationship with even stronger significances for the short-term debt ratio.   
Consistent with this evidence, the firm size of temporary speculators falls in between the 
thresholds of MS and FS, i.e., temporary speculators are significantly smaller than marginal 
speculators and significantly bigger than firms that frequently speculate. Similarly, for the firm 
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characteristics categorized in growth and liquidity, Table 13 illustrates that the values for temporary 
speculators are logically interjacent to marginal and frequent speculators, with significant 
differences for e.g., the R&D ratio, interest coverage and the short-term debt ratio. 
Following the univariate analysis and Géczy et al. (2007), we examine the relationship between 
the firm characteristics and speculation in a multinomial logistic regression. According to our 
firm classification, the nominally scaled dependent variable can take the three categories marginal 
speculators, temporary speculator or frequent speculator. The dependent variable includes 337 
observations, where data availabilities from Compustat Global explain the differing observation 
numbers. For the sake of consistency, the independent variables are the same as in the main and 
alternative regression model from Table 12.  
Table 14 reports the results of the multinomial logistic regression with robust standard errors 
and with the marginal speculators class as base category, where Table 14 Panel A [B] presents the 
estimates for the main [alternative] regression model. The evidence provided is consistent with 
the univariate analysis and the logit regression results. In Panel A [B], a one-unit increase in the 
variable log (total assets) is associated with a reduction of -0.42 [-0.56] in the relative log odds of 
being a frequent speculator compared to a marginal speculator. That is, frequent speculators tend 
to be smaller than marginal speculators. For the category growth we find once more that frequent 
speculators are more likely to exhibit higher growth opportunities than marginal speculators. 
Concerning liquidity, the short- and long-term liquidity indicators together with the debt ratios 
illustrate lower cash positions and higher debt levels for frequent speculators. Further, also firms 
that temporarily speculate differ significantly from marginal speculators in terms of firm size, 
growth and liquidity in Panel A and B, where the parameter estimates are again logically interjacent 
to marginal and frequent speculators.  
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Table 14: Determinants of Speculation – Multinomial Logistic Regression 
This table reports the multinomial logistic regression results of our firm classification as a function of firm 
characteristics with robust standard errors and the marginal speculators classification as base outcome. The 
dependent variable can take the values marginal speculator, temporary speculator or frequent speculator according 
to their speculative share relative to total firm exposure, where hedging [speculation] refers to risk-decreasing [risk-
increasing/-constant] activities. Based on the limits of 20 percent and 80 percent, firms are labelled marginal 
speculators [frequent speculator] (temporary speculator) when speculating with less [more] (between) than 20 
percent [80 percent] (20 percent and 80 percent) of their exposure. The independent variables are the firm 
characteristics detailed in Table 10. Panel A details our main regression model with one financial characteristic per 
category firm size and growth, as well as one short-term liquidity indicator and one debt measure. In Panel B, we 
substitute each variable to ensure consistency in an alternative regression model. Log (total assets) is the logarithm 
of total assets, log (mkt value) the logarithm of market capitalization, the R&D [Capex] ratio divides the R&D 
expense [capital expenditures] by total revenues, the operating cash flow is standardized by total revenues and 
interest coverage is measured by the sum of pretax income plus interest expense, divided by interest expense. The 
[short-term] debt ratio captures total [current] liabilities in relation to total assets. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance 
at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 8.     
Panel A: Main regression model  
Dependent Variable Independent Variables  Coef.      p-value 
Marginal speculators Base Outcome 
Frequent speculator Log (total assets) -0.419 0.029** 
 R&D ratio 25.504 0.000*** 
 Operating CF -17.027 0.000*** 
 Debt ratio 4.290 0.021** 
 Constant -0.795 0.698 
Temporary speculator Log (total assets) -0.366 0.013** 
 R&D ratio 15.963 0.000*** 
 Operating CF -5.805 0.086* 
 Debt ratio 1.186 0.444 
 Constant 1.224 0.294 
Observations  203  
Pseudo R-squared  0.252  
 
Panel B: Alternative regression model 
Dependent Variable Independent Variables Coef.     p-value 
Marginal speculators Base Outcome 
Frequent speculator Log (mkt value) -0.556 0.000*** 
 Capex ratio 10.342 0.007*** 
 Interest coverage -0.004 0.126 
 Debt ratio short-term 6.964 0.000*** 
 Constant -0.320 0.742 
Temporary speculator Log (mkt value) -0.208 0.011** 
 Capex ratio -9.796 0.060* 
 Interest coverage -0.004 0.005*** 
 Debt ratio short-term 1.105 0.345 
 Constant 1.085 0.162 
Observations  327  
Pseudo R-squared  0.144  
 
In the aggregate, the findings substantiate the evidence provided in our logit model and support 
all three parts of our hypothesis regarding empirical evidence for the convexity theories in FX 
risk management. A potential point of criticism for the firm classification and the multinomial 
logistic regression analysis is that it forces the weighted sum of positions into a rigid structure 
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with the fixed thresholds of 0.2 and 0.8. To mitigate this shortcoming, we alter these thresholds 
to ensure robustness of our results.  
3.4.3.3 Robustness of Results 
To ensure the stability of our results, we have already used a main and an alternative regression 
model with different firm characteristics in both the logit model in Table 12 and the multinomial 
logit model in Table 14, where the results of the multinomial logit analysis confirm the logit 
model. Further, our findings from the multinomial logit analysis hinge on the division of our 
sample into marginal, temporary or frequent speculators. To demonstrate robustness, we use 
alternative input parameters for the separation of our sample.  
First, the firm classification in the multinomial logit analysis into marginal, temporary and 
frequent speculator was based on the limits of 20 percent and 80 percent due to the findings of 
Hecht & Lampenius (2018). We alter these thresholds in a sensitivity analysis to the extent of 
+/- 10 percent. Table 15 reports the resulting estimates, Panel A [B] for the main [alternative] 
regression model, where we find overall robust evidence for both limits of 30 percent/70 
percent and 10 percent/90 percent. For both limit pairs and models, speculation remains to be 
negatively correlated to firm size, positively correlated to growth and negatively to liquidity, where a 
higher debt ratio confirms the lower operating cash flow for frequent speculators in relation to 
marginal speculators. For both limit pairs, the stated relationships are predominantly statistically 
significant at the 1 percent and 5 percent level with only few exceptions, where Panel A and B 
complement each other to mitigate the exceptions.  
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Table 15: Determinants of Speculation – Robustness Checks 
This table reports a robustness check of the multinomial logistic regression results of our firm classification as a 
function of firm characteristics with robust standard errors. The independent variables are the firm characteristics 
detailed in Table 10. Panel A [B] refers to our main [alternative] regression model detailed in Table 14, and present 
the outcome of the sensitivity analysis of the firm classification based on the limits of 20 percent and 80 percent to 
the extent of +/- 10 percent., where hedging [speculation] refers to risk-decreasing [risk-increasing/-constant] 
activities. The dependent variable can take the values marginal speculators, temporary speculator or frequent 
speculator according to their speculative share relative to total firm exposure, with the marginal speculators 
classification as base outcome. Log (total assets) is the logarithm of total assets, log (mkt value) the logarithm of 
market capitalization, the R&D [Capex] ratio divides the R&D expense [capital expenditures] by total revenues, the 
operating cash flow is standardized by total revenues and interest coverage is measured by the sum of pretax income 
plus interest expense, divided by interest expense. The [short-term] debt ratio captures total [current] liabilities in 
relation to total assets. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 8.  
Panel A: Robustness check ‘sensitivity analysis’ for main regression model 
     Limits of 30% and 70%   Limits of 10% and 90% 
Dependent Variable Independent 
Variables 
    Coef.         p-value 
 
   Coef.                p-value 
Marginal speculators Base Outcome 
Frequent speculator Log (total assets)  -0.295 0.066* -0.244 0.212 
 R&D ratio 12.879 0.000*** 21.536 0.000*** 
 Operating CF -12.409 0.000*** -15.340 0.001*** 
 Debt ratio 2.541 0.108 4.323 0.036** 
 Constant -0.219 0.895 -2.311 0.347 
Temporary speculator Log (total assets) -0.412 0.007*** -0.405 0.003*** 
 R&D ratio 3.851 0.152 5.065 0.081* 
 Operating CF -5.733 0.061* 3.927 0.213 
 Debt ratio 0.565 0.719 -1.645 0.308 
 Constant 2.220 0.084* 3.589 0.001*** 
Observations   203  203 
Pseudo R-squared   0.170  0.240 
 
Panel B: Robustness check ‘sensitivity analysis’ for alternative regression model 
  Limits of 30% and 70%            Limits of 10% and 90% 
Dependent Variable Independent 
Variables 
    Coef.        p-value 
 
              Coef.             p-value 
Marginal speculators Base Outcome 
Frequent speculator Log (mkt value) -0.463 0.000*** -0.452 0.000*** 
 Capex ratio 8.469 0.045** 2.828      0.635 
 Interest coverage -0.002 0.004*** -0.003 0.116 
 Debt ratio short-term 5.376 0.000*** 5.545 0.000*** 
 Constant -0.214 0.807 -0.167 0.878 
Temporary speculator Log (mkt value) -0.275 0.001*** -0.108 0.137 
 Capex ratio -2.447 0.555 -7.941 0.068* 
 Interest coverage -0.006 0.054* -0.001 0.003*** 
 Debt ratio short-term -0.175 0.885 -0.697 0.484 
 Constant 1.324 0.105 1.658 0.026** 
Observations         327  327 
Pseudo R-squared   0.120  0.091 
 
Second, we reduce the number of categories from three to two and divide our sample in only 
two homogeneous parts, where we attribute speculation with less [more] than 50 percent of a 
firm’s exposure to a minor speculator [major speculator]. The results are robust for all three 
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categories firm size, growth and liquidity (Appendix 10 provides the regression results). Overall, the 
outcomes confirm our main results and we deduce that they are not subject to a particular 
threshold for the definition of speculation.  
Finally, as we observed diverging results with the same dataset but different subperiods for 
Adam et al. (2017) and Brown et al. (2006), we test for a potential bias originating from our 
sample period. Consequently, we alter our sample period to check for robustness of our results 
from both the logit and multinomial logit analysis. We find robust evidence when we for 
example limit our sample period to the years of 2010 to 2013 or 2012 to 2015 in both the logit 
and multinomial logit model (Appendix 11 provides the regression results).   
3.5 Conclusion 
Until present, openly available publications did not enable the identification of corporate 
speculative activities. If at all, a retrospective determination by means of confidential, private 
sources could shed some light into the dark. We attempt to overcome this limitation by 
exploring a unique regulatory setting, where the regulating authority advocates additional 
disclosures that exceed existing IFRS reporting requirements. These optional recommendations 
in the realm of FX risk management enable the calculation of firm-, currency-, and year-specific 
hedge ratios. These hedge ratios allow us to identify speculation as activity that increases or holds 
currency-specific FX exposure constant and separates it from hedging that reduces currency-
specific FX exposure, so we are able to show that it is possible to identify speculative activities 
related to FX risk management reading public corporate disclosures.  
In addition, we focus on the determinants of speculation to help solve the issue of who these 
speculators are and why they speculate. So far, the empirical literature provides conflicting results 
on these determinants of corporate speculation. When analysing most recent empirical evidence, 
we deduce that the heterogenous findings may be the result of different methodologies in 
defining and determining speculation. Using our hedge ratio classification to distinguish between 
speculation (increasing or holding currency-specific FX exposure constant) and hedging 
(reducing currency-specific FX exposure), we provide evidence that frequent speculators are 
smaller, have more growth potential and are endowed with lower internal resources compared to 
marginal speculators. These, to our knowledge, unprecedented findings confirm the convexity 
theories in a corporate FX context.  
Finally, the new evidence on the determinants of speculation illustrates the significance of the 
additionally disclosed FX-information that might facilitate various benefits via an optional 
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supplement. In connection with the result of Sapra (2002), who assumes that firms are endowed 
with private information and finds that mandatory hedge disclosures might induce excessive 
speculation, future research is required as to whether regulatory improvements via optional or 
mandatory requirements are more appropriate to avoid incautious risk management activities.  
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3.7 Appendix  
Appendix 5: Template of Information Requested in the Registration Document  
This table presents the recommendations, including a numerical example currency position, detailed by the 
supervisor of the French financial markets, Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF), in position paper n°2009-16. In 
this guideline document, the AMF has established a so-called ‘registration document’, which as optional supplement, 
aims at providing additional information regarding risk management of foreign exchange exposure for various 
stakeholders. The original document is in French language and not available in English. 
Year  
Assets* 
[a] 
Liabilities* 
[b] 
Forecasted Exposure 
(Sales (+) and Purchases 
(-)) 
[c] 
Exposure 
Before 
Hedging 
[d] = [a] - [b] + 
[c] 
Hedging Instruments 
(Long (+) and Short (-)) 
[e] 
Exposure 
After Hedging 
[f] = [d] + [e] 
Currency 1 120 30 10 100 -50 50 
Currency 2             
Currency n             
…       
Total … … … … … … 
* Mostly in form of FX-trade receivables and FX-trade payables, respectively. 
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Appendix 6: Examples of Reported FX Information from Registration Documents  
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Appendix 7: Hedge Ratio Properties 
This table illustrates properties of the hedge ratio ( HR ) and contains a numerical illustration to demonstrate the 
combination of FX exposure before hedging (denominator) and the hedging instruments (numerator) in the hedge 
ratio using the column references introduced in Appendix 5. For illustrative purposes we assume as base scenario a 
firm with an exposure before hedging in a particular currency of 100 units, i.e.,  100bE . That firm can now take 
one out of six exemplary, fundamentally different positions that differ in the amount of hedging instruments ( H ) 
and the resulting exposure after hedging ( E a ), where two of the six positions result in a decrease in risk, two in an 
increase in risk and two keep the risk at a constant level. Further, it illustrates the hedge ratio range given the six 
fundamentally different positions.  
Hedge Ratio Range:  
 Risk-
increasing 
strategy 
 Risk-
decreasing 
strategy 
Risk-
decreasing 
strategy 
 Risk-
increasing 
strategy 
Risk-
constant 
strategy 
Risk-
constant 
strategy 
Exposure Before Hedging [d] 100  100 100  100 100 100 
Hedging Instruments [e] -250  -150 -50  50 -200 0 
Exposure After Hedging [f] -150  -50 50  150 -100 100 
Hedge Ratio (HR = [e] / [d]) -2.5  -1.5 -0.5  0.5 -2 0 
HR: 
 
 
Appendix 8: Definition of Variables  
Variables Description of variables 
Capex ratio Capital Expenditures / Total Revenues  
Quick ratio (Cash + Short-Term Investments) / Total Current Liabilities) 
Debt ratio  Total Liabilities / Total Assets 
Debt ratio short-term Total Current Liabilities / Total Assets 
b
tE  
Exposure before hedging in t  
HR  Hedge ratio with Ebt t tHR H  percentage of FX exposure covered by 
financial instruments 
tH  Hedging instruments in t   
Interest coverage (Pretax Income + Interest Expense) / Interest Expense 
Log (mkt value) Log (Com. Shares Outstanding * Closing Share Price End of Year) 
Operating CF Operating Cash Flow / Total Revenues 
R&D ratio R&D Expense / Total Revenues 
Speculation ratio This variable measures the value-weighted proportion of speculation 
per firm on a metric scale from 0 to 1, where 0 [1] indicates 100 percent 
hedging [speculation] with a firm’s total FX exposure during the sample 
period. 
∞ -2 0 -1 -∞ 
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Appendix 9: Determinants of Speculation – Logistic Regression with Quick Ratio 
This table reports the logistic regression results of our classification of FX derivative positions as a function of firm 
characteristics with robust standard errors. The dependent variable HR classification can take the values 0 [1] for 
positions classified as hedging [speculation], where hedging [speculation] refers to risk-decreasing [risk-increasing/-
constant] activities. The independent variables are the firm characteristics detailed in Table 10. Panel A details our 
main regression model with one financial characteristic per category firm size and growth, as well as one short-term 
liquidity indicator and one debt measure. In Panel B, we substitute each variable to ensure consistency in an 
alternative regression model. Log (total assets) is the logarithm of total assets, log (mkt value) the logarithm of 
market capitalization, the R&D [Capex] ratio divides the R&D expense [capital expenditures] by total revenues and 
the quick ratio is defined as cash and short-term investments over total current liabilities. The [short-term] debt ratio 
captures total [current] liabilities in relation to total assets. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 
percent and 1 percent level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 8. 
Panel A: Main regression model with Quick Ratio 
Dependent Variable Independent Variables Coef.     p-value 
HR classification Log (total assets) -0.329 0.000*** 
 R&D ratio  5.712 0.000*** 
 Quick ratio -0.340 0.168 
 Debt ratio  0.608 0.242 
 Constant  1.289 0.009*** 
Observations 1,097        
Pseudo R-squared 0.127   
 
Panel B: Alternative regression model with quick ratio 
Dependent Variable Independent Variables Coef.     p-value 
HR classification Log (mkt value) -0.319 0.000*** 
 Capex ratio  2.608 0.060* 
 Quick ratio -0.015 0.918 
 Debt ratio short-term  1.216 0.006*** 
 Constant  1.364 0.000*** 
Observations 1,737        
Pseudo R-squared 0.057   
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Appendix 10: Robustness Checks: Reduced Speculation Categories  
This table reports the logistic regression results of our firm classification as a function of firm characteristics with 
robust standard errors. The dependent variable is a binary dummy variable that can take the values minor 
speculators (0) or major speculator (1) on firm-level according to their speculative share relative to total firm 
exposure, where hedging [speculation] refers to risk-decreasing [risk-increasing/-constant] activities. Based on a limit 
of 50 percent, firms are labelled minor [major] speculator when speculating with less [more] than 50 percent of their 
exposure. The independent variables are the firm characteristics detailed in Table 10. Panel A [B] refers to our main 
[alternative] regression model detailed in Table 12. Log (total assets) is the logarithm of total assets, log (mkt value) 
the logarithm of market capitalization, the R&D [Capex] ratio divides the R&D expense [capital expenditures] by 
total revenues, the operating cash flow is standardized by total revenues and interest coverage is measured by the 
sum of pretax income plus interest expense, divided by interest expense. The [short-term] debt ratio captures total 
[current] liabilities in relation to total assets. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 
percent level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 8. 
Panel A: Robustness check ‘reduced speculation categories’ for main regression model 
Dependent Variable Independent Variables Coef.     p-value 
Minor/Major Spec. Log (total assets) -0.521 0.001*** 
 R&D ratio 10.043 0.000*** 
 Operating CF -5.926 0.021** 
 Debt ratio 2.493 0.083* 
 Constant 1.333 0.354 
Observations 327        
Pseudo R-squared 0.177   
 
Panel B: Robustness check ‘reduced speculation categories’ for alternative regression model 
Dependent Variable Independent Variables Coef.     p-value 
Minor/Major Spec. Log (mkt value) -0.511 0.000*** 
 Capex ratio  3.609 0.374 
 Interest Coverage -0.002 0.001*** 
 Debt ratio short-term  3.519 0.001*** 
 Constant  1.246 0.097* 
Observations 327        
Pseudo R-squared 0.177   
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Appendix 11: Robustness Checks: Alternative Sample Period  
This table reports the (multinomial) logistic regression results of our hedge ratio (firm) classification as a function of 
firm characteristics with robust standard errors. Panel A [B] refers to our main [alternative] regression model 
detailed in Table 12, but limits the sample period to the years 2010 to 2013 [2012 to 2015]. Here, the dependent 
variable is a binary dummy variable that can take the values hedging (0) or speculation (1) on currency position level, 
where hedging [speculation] refers to risk-decreasing [risk-increasing/-constant] activities. Panel C [D] refers to our 
main [alternative] regression model detailed in Table 14, but limits the sample period to the years 2010 to 2013 [2012 
to 2015]. Here, the dependent variable can take the values marginal speculator, temporary speculator or frequent 
speculator according to their speculative share relative to total firm exposure. The independent variables are the firm 
characteristics detailed in Table 10. Log (total assets) is the logarithm of total assets, log (mkt value) the logarithm of 
market capitalization, the R&D [Capex] ratio divides the R&D expense [capital expenditures] by total revenues, the 
operating cash flow is standardized by total revenues and interest coverage is measured by the sum of pretax income 
plus interest expense, divided by interest expense. The [short-term] debt ratio captures total [current] liabilities in 
relation to total assets. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 8. 
Panel A: Robustness check ‘sample period’ for main regression model with HR classification 
       Years 2010 – 2013         Years 2012 – 2015 
Dependent  
Variable 
Independent   Variables    Coef.           p-value 
 
     Coef.               p-value 
HR classification Log (total assets) -0.279 0.000*** -0.399 0.000*** 
 R&D ratio 4.385 0.000*** 6.111 0.000*** 
 Operating CF -2.628 0.038** -1.198 0.394 
 Debt ratio -1.082 0.117 1.467 0.054* 
 Constant -2.222 0.001*** 1.312 0.041** 
Observations   694  758 
Pseudo R-squared   0.100  0.175 
 
Panel B: Robustness check ‘sample period’ for alternative regression model with HR classification 
       Years 2010 – 2013         Years 2012 – 2015 
Dependent  
Variable 
Independent   Variables    Coef.           p-value 
 
     Coef.               p-value 
HR classification Log (mkt value) -0.254 0.000*** -0.326 0.000*** 
 Capex ratio 0.430 0.812 3.601 0.037** 
 Interest coverage -0.001 0.001*** -0.001 0.093* 
 Debt ratio short-term 0.281 0.573* 1.832 0.000*** 
 Constant 1.407 0.001*** 1.212 0.001*** 
Observations   1121  1180 
Pseudo R-squared   0.053  0.071 
 
Panel C: Robustness check ‘sample period’ for main regression model with firm classification 
       Years 2010 – 2013         Years 2012 – 2015 
Dependent Variable Independent 
Variables 
   Coef.            p-value 
 
     Coef.               p-value 
Marginal speculators Base Outcome 
Frequent speculator Log (total assets) -0.384 0.095* -0.478 0.068* 
 R&D ratio 25.371 0.000*** 26.235 0.000*** 
 Operating CF -18.233 0.001*** -16.223 0.001*** 
 Debt ratio 2.511 0.282 5.551 0.027** 
 Constant 0.138 0.958 -1.346 0.646 
Temporary speculator Log (total assets) -0.421 0.022** -0.259 0.146 
 R&D ratio 15.748 0.000*** 16.838 0.000*** 
 Operating CF -2.953 0.539 -8.407 0.033* 
 Debt ratio 2.880 0.177 -0.357 0.849 
 Constant 0.262 0.869 1.611 0.247 
Observations   131  141 
Pseudo R-squared   0.256  0.260 
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Panel D: Robustness check ‘sample period’ for alternative regression model with firm classification 
       Years 2010 – 2013       Years 2012 – 2015 
Dependent Variable Independent  
Variables 
    Coef.         p-value 
 
              Coef.             p-value 
Marginal speculators Base Outcome 
Frequent speculator Log (mkt value) -0.545 0.000*** -0.575 0.000*** 
 Capex ratio 10.446      0.023** 10.261 0.020** 
 Interest coverage -0.002 0.063* -0.003 0.142 
 Debt ratio short-term 6.076 0.000*** 7.027 0.000*** 
 Constant -0.145 0.909 -0.129 0.916 
Temporary speculator Log (mkt value) -0.205 0.036** -0.169 0.093* 
 Capex ratio -7.613 0.214 -15.485 0.018** 
 Interest coverage -0.006 0.027** -0.003 0.006*** 
 Debt ratio short-term 1.307 0.370 1.031 0.443 
 Constant 0.896 0.369 1.077 0.234 
Observations         217  224 
Pseudo R-squared   0.133  0.160 
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Using new publicly reported data on interest rate (IR) exposure before and 
after hedging with corresponding hedged amounts, we tackle the 
complexity of IR risk and examine how firms manage their exposure. We 
find that assets are an essential component of the IR exposure and that 
firms predominantly swap from fixed- to floating-rate positions in the 
short-to medium-term. Based on calculated firm-, year-, maturity-, and 
currency-specific hedge ratios, we find that 63 [37] percent of IR firm 
exposure are managed using risk-decreasing [risk-increasing/-constant] 
strategies. When we attribute these findings to speculative behavior and 
combine the IR- with currency data, we find that a firm that speculates with 
IR derivatives does not necessarily speculate with currency derivatives, and 
that the exposure of frequent speculators is significantly smaller for both IR 
and currency risk. 
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4.1 Introduction 
“[I]nterest rate risk may be more complex, since identifying a firm’s interest rate exposure is not so 
straightforward” 50  
Faulkender (2005) points out that interest rate (IR) risk is complex, more complex than foreign 
exchange (FX) or commodity risk, which makes it difficult to determine a firm’s interest rate 
exposure and thus to analyze how firms manage their interest rate risk. A major reason is that 
interest rate risk comprises two different types of risk, the cash flow and the fair value risk, with 
important interdependencies. To manage this complexity, the extant literature assumes that firms 
work toward a target fixed/floating debt structure and hence analyze the mix of fixed- and 
floating-rate debt as proxy for IR exposure (e.g., Chava & Purnanandam, 2007; Chernenko & 
Faulkender, 2011; Oberoi, 2018). However, non-financial firms focus, in contrast to banks and 
financial corporations, on the cash flow risk (Backhaus, 2018)51 rather than working with a target 
fixed/floating mix as anecdotal evidence from interviewed treasury executives suggests. Further, 
the debt-based approach in literature neglects that assets might be an essential component of the 
IR exposure of non-financial firms.  
To analyze the two risk types separately and focus on the cash flow risk for non-financial firms, 
we exploit a unique regulatory environment that contains publicly reported IR exposure data 
separately for fixed- and floating-rate positions. Our new, hand-collected dataset further details 
the firms’ exposures before and after hedging with corresponding hedged amounts, which allows 
us to examine how firms manage their IR exposure based on an unprecedented data granularity. 
As additional advantage, the dataset also illustrates the composition of the exposure between 
assets and liabilities, which enables us to test whether the debt-based approach in literature is 
appropriate or whether assets are an integral part of firms’ IR exposure.  
Bartram (2002) and Glaum (2011) illustrate the importance of interest rate risk and its 
management for non-financial firms where hedging the cash flow risk is not the same as hedging 
the fair value risk. The cash flow risk describes the direct impact of interest rate changes on 
payments for floating-rate financial assets and liabilities, while the fair value risk represents the 
                                                 
50  As appeared in the Journal of Finance article “Hedging or market timing? Selecting the interest rate exposure 
of corporate debt” by Faulkender (2005, p. 935). 
51  Anecdotal evidence from four consulted treasury executives of major German non-financial corporations, 
including two DAX-30 firms, confirms this emphasis on the floating-rate interest rate exposure of non-
financial firms. Further, our sample firms indicate in their annual disclosures that they focus on the cash 
flow risk.  
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effect of interest rate fluctuations on the market value of fixed-rate financial assets and liabilities. 
Both types can impact the borrowing capacity of a firm (Oberoi, 2018). In addition, the by far 
most important hedging instrument, i.e., an interest rate swap (Backhaus, 2018; Chava & 
Purnanandam, 2007), creates interrelations between both risk types: When hedging the cash flow 
risk by decreasing its floating-rate exposure with swap contracts, this involves a direct increase of 
its fixed-rate positions, i.e., of the fair value risk. To examine how firms manage their IR 
exposure, the existing literature assumes a target fixed/floating ratio and analyzes the mix of 
fixed- and floating-rate debt (e.g., Chava & Purnanandam, 2007; Chernenko & Faulkender, 2011; 
Oberoi, 2018). For example, Chava & Purnanandam (2007) analyze the determinants of a firm’s 
debt structure using the share of floating-rate debt of total corporate debt as key indicator. Most 
recently, Oberoi (2018)’s central theme is the choice and trade-off between cash flow and fair 
value risk. Using the proportion of fixed-rate debt as major element, Oberoi (2018) examines the 
after-swap mix of fixed- and floating-rate debt of non-financial firms. In order to focus on the 
relevant cash flow risk, data granularity would be required to isolate the cash flow from the fair 
value risk and to separately analyze the cash flow risk actions.  
With his dataset that takes advantage of the accounting regulations during the 1990s, Oberoi 
(2018) states that he is able to overcome some of the data limitations in literature. Using actual 
derivative positions specifying the face value and direction of the derivative instead of proxy 
variables, Oberoi (2018) combines this information with data on debt positions to analyze how 
firms modify the mix of fixed- and floating-rate debt with derivative transactions. Far beyond 
that, our dataset from the 2010s provides – separately for fixed- and floating-rate exposure – 
information on the actual IR exposure before and after hedging together with the amount of 
hedging instruments, and further describes the composition of the exposure in terms of assets 
and liabilities. In addition, the entire information is usually stated separately for maturities up to 
one year, between one and five as well as beyond five years. This innovative database enables us 
to analyze entirely new aspects of the interest rate risk management activities of non-financial 
firms and distinguishes us from the existing literature.  
The analysis of the reported data shows that assets are a meaningful ingredient in the interest rate 
exposure of our non-financial sample firms, in particular for floating-rate positions. In addition, 
we find that firms use hedging instruments to swap from fixed- to floating-rate positions 
predominantly in the short-to medium-term. Further, we use the advanced disclosures on the 
exposure before and after hedging to determine firm-, year-, maturity-, and currency-specific 
hedge ratios for interest rate risk management activities for both fixed- and floating-rate 
positions. These hedge ratios enable us to analyze whether firms decrease, increase or keep their 
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exposure constant with IR derivative transactions. We find that overall 63 percent of IR firm 
exposure are managed using risk-decreasing strategies, while 37 percent are managed using risk-
increasing/-constant strategies, where our sample firms seem to be more risk-taking in the long 
run.  
Next, we relate these findings to speculative behavior in IR risk management, where Oberoi 
(2018) states that, especially with regard to interest rates, the disentanglement of hedging and 
speculative activities is too complex to be measured by simple proxies. The granularity of our 
dataset allows us to help solve this problem of capturing speculation empirically. Following the 
extant literature that uses the terms hedging [speculation] for risk-decreasing [risk-increasing/-
constant] strategies, we label the characteristic values (i.e., risk-decreasing, risk-increasing, risk-
constant) of our hedge ratio variable – as simple proxy for hedging and speculative behavior – 
accordingly. Our analysis of the financial characteristics of IR-speculators indicates that frequent 
speculators have less growth opportunities and higher short- and long-term liquidity. Similar to 
the advanced disclosures on IR risk management, the regulatory environment also advocates FX 
information with similar data granularity (Hecht, 2018).52 We document that the evidence from 
interest rates does not match with the result from the FX setting, but it corresponds to Géczy, 
Minton, & Schrand (2007), who simultaneously analyze the IR- and FX risk behavior of their 
sample firms, and find no significant overlap between IR- and FX-speculators. To empirically 
verify potential interdependencies between both risk types, we combine the present IR- with the 
FX-dataset of Hecht (2018), and find that firms that speculate with FX-derivatives do not 
necessarily speculate with IR-derivatives. In contrast to Géczy et al. (2007), we find the exposure 
of frequent speculators to be significantly smaller for both FX and IR risk. Interestingly, we 
observe that the exposure of firms that frequently speculate with FX risk is short, while the 
exposure of firms that speculate to a lesser extent is long. For the floating IR risk, we find the 
opposite: the exposure of frequent speculators is long, whereas marginal and temporary 
speculators have a short exposure. This suggests that currency speculators could engage in risk-
increasing activities to reduce their payments on liabilities, whereas IR-speculators use their 
floating-rate assets for speculative transactions.  
Finally, we examine the interdependency of accounting and derivative usage. Similar to Hecht 
(2018) for the FX-context, we find speculation to be negatively associated with the probability of 
applying hedge accounting in an IR-context. However, this correlation between the accounting 
                                                 
52  Hecht (2018) documents that frequent speculators are smaller, have more growth opportunities and 
possess lower internal resources, which indicates unprecedented empirical evidence for the theories for 
optimal speculation (Adam et al., 2007; Campbell & Kracaw, 1999).  
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policy and speculative elements is merely an indication and not a necessary or sufficient 
condition for speculation. 
We contribute to the literature on corporate interest rate risk management in three ways. First, 
based on the granularity of our dataset we are able to differentiate between the exposure before 
and after hedging for fixed- and floating-rate positions across different maturities and currencies 
and hence contribute to the understanding of how firms manage their IR exposure. Moreover, 
we demonstrate that assets are an important component of the interest rate exposure of non-
financial firms. Second, the granularity of the data enables us to establish a hedge ratio measure 
that allows discriminating interest rate positions as risk-decreasing, risk-increasing or risk-
constant. Following the designation of risk-increasing/-constant positions as speculation in the 
literature, we are able to provide new evidence on speculative elements in corporate interest rate 
risk management. Third, by combining the IR- with the FX-dataset of Hecht (2018), we are to 
our knowledge the first to illustrate dissimilarities between IR and FX speculation based on 
reported quantitative data.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 illustrates the new level of 
granularity of our dataset with the sample description and establishes the hedge ratio measure. 
Section 4.3 analyzes the reported data on IR risk management to illustrate how firms manage 
their IR exposure. Section 4.4 deals with speculative elements in IR risk management and related 
activities. Section 4.5 concludes.  
4.2 Data and Sample Description 
4.2.1 Information Provided in the Registration Document 
We examine publicly available accounting data from France due to the prevailing unique 
regulatory environment, where the regulating authority endorses the publication of advanced 
disclosures on corporate interest rate risk management that exceed existing IFRS requirements 
through an optional supplement. In the preparation guidelines (position paper n°2009-16, 
Autorité des Marchés Financiers, 2009) for this so-called ‘registration document’53, the supervisor 
of the French financial markets, the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF), recommends 
enhanced corporate disclosures concerning the management of interest rate risks. Exceeding the 
specifications of IFRS 7 §33 and 34, firms are requested to provide information on the 
                                                 
53  For details on the ‘registration document’ refer to http://www.amf-france.org/en_US/Acteurs-et-
produits/Societes-cotees-et-operations-financieres/Document-de-reference.html. 
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composition of their interest rate risk as well as on their IR exposure before and after 
management by year and with the differentiation of fixed-and floating-rate positions. Beyond 
that, most firms also differentiate their specifications by maturity and currency, which is similar 
to above, voluntary.54 Table 16 demonstrates the recommended format for the data provision by 
the AMF with exemplary figures.  
Table 16: Template of Information Requested in the Registration Document  
This table presents the recommendations, including a numerical example, detailed by the supervisor of the French 
financial markets, Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF), in position paper n°2009-16. In this guidance document, 
the AMF has established a so-called ‘registration document’, which, as an optional supplement, is intended to 
provide additional information on interest rate risk management activities for various stakeholders. The original 
document is in French language and not available in English. 
 
Year  
Financial Assets* 
[a] 
Financial Liabilities* 
[b] 
Exposure Before 
Hedging 
[c] = [a] - [b] 
Hedging Instruments  
[d] 
Exposure After 
Hedging 
[e] = [c] + [d] 
 
Fixed 
Rate 
Floating 
Rate 
Fixed 
Rate 
Floating 
Rate 
Fixed 
Rate 
Floating 
Rate 
Fixed 
Rate 
Floating 
Rate 
Fixed 
Rate 
Floating 
Rate 
Less than 1 year 130 … 30 … 100 … -50 … 50 … 
From 1 to 2 years                
------                
More than 5 years           
Total … … … … … … … … … … 
* The issuer specifies in the registration document which financial assets and liabilities have been taken into account. 
  
 
In detail, firms typically specify separately their fixed- and floating-rate assets (column [a]) and 
liabilities (column [b]) that are subject to interest rate risk. Further, the registration document 
contains the netted sum of these figures, i.e., the exposure before hedging for fixed- and floating- 
rate positions individually (column [c]). Further, the firms provide information on the 
corresponding hedging instruments (column [d]), that can be long (positive) or short (negative), 
and the resulting exposure after hedging (column [e]). In addition, the row headers in Table 16 
indicate that this information on interest rate exposure is further broken down in terms of 
maturity, where firms predominantly split into maturities up to one, between one and five as well 
as beyond five years. To illustrate the structure of the analyzed data, assume a firm that reports 
130 units of fixed-rate assets and 30 units of fixed-rate liabilities to be subject to interest rate risk. 
The netted position of 100 units (130 – 30) is reported as exposure before hedging ( btE ), which 
is hedged with corresponding hedging instruments ( tH ) of, for example, 50 units. The exposure 
after hedging results in 50 units (100 + (-50)). Similar to this example with fixed-rate positions, 
                                                 
54  63 percent of our sample firms distinguish in their specification between different maturities, 
predominantly between up to one year, between one and five as well as beyond five years.  
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the firm reports its floating- rate exposure in the same structure. In addition, both the fixed- and 
floating-rate interest rate exposure data are usually specified separately for maturities up to one 
year, between one and five as well as beyond five years, and if applicable, the firm provides this 
data for other relevant currencies. Appendix 12 provides examples of the reported IR 
information from the registration documents. Altogether, the reported data in the registration 
document captures the firm-, year-, maturity- and currency-specific interest rate exposure before 
and after hedging separately for fixed- and floating-rate positions of our sample firms. This new 
level of granularity allows us to accurately determine a firm’s interest rate exposure and to 
examine how firms manage their IR exposure from new perspectives.    
4.2.2 Hedge Ratio Measure  
The detailed information provided in the registration documents enables us to evaluate the IR 
activities based on hedge ratios. We use the data on the exposure before and after hedging 
together with the hedged amount to determine firm-, year-, maturity-, and currency-specific 
hedge ratios for fixed- and floating-rate positions separately. For this purpose, we define a hedge 
ratio in t  ( tHR ) as  E
b
t t tHR H , where tH  denotes the hedging instruments and 
b
tE  the 
exposure before hedging in t , so that hedge ratios illustrate the percentage of IR exposure 
covered by financial instruments. Since both tH  and 
b
tE  can be positive or negative (i.e., long 
and short), HR  can also take positive and negative values. Note that a long [short] derivative 
position ( tH ) is identified through a positive [negative] sign and that a combination with a 
positive [negative] exposure before hedging ( btE ) results in s positive [negative] hedge ratio 
( HR ). In analogy to Hecht & Lampenius (2018), Appendix 13 illustrates this combination of the 
hedging instruments (numerator) and the exposure before hedging (denominator) in the hedge 
ratio, where we assume a base scenario with a long exposure before hedging of 100 units, i.e., 
100bE  . In dependence on the amount of hedging instruments, Appendix 13 demonstrates 
numerically the six exemplary, fundamentally different positions a firm may take. Two of these 
six positions are risk-decreasing, where first hedging short e.g., 50 units with hedging instruments 
( 50H   , 0.5HR   ) decreases a firm’s IR exposure from 100 to 50 units, and second hedging 
short e.g., 150 units ( 150H   , 1.5HR   ) also decreases a firm’s IR exposure from 100 to a 
short exposure of -50 units.55 Further, we identify two positions that are risk-increasing, where 
                                                 
55  The overhedging changes the sign of the exposure, which could imply speculative intentions. Similar to 
Hecht & Lampenius (2018) and Hecht (2018), we can classify such positions as risk-decreasing, since 
imperfect hedge conditions in the real world also lead to under-/overhedging (Hull, 2015).  
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first hedging short e.g., 250 units ( 250H   , 2.5HR   ) results in a ‘higher’ short IR exposure 
(from 100 to -150 units) and second hedging long e.g., 50 units ( 50H  , 0.5HR  ) results also 
in a higher long IR exposure (from 100 to now 150 units). Finally, two positions are risk-
constant, where not hedging ( 0H  , 0.0HR  ) and hedging short 200 units using derivative 
instruments ( 200H   , 2.0HR   ) keeps the level of exposure constant. Appendix 13 further 
demonstrates the overall hedge ratio range, where the two risk-constant strategies (  2HR  and 
0 ) mark the limits between risk-decreasing and risk-increasing strategies. While all positive hedge 
ratios ( 0HR  ) as well as hedge ratios below –2 ( 2HR   ) increase risk, negative hedge ratios 
between –2 and 0 ( 2 0HR   ) decrease risk. This distribution of the different positions 
illustrates the discontinuous nature of the hedge ratio in relation to the categories of risk-
increasing and risk-decreasing. Thus, the interpretation of the hedge ratio is range-dependent. 
Most importantly, since the information provided in the registration document distinguishes 
between fixed- and floating-rate positions, we can derive two hedge ratios per year and firm. 
Overall, this approach allows us to determine interest rate positions that either decrease, increase 
or keep IR exposure constant. Such an unprecedented discrimination of hedging activities with 
derivative transactions in IR risk management is in line with the general literature on corporate 
risk management. Both Hentschel & Kothari (2001) and Allayannis & Ofek (2001) use stock 
returns as central risk measure and refer to risk-decreasing [risk-increasing] strategies as hedging 
[speculation]. Further, Zhang (2009) differentiates between ‘effective hedgers’ [‘ineffective 
hedgers/speculators’] for firms that [fail to] reduce their risk exposure, where Zhang (2009) 
compares the risk exposure to an expected risk level. Due to the information content of our 
dataset, we can rely on actually reported results.56  
4.2.3 Sample Selection 
As the position paper of the AMF with the recommendations and details for the preparation of 
the registration document dates from December 2009, we start our analysis with the year 2010 
and include the period until 2015. Our panel dataset comprises all French firms quoted in the 
CAC All-Tradable index as of April 2016. The initial sample includes 333 firms, where we 
exclude 18 financial firms due to their different business model and motivation for derivative 
usage. For all remaining 315 firms, we hand-collect the reported information on IR-exposure and 
                                                 
56  Chava & Purnanandam (2007) also discuss the question of risk-decreasing or risk-increasing for IR only, 
but in a different context. Chava & Purnanandam (2007) approximate the managerial incentive to decrease 
[increase] firm risk by the delta [vega] of the CEO’s and CFO’s stock and option holdings, and show that 
risk-increasing and risk-reducing incentives of chief financial officers influence the debt structure of firms 
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corresponding hedged amounts per year, maturity, currency and type of risk (fixed- or floating-
rate). Since 178 firms do not have any or no material IR exposure and 69 firm do not report the 
IR exposure according to the recommendations of the AMF57, we are able to collect the relevant 
data for 68 firms (952 firm-year observations). Further, 12 firms provide the required IR 
information but never hedge. Following Adam et al. (2015), we exclude these to avoid a bias 
towards firms that never hedge their IR risks, i.e., we only include active hedgers. Our final 
sample counts 56 firms and 752 firm-year observations across 48 industries (according to the 
four digit SIC code), where we possess per firm-year observation one specification for fixed-rate 
and one for floating-rate positions separately. We match this information of our sample firms on 
IR exposure with interest rate data from Bloomberg (see section 4.3.2) and with firm 
characteristics from the Compustat Global Vantage database (see section 4.4). To eliminate data 
outliers, we winsorize the firm characteristics to the 1st and 99th percentile. The hand-collected 
data on interest rate risk management activities is not winsorized, since all data points are 
meaningful. We ignore all transaction costs related to hedging activities and assume IR markets 
to be efficient in the weak sense of informational efficiency (Fama, 1970).  
4.3 Empirical Analysis 
4.3.1 Analysis of the Reported Data on IR Exposure and its Management 
Exposure, not only to interest rate risk, usually has two sides: assets and liabilities, i.e., it can be 
long or short. For example, following the cash flow risk, a raise in interest rates increases both 
incoming payments on floating-rate assets and outgoing payments on floating-rate debt. 
Consequently, the accurate exposure to interest rate risk is the netted position of both assets and 
liabilities (column [c] according to Table 16). While the extant literature has so far concentrated 
on the liability side, with a focus on debt issues and the mix of fixed- and floating-rate debt (e.g., 
Antoniou, Zhao, & Zhou, 2009; Chava & Purnanandam, 2007; Chernenko & Faulkender, 2011; 
Faulkender, 2005; Oberoi, 2018; Vickery, 2008), the granularity of our dataset enables the 
differentiation of assets and liabilities. If the liabilities dominate in the exposure before hedging 
and assets are negligibly small, the debt-based approach would be justified. Otherwise, it could 
lead to a potential bias. To examine whether assets are an integral part of the IR exposure of 
                                                 
57  Due to the optional disclosure of the detailed IR data, our results could be subject to a selection bias. In 
view of the high direct cost of compliance with the guidelines of the AMF, as firms have to provide 
additional information on their activity, financial situation and prospects in the registration document, we 
consider the selection bias as not significant.  
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non-financial firms, we analyze the distribution of assets, liabilities and the exposure before 
hedging of our sample firms, separately for fixed- and floating-rate positions.  
Table 17: Descriptive Statistics of IR Exposure and Hedging Instruments 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the (composition of) IR exposure before and after hedging together with 
associated hedging instruments. The entries correspond to the information requested in the registration document as 
illustrated in Table 16. 
 
No. Obs. Mean Median SD Min Max 
Fix Float Fix Float Fix Float Fix Float Fix Float Fix Float 
Assets 138 354 144.495 869.678 45.782 194.600 265.554 1751.415 0.130 -48.400 1,645 12,307 
Liabilities 464 580 1046.438 537.844 186.859 128.809 2152.266 1080.264 -51.000 -26.076 13,741 9,549 
Exposure Before Hedging 535 690 -1704.125 -123.337 -123.100 -27.650 6140.531 1566.589 -56,840 -9,250 4,128 11,047 
Hedging Instruments  328 477 245.786 -34.597 -20.800 47.400 1787.637 1640.333 -2,900 -22,261 22,261 5,860 
Exposure After Hedging* 582 693 -1428.013 -146.616 -100.00 -11.000 5080.528 2181.624 -47,462 -29,604 3,128 10,024 
* Due to the fact that not all positions of the exposure before hedging are covered with hedging instruments, the average/median exposure after 
hedging is not simply the sum of the exposure before hedging and hedging instruments.  
 
As Table 17 shows, we find average fixed-rate [floating-rate] assets of 144.50 [869.68] million 
Euros and average fixed-rate [floating-rate] liabilities of 1046.44 [537.84] million Euros, i.e., 
assets seem to be meaningful, in particular for floating-rate positions. Similarly, the histograms of 
the exposure before hedging for fixed- and floating-rate positions in Figure 1 confirm that assets 
are a non-negligible part of the floating-rate exposure. In total, we observe the exposure before 
hedging for fixed-rate positions to be long [short] and hence mainly driven by assets [liabilities] 
in 16 [84] percent of the observations, while for floating-rate positions the exposure before 
hedging is long [short] in 37 [63] percent of the observations. As Table 17 further illustrates, the 
average exposure before hedging for fixed-rate [floating-rate] positions amounts to -1704.13 [-
123.34] million Euros.58 Overall, these findings demonstrate that – especially for floating-rate 
positions – assets are an essential component of the interest rate exposure of our non-financial 
sample firms.  
                                                 
58  Determining the average exposure before hedging by deducting liabilities of assets is not possible because 
some firms do not distinguish between assets and liabilities but directly report the exposure before 
hedging. 
How Do Firms Manage Their Interest Rate Exposure? 
 
91 
Figure 1: Histogram: Exposure Before Hedging 
This figure reports the distribution of the exposure before hedging as detailed in Table 17, where Panel A relates to 
the fixed-rate exposure and Panel B to the floating-rate exposure.  
Panel A: Fixed-Rate Exposure Before Hedging 
 
Panel B: Floating-Rate Exposure Before Hedging 
 
As can be seen from the column ’SD’, the standard deviation is quite large and hence indicates a 
greater variance in the underlying values. Since the median is more robust to outliers, Table 17 
includes the median for all positions. Similar to the average values for the exposure before 
hedging, the median values in Table 17 also show that assets are substantial and that the IR 
exposure is overall negative, i.e., short for both fixed- and floating-rate positions with -123.10   [-
27.65] million Euros. For the hedging instruments, we find a median for fixed-rate [floating-rate] 
positions of -20.80 [47.40]. This indicates that – based on the median – our sample firms lower 
[raise] their fixed-rate [floating-rate] exposure, i.e., swap from fixed- to floating-rate positions. 
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Similarly to the exposure before hedging, the exposure after hedging is also negative in both 
cases, with a median for fixed-rate [floating-rate] positions of -100.00 [-11.00] million Euros.  
Of particular interest is also how firms manage this exposure for different maturities. Following 
the recommendation of the AMF, the majority of our sample firms disclose their information on 
interest rate exposure differentiated by maturities of up to one, between one and five as well as 
beyond five years. This allows us to analyze (the distribution of) assets, liabilities, the exposure 
before and after hedging as well as the corresponding hedged amounts separately by maturity. To 
the best of our knowledge, there is no study with access to such data granularity. 
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Table 18: Maturity Analysis 
This table presents the maturity analysis of assets, liabilities, the IR exposure before and after hedging as well as 
associated hedging instruments, broken down into maturities less than one year, between one and five years and 
more than five years. The entries correspond to the information requested in the registration document as illustrated 
in Table 16. 
 Assets 
Maturity 
No. Obs. Mean Median SD 
Fix Float Fix Float Fix Float Fix Float 
Less than 1 year 64 169 194.113 1.139.330 59.000 284.550 349.546 2.146.872 
Between 1-5 years 36 42 38.939 55.694 10.800 15.900 57.518 115.468 
More than 5 years 22 19 79.024 89.950 1.255 54.400 140.732 116.031 
 
 Liabilities 
Maturity 
No. Obs. Mean Median SD 
Fix Float Fix Float Fix Float Fix Float 
Less than 1 year 123 199 349.972 353.733 48.007 109.050 765.549 581.136 
Between 1-5 years 141 170 935.143 375.624 316.500 154.400 1591.821 786.346 
More than 5 years 92 66 662.083 86.111 222.400 28.500 1.074.062 140.448 
 
 Exposure Before Hedging 
Maturity 
No. Obs. Mean Median SD 
Fix Float Fix Float Fix Float Fix Float 
Less than 1 year 134 207 -98.335 604.706 -5.048 49.394 988.564 1.624.736 
Between 1-5 years 149 178 -746.359 -326.989 -220.750 -145.400 1738.518 767.525 
More than 5 years 100 84 -558.808 -41.230 -115.000 -9.600 1.059.572 164.758 
 
 Hedging Instruments 
Maturity 
No. Obs. Mean Median SD 
Fix Float Fix Float Fix Float Fix Float 
Less than 1 year 97 135 36.373 41.108 -31.220 42.920 551.721 560.944 
Between 1-5 years 98 134 30.615 131.490 -47.727 80.000 816.970 791.377 
More than 5 years 22 29 84.643 -116.196 -9.200 7.200 357.282 472.235 
 
 Exposure After Hedging 
Maturity 
No. Obs. Mean Median SD 
Fix Float Fix Float Fix Float Fix Float 
Less than 1 year 156 200 -61.850 653.658 -25.000 127.332 636.758 1.603.871 
Between 1-5 years 157 180 -689.143 -225.636 -175.500 -77.000 1349.712 840.485 
More than 5 years 100 92 -540.852 -73.358 -125.000 -9.600 1035.7926 300.492 
 
We find clear differences among the analyzed items in terms of the stated maturities. Table 18 
reports this maturity analysis separately for mean and median values, where we focus on median 
values, as they are less vulnerable to outliers. We find that both fixed- and floating-rate assets 
that are subject to interest rate risk occur predominantly in the short-term, i.e., with a maturity 
lower than one year. As concerns liabilities, fixed- and floating-rate positions differ: fixed-rate 
liabilities arise mainly with maturities between one and five as well as beyond five years, while 
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floating-rate liabilities occur predominantly with a maturity lower than one and between one and 
five years. This also applies to the exposure before and after hedging. With regard to the utilized 
hedging instruments, Table 18 illustrates that interest rate hedging predominantly occurs – on 
median – for both fixed- and floating-rate positions in the short-to medium-term, i.e., with a 
maturity lower than one and between one and five years. Interestingly, the different leading signs 
for fixed- and floating-rate positions indicate that our sample firms swap – on median – from 
fixed- to floating-rate positions. This is in line with Table 17 above, where we also find for the 
median that the fixed-rate [floating-rate] exposure is decreased [increased] using hedging 
instruments, i.e., swapped from fixed- to floating-rate positions. A potential explanation for this 
observed pattern could be that our sample firms finance themselves in long-term fixed-rate 
position and swap these into floating-rate positions in the short-term to benefit from the 
historically low interest rates, as one interviewed treasury executive suspected. In line with this 
behavior, we find in a breakdown by year that the hedging instruments are negative for fixed- 
and positive for floating-rate positions across all six years.   
The granularity of our dataset also allows us to differentiate between the interest rate exposures 
in different currencies of our French sample firms. By far the most common currency is naturally 
the EUR, with more than 80 percent (602 observations), followed by the USD with about 10 
percent (78 observations) of the positions. The following currencies are in descending order the 
BRL, JPY, CNY, THB, AUD, INR, CAD and GBP, but account only for very few 
observations.59  
4.3.2 Hedge Ratio Analysis 
Exposure to interest rates implies two types of risk: first the cash flow risk and second the fair 
value risk. The cash flow risk refers to the effect of interest rate changes on payments for 
floating-rate financial assets and liabilities, whereas the fair value risk describes the impact of 
interest rate changes on the market value of fixed-rate financial assets and liabilities. While recent 
articles on IR risk management assume that firms work toward a target fixed/floating exposure 
(e.g., Chava & Purnanandam, 2007; Chernenko & Faulkender, 2011; Oberoi, 2018), anecdotal 
evidence from indicative interviews with treasury executives shows that non-financial firms take 
                                                 
59  Few firms also group their remaining exposure in unspecified ‘Other Currencies’ (27 observations, less 
than 4 percent of all observations). Appendix 14 explains all currency codes. 
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particular interest in the cash flow risk and hence floating-rate positions (Backhaus, 2018)60. 
Contrary to the extant literature, the granularity of our dataset allows us to separately evaluate 
fixed-and floating-rate interest rate exposures and thus to put the focus on the floating-rate 
positions. 
To analyze how firms manage these different interest rate exposures, we examine whether firms 
increase or decrease their risk with interest rate derivatives. For this purpose, we summarize 
descriptive statistics of the hedge ratios in Table 19, separately for fixed-rate and floating-rate 
positions in Panel A and B, respectively. As the previous section indicates, our sample firms 
swap from fix to floating, i.e., the median for the hedging instruments is short [long] for fixed-
rate [floating-rate] positions. To be able to determine whether swapping from fix to floating is 
risk-decreasing or risk-increasing, we need to take the exposure before hedging into account. As 
illustrated in Table 17, the exposure for both fixed-rate and floating-rate positions is – on 
average and median – negative, i.e., this short exposure is then associated with short [long] 
hedging instruments for fixed-rate [floating-rate] positions. In case of fixed-rate positions, 
combining the short exposure with short derivative instruments would be risk-increasing, while 
for floating-rate positions the short exposure combined with long derivative instruments would 
be risk-decreasing.  
This connection of hedging instruments (numerator) and the exposure before hedging 
(denominator) and is captured in hedge ratios, which we further analyze on a position level. For 
fixed-rate positions, we find that approximately 26 percent (137 observations) of the positions 
are risk-decreasing, with approximately the same percentage of positions being risk-increasing 
(27 percent, 143 observations). The remaining share of approximately 46 percent (242 
observations) are risk-constant positions, i.e., the exposure is not hedged. For floating-rate 
positions, we observe a different allocation. Risk-decreasing positions are now the majority with 
more than 38 percent (265 observations), while risk-increasing positions account for less than 29 
percent (198 observations) and risk-constant positions for 33 percent (228 observations). 
Overall, these distributions show that the exposure from floating-rate positions is more often 
decreased than increased, where for fixed-rate positions it is more balanced and rather the 
                                                 
60  An analysis of our sample firms underlines this assumption. We randomly select 20 of our sample firms to 
check whether they state the importance of each type of risk in the registration documents. Almost all 
firms put the emphasis on the cash flow risk, with only one firm indicating that it arbitrates between both 
types of risk. 
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opposite applies.61 This complements the previous finding that our sample firms swap from fix 
to floating.  
Table 19: Descriptive Statistics of Hedge Ratio 
This table reports descriptive statistics of the hedge ratio ( HR ), defined as the percentage of IR exposure covered 
by financial instruments ( Ebt t tHR H ), where tH  and 
b
tE  denotes the hedging instruments and the exposure 
before hedging in t , respectively. Panel A [B] refers to fixed-rate [floating-rate] positions and Panel C presents the 
combined HR measure with priority given to floating-rate positions. Descriptive statistics are presented separately 
based on risk-decreasing, risk-increasing, and risk-constant strategies, where we introduce the following 
classification: (a) risk-decreasing strategies reduce the exposure with 2 0HR   ; (b) risk-increasing strategies raise 
the exposure with 2HR    or 0HR   and (c) risk-constant strategies keep the exposure constant with 2HR    
or 0HR  .  
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Hedge Ratios for Fixed-Rate Positions 
Strategy Hedge Ratio No. Obs. Cum. Obs. Mean Median SD Min P25 P75 Max 
           
Risk-decreasing 
2 1HR     5 5 -1.501 -1.469 0.345 -1.867 -1.808 -1.328 -1.034
1 0HR    132 137 -0.413 -0.343 0.291 -0.998 -0.645 -0.171 -0.001 
Risk-increasing 
2HR     10 147 -326.446 -3.752 1018.735 -3225.806 -6.173 -2.309 -2.090 
0 HR  133 280 7.740 0.570 38.832 0.004 0.118 3.297 412.000 
Risk-constant 0HR   242 522 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of Hedge Ratio for Floating-Rate Positions 
Strategy Hedge Ratio No. Obs. Cum. Obs. Mean Median SD Min P25 P75 Max 
           
Risk-decreasing 
2 1HR     34 34 -1.373 -1.274 0.267 -1.876 -1.603 -1.125 -1.001
      1HR  
1 0HR    
11 
220 
45 
265 
-1.000 
-0.459 
-1.000 
-0.446 
-1.000 
0.285 
-1.000 
-0.998 
-1.000 
-0.714 
-1.000 
-0.234 
-1.000 
-0.002 
Risk-increasing  
2HR     43 308 -35.638 -3.670 118.015 -567.000 -9.181 -2.646 -2.026 
0 HR  155 463 9.382 0.823 40.622 0.002 0.182 3.103 390.500 
Risk-constant 0HR   228 691 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0..000 0.000 0.000 
 
Panel C: Combined Hedge Ratio Measure 
Strategy No.Obs. Percentage 
   Risk-decreasing 267 35.51
Risk-increasing  216 28.72 
Risk-constant 269 35.77 
Total 752 100.00 
 
Due to the peculiarities of interest rate risk, we further construct a combined measure of both 
fixed- and floating-rate positions. The most common instrument to hedge interest rate risk, a 
swap agreement (Backhaus, 2018; Chava & Purnanandam, 2007), creates reciprocal effects on 
both the cash flow and fair value risk. For instance, a firm with a cash flow risk orientation aims 
at reducing its floating-rate exposure and hence swaps floating-rate positions into fixed-rate 
positions. This decreases the floating-rate exposure (cash flow risk) and increases at the same 
time the fixed-rate exposure (fair value risk). For this reason, Table 19 Panel C illustrates a joint 
                                                 
61  The descriptive statistics presented in Table 19 Panel A and B illustrate few extreme hedge ratios. These 
outliers arise when firms swap from e.g., floating-to fixed-rate positions to manage the cash flow risk, but 
the exposure before hedging of e.g., fixed-rate positions is very small.    
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measure that considers both fixed- and floating-rate positions, with the focus on floating risk 
actions consistent with the cash flow risk orientation of non-financial firms. For positions where 
the hedge ratio for both the fixed and floating part indicates risk-decreasing [risk-increasing] 
strategies according to Table 19 Panel A and B, the combined measure takes the same value of 
risk-decreasing [risk-increasing]. In case the hedge ratio for the fixed exposure represents risk-
increasing [risk-decreasing] but the hedge ratio for the floating exposure represents risk-
decreasing [risk-increasing] strategies, we categorize this position as risk-decreasing [risk-
increasing] to give priority to floating-rate positions and thus the cash flow risk.62  
Using this joint classification scheme, we examine whether the overall interest rate activities of 
our sample firms are driven by risk-decreasing or risk-increasing strategies. 63 We find that almost 
36 [29] percent of the combined interest rate positions can be classified as risk-decreasing [risk-
increasing], where the remaining share of almost 36 percent belongs to risk-constant strategies, 
i.e., the exposure remains unchanged. However, interest rate observations might differ 
considerably with regard to the amount of exposure, and an observation with an exposure of 0.5 
million Euros should not be equally important as an observation with an exposure of 500 million 
Euros. For this reason, we evaluate the data in relative terms, i.e. we relate the exposure before 
hedging per interest rate position to overall firm exposure. Consequently, a position of 0.5 
million Euros at stake is not given equal weight than a position of 500 million Euros, and we 
find that overall 63 [37] percent of IR firm exposure are managed using risk-decreasing [risk-
increasing/-constant] strategies.  
These unique findings from a IR-context relate to the literature, in particular to Zhang (2009), 
who classifies firms as ‘effective hedgers’ [‘ineffective hedgers/speculators’] if they [fail to] 
reduce their risk exposure in the area of FX, commodities and IR. While Zhang (2009) makes 
this distinction according to the development of the risk exposures compared to an expected 
level, we use actually reported outcomes. Out of 225 sample firms, Zhang (2009) finds that 55 
percent (125 firms) reduce their risk exposure, while 39 percent (87 firms) fail to do so. Since the 
remaining 6 percent (13 firms) are classified as neutral due to ambiguity among the three areas of 
FX, commodity and IR, a proportion of 55 to 39 percent of risk-decreasing vs. risk-increasing/-
constant emerges. Further, Glaum (2002) provides survey evidence that speculative elements are 
                                                 
62  The argument that a firm focusing on its cash flow risk should only be analyzed using the floating-rate 
positions is appropriate, but in the absence of observations, a joint examination still allows to evaluate a 
firm’s risk management activities and to foster a holistic view of a firm’s IR risk management approach. In 
addition, floating-rate positions are also the crucial element in the combined measure.  
63  We investigated whether only certain firms with specific business models (e.g. with an in-house banking 
license) have contrarian values. We find this pattern across all firms, maturities and currencies.   
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more pronounced in IR risk management compared to FX risk management. Glaum (2002) 
differentiates between selective hedging, i.e., the inclusion of individual views in hedge decisions, 
and risk-increasing strategies, and finds that both are more prevalent in the realm of interest 
rates. To test whether the evidence on the basis of reported quantitative IR-data is in line with 
survey result of Glaum (2002), we relate our findings to the outcome with exclusively FX-data of 
Hecht & Lampenius (2018). As Hecht & Lampenius (2018) find that firms manage 20 percent of 
their FX exposure using risk-increasing/-constant strategies while 80 percent of the FX exposure 
are managed with risk-decreasing strategies, our quantitative analysis shows that risk-increasing/-
constant strategies in IR risk management are more pronounced than in FX risk management. 
Nonetheless, the observed number of risk-increasing positions (216 observations) requires 
further investigation. First, defining interest rate risk is a difficult endeavor, as it concerns two 
unequal types of risk with important interdependencies. To include practical expertise, we 
interviewed four treasury executives of major German non-financial corporations, including two 
DAX-30 firms. Besides the finding that non-financial firms focus on the floating-rate interest 
rate exposure, the interviewed practitioners further reveal that the definition of interest rate risk 
might not be clear-cut and firm specific. In fact, we have found consistent evidence that the cash 
flow risk is of particular interest for non-financial firms. However, as the anecdotal evidence 
indicates, a firm managing its cash flow risk might decide, according to their views on future IR 
developments, to also (partially) manage the impact of changing interest rates on fair values. In 
this respect, we have introduced an innovative classification scheme that combines simultaneous 
fixed- and floating-rate observations. In case when these observations are contrarian, we follow 
the cash flow risk orientation of non-financial firms and give higher weight to the floating-rate 
risk component. This approach mitigates a potential ambiguity resulting from the nature of IR 
risk, but it may also be an error-prone component of our analysis. Second, we point to the recent 
survey of Gumb et al. (2018) for an explanation of the high amount of risk-increasing 
observations. In their interview study with 48 French corporate treasurers, they find that their 
behavior is neither stable nor homogenous: while some treasury officials are willing to increase 
volatility, other refuse to do so. Since their study covers the same period and about 21 percent of 
the sample firms overlap with our sample, we consider their results to be highly relevant. Third, 
as alternative explanation, one interviewed treasury executive indicated that the current strategy 
of our sample firms could be based on long-term fixed-rate funding that is swapped into 
floating-rate positions in the short-term to take advantage of the historically low interest rates. 
One of our sample firms indeed explains its hedging activities in the registration document on 
the grounds that it intends to profit from the low interest rate level.  
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Further, we examine whether a firm’s hedging behavior differs in terms of currency and 
maturity. Overall, we identified that about 63 [37] percent of IR firm exposure are managed 
using risk-decreasing [risk-increasing/-constant] strategies. Analyzed separately for EUR and 
USD observations, we find that the proportion for EUR [USD] is 63-37 [60-40] percent, i.e., the 
currency does not seem to influence the hedging behavior. Regarding maturity, we evaluate the 
proportion separately for maturities less than one, between one and five as well as beyond five 
years. For medium-term maturities between one and five years, we find exactly the identical 
proportion of 63 vs. 37 percent for risk-decreasing vs. risk-increasing/-constant strategies as in 
the overall outcome. For short-term maturities less than one year, we observe an equal 
distribution of 50 vs. 50 percent, while for long-term maturities beyond five years, we find 19 
[81] percent of IR firm exposure are managed using risk-decreasing [risk-increasing/-constant] 
strategies, i.e, firms are more risk-taking in the long run.    
Finally, we evaluate whether the level of interest rates affects the hedging behavior of our sample 
firms, because anecdotal evidence indicates that firms try to benefit from the historically low 
interest rates. Since our dataset contains interest rate exposures with mainly EUR observations64, 
we analyze the potential impact of EURIBOR changes on the choice of risk-decreasing vs. risk-
increasing/-constant strategies. Similar to Chernenko & Faulkender (2011) we use the 3-month 
EURIBOR as indicator, since commercial loans with floating interest rates are often tied to this 
benchmark. For the period of 2010 to 2015, we observe the average 3-month EURIBOR to 
increase from 0.81 to 1.39 in 2011 and then decrease to -0.02 in 2015. We find, however, that the 
proportion of risk-decreasing vs. risk-increasing/-constant strategies is rather stable during our 
sample period, with most of the values close to the percentages of 63 and 37 and maximum 
deviations of +/- 10 percent.  
In summary, we find assets to be an essential ingredient in the interest rate exposure of our non-
financial sample firms, which is predominantly short for both fixed- and floating-rate positions, 
and where our analysis indicates that using hedging instruments, firms swap from fixed- to 
floating-rate positions. Further, while the taken positions with derivative instruments are 
predominantly risk-decreasing, we find that a considerable part of positions increase IR 
exposure. We do not observe that the choice of these differing strategies depends on specific 
years and interest rate levels, but firms seem to have a bigger risk appetite in the long run.   
                                                 
64  78 observations (10 percent) are denoted in USD. An analysis per year is not feasible due to insufficient 
observations per year.   
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4.4 Speculation in Interest Rate Risk Management and Related Activities 
4.4.1 Speculation in General 
“We have also seen that, in the case of interest rates, hedging or speculative behavior is too complex to be captured 
by a simple proxy such as active swap usage or the level of variation in the share of fixed rate debt”65 
In his analysis on active swap usage and the extent of variation of the after-swap mix, Oberoi 
(2018) concludes that separating hedging and speculation in IR risk management is too 
complicated to be solved with simple proxies. In a broader sense, his conclusion is observable in 
the literature. While sufficient evidence demonstrates the relevance of speculative elements in 
several areas of corporate risk management practices, most of the empirical attention was 
devoted to commodity (e.g., Adam et al., 2015, 2017; Brown et al., 2006), and FX risk (Beber & 
Fabbri, 2012; Hecht & Lampenius, 2018). Very few empirical evidence comes from corporate 
interest rate risk, in spite of survey outcomes (Bodnar, Marston, & Hayt, 1998; Glaum, 2002) 
that indicate speculative activities in this area. What are the reasons for the meagre attention and 
findings of speculation in corporate interest rate risk management? As Oberoi (2018)’s quote 
suggests, the complexity of interest rate risk with its differing sub-categories of cash flow and fair 
value risk as well as important interdependencies make it more difficult to analyze than FX or 
commodity risk. Using the granularity of our dataset, we are able to calculate firm-, year-, 
maturity- and currency-specific hedge ratios for both fixed- and floating-rate positions separately 
and hence classify a firm’s overall interest rate activities as risk-decreasing, risk-increasing or risk-
constant. Following the literature that often uses the terms ‘hedging’ and ‘speculation’ for risk-
decreasing and risk-increasing/-constant strategies, respectively (Allayannis & Ofek, 2001; Géczy 
et al., 2007; Hentschel & Kothari, 2001; Zhang, 2009; see section 2.2), we denominate these 
positions accordingly. Our hedge ratio measure could hence be a potential proxy for speculative 
behavior in the complex environment of corporate IR risk management.  
4.4.2 Financial Characteristics of Speculators 
The identification of speculative, risk-increasing activities is linked to the questions of who these 
speculators are and why they engage in speculative actions. As until now it has been very difficult 
to capture speculation in the realm of interest rate risk management, the financial characteristics 
                                                 
65  As appeared in the Journal of Banking and Finance article “Interest rate risk management and the mix of fixed 
and floating rate debt” by Oberoi (2018, p. 83). 
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of speculators remain vague in the literature. Based on survey data on FX and IR risk, Géczy et 
al. (2007) denominate speculation as risk-increasing activity and distinguish between frequent, 
sometimes and non-speculators in their analysis, in which they find that frequent speculators are 
larger and have lower leverage than non- or sometimes speculators. To our knowledge, only the 
analysis of Chernenko & Faulkender (2011) focuses exclusively on interest rates and sheds light 
on the characteristics of firms that speculate as opposed to those who hedge. In the 
decomposition analysis of their panel data, Chernenko & Faulkender (2011) assume for each of 
their sample firms a stable target share of fixed-rate debt to separate hedging from speculation 
and argue that the cross-sectional component examines the hedging part of interest rate swap 
usage, whereas the time-series variation delivers insights on a firm’s speculative activities with 
interest rate swaps. Chernenko & Faulkender (2011) find that hedging of interest rate exposure is 
clustered among high-investment firm, while speculative elements seem to depend on the 
structure of executive compensation contracts. Without the assumption of an optimal stable 
hedge ratio over time, we use our hedge ratio measure to identify speculation as risk-increasing/-
constant strategy and distinguish it from hedging (risk-decreasing strategy) to analyze the 
financial characteristics of speculators and hedgers.  
The variables that we examine are chosen according to Géczy et al. (2007) and the theories for 
optimal speculation of Campbell & Kracaw (1999) and Adam, Dasgupta, & Titman (2007), 
which describe incentives to increase a firm’s risk exposure.66 Campbell & Kracaw (1999) and 
Adam et al. (2007) illustrate that a firm’s profit function that is convex in investment provides an 
incentive to speculate. Following this convexity of investment opportunities, positive speculative 
outcomes allow for productive investments that would otherwise be abandoned. According to 
Campbell & Kracaw (1999), this pattern should be observable with firms that exhibit the 
following characteristics: high cost of asymmetric information [size]67, important growth 
opportunities [growth] as well as meagre internal resources [liquidity]. Following Adam et al. 
(2017) and Géczy et al. (2007) we approximate firm size by the logarithm of total assets (log 
(total assets) and alternatively by the logarithm of market capitalization (log (mkt value). Similar 
to Géczy et al. (2007), we measure growth opportunities by the ratio of research and 
development expenses over total revenue (R&D ratio) and as alternative, following Beber & 
                                                 
66  Stulz (1996) also provides explanations for speculative positions, such as having specialized information. 
However, Stulz (1996) points out that such private information would lead to selective hedging rather than 
speculative, risk-increasing practices. In addition, non-financial firms do most likely not possess a 
comparative advantage regarding IR risk management. 
67  Similar to Adam et al. (2017) and Graham et al. (2001), we presume that informational asymmetry affects 
smaller firms more than bigger ones and that smaller firms are more constrained in external financing. 
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Fabbri (2012) by capital expenditures to total revenues (capex ratio).68 Following Géczy et al. 
(2007) we measure short- and long-term liquidity with the quick ratio (cash and short-term 
investments to total current liabilities) and the interest coverage ratio ((pretax income + interest 
expense) / interest expense), respectively. Further, we investigate the levels of indebtedness, 
where we follow Géczy et al. (2007) and use the long-term debt ratio with total long-term debt 
over total assets. All variables are defined in Appendix 14 and Table 20 Panel A presents 
descriptive statistics of the financial characteristics.  
Following the approach of Géczy et al. (2007) with the classification in frequent, sometimes and 
non-speculators, we similarly categorize firms as either marginal speculator (MS), temporary 
speculator (TS) or frequent speculator (FS) according to the firm-specific share of speculation 
(‘speculation ratio’). According to section 4.3.2 with the value-weighted proportion of 
speculation to not evaluate a position of 0.5 million Euros as equal to a position of 500 million 
Euros, we assess the exposure before hedging relative to overall firm exposure, which means that 
we calculate the value-weighted proportions of hedging (reducing IR exposure) and speculation 
(increasing/constant IR exposure) per firm. The resulting ‘speculation ratio’ ranges from zero to 
one and shows for a value of e.g., 0.3 that a firm speculates with 30 percent of its total IR 
exposure. We then classify firms that speculate with less than 37 percent [more than 63 percent] 
of their exposure as marginal speculator [frequent speculator]. Firms that speculate between 37 
percent and 63 percent are labelled temporary speculator, where we overall find a distribution of 
34 percent MS, 45 percent FS and 21 percent TS. The limits of 37 percent and 63 percent are the 
result of the findings in section 4.3.2, where the analysis shows that 63 percent of IR exposure is 
hedged and 37 percent is speculated with.69 This approach is in line with Hecht (2018).70  
                                                 
68  Please note that we do not employ the book-to-market-ratio due to potential misinterpretations. Géczy et 
al. (2007) state off-balance sheet correlations with speculation as possible explanation.   
69  In a robustness check, we rule out the possibility that our results depend on these limits. Similar to Hecht 
(2018), we alter the thresholds in a sensitivity analysis to the extent of +/– 10 percent and find overall 
robustness. We conclude that our results are not subject to a particular limit for the definition of 
speculation. 
70  Per firm and per year, we typically have several observations that differ in terms of maturity. Since for 
these observations, the financial characteristics such as firm size are the same for one year and one firm, we 
drop all duplicate values to rely on one observation per firm and year. 
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Table 20: Descriptive Statistics of Financial Characteristics (According to Firm Classification) 
This table reports summary statistics of the financial characteristics of our sample firms in Panel A as well as the 
financial characteristics according to our firm classification into marginal speculators (MS), temporary speculator 
(TS) or frequent speculator (FS) in Panel B. The MS vs. FS [MS vs. TS] {FS vs. TS} column reports the significance 
level of a Welch’s t-test comparing the mean values for marginal speculators versus frequent speculators [marginal 
speculators vs. temporary speculators] {frequent speculators vs. temporary speculators}. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. For the firm classification, we drop all 
duplicate values to rely on one observation per firm and year (see section 4.4.2) . Log (total assets) is the logarithm 
of total assets, log (mkt value) the logarithm of market capitalization, the R&D [Capex] ratio divides the R&D 
expense [capital expenditures] by total revenues and the quick ratio captures the sum of cash plus short-term 
investments divided by total current liabilities. Interest coverage is measured by the sum of pretax income plus 
interest expense, divided by interest expense. The long-term debt ratio captures total long-term debt in relation to 
total assets. All variables are defined in Appendix 14.  
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Financial Characteristics 
 
N Mean SD Min p25  p50 p75 Max 
Log (total assets) 744 8.796 1.542 5.489 7.818  8.873 10.050 12.020 
Log (mkt value) 735 8.106 1.687 3.183 7.197  8.479 9.357 11.100 
R&D ratio 502 0.047 0.050 0.000 0.013  0.034 0.053 0.260 
Capex ratio 742 0.063 0.078 0.005 0.026  0.041 0.069 0.467 
Quick ratio 739 0.376 0.368 0.037 0.177  0.298 0.416 2.248 
Interest coverage 740 18.870 90.180 -13.510 3.259  6.799 10.620 1,457 
Debt ratio long-term 740 0.189 0.115 0.000 0.098  0.170 0.268 0.509 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of Financial Characteristics According to Firm Classification 
 
Marginal Speculator 
(N = 101) 
 Frequent Speculator 
(N = 134) 
 
Temporary Speculator 
  (N = 63) 
 
 
 
     Mean    SD    Mean    SD MS vs. FS     Mean    SD MS vs. TS FS vs. TS      
Log (total assets) 8.567 1.907 8.714 1.304  9.137 1.302 ** ** 
Log (mkt value) 7.712 2.082 8.085 1.259  8.428 1.487 **  
R&D ratio 0.057 0.051 0.038 0.058 ** 0.042 0.029 **  
Capex ratio 0.075 0.094 0.061 0.083  0.043 0.020 *** ** 
Quick ratio 0.315 0.263 0.439 0.446 *** 0.366 0.224   
Interest coverage 14.590 52.088 42.290 188.204  10.430 14.129  * 
Debt ratio long-term 0.208 0.110 0.178 0.120 ** 0.213 0.134  * 
 
Across the three groups of speculators, Table 20 Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the 
financial characteristics. With respect to firm size, frequent speculators seem to be bigger than 
marginal speculators, but overall the groups do not differ significantly for both of our measures. 
Regarding growth opportunities, we find that frequent speculators have significantly lower R&D 
ratios than firms that only marginally speculate. The alternative measure for growth 
opportunities, the capex ratio, also illustrates this relationship, where only the differences 
between frequent and marginal speculators are not significant. In terms of liquidity, frequent 
speculators have significantly higher quick ratios than marginal speculators, which could indicate 
higher short-term liquidity. Further, the ratios of interest coverage also indicate higher long-term 
liquidity for frequent speculators, but the differences between the groups are insignificant. In line 
with Géczy et al. (2007), we also find that the long-term debt ratios of frequent speculators are 
significantly lower than those of marginal speculators. Overall, our findings on the financial 
characteristics of speculators are inconsistent with the theoretical explanations for optimal 
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speculation of Campbell & Kracaw (1999) and Adam et al. (2007). Interestingly, this evidence is 
not in accordance with the outcome of Hecht (2018), who finds empirical evidence for the 
theories of Campbell & Kracaw (1999) and Adam et al. (2007) in an FX-context, but it 
corresponds to Géczy et al. (2007), who identify no significant overlap between firms that 
frequently speculate with FX derivatives and those with IR derivatives. The next section 
addresses this combination of IR and FX data, where we link the present IR dataset with the FX-
dataset of Hecht (2018) to empirically verify potential interrelations between both risk classes.  
4.4.3 Interrelation Between IR and FX Speculation 
Due to access to the survey data of Bodnar et al. (1998), Géczy et al. (2007) are in the unique 
position to simultaneously analyze the IR and FX risk behavior and potential interdependencies 
of their sample firms. In this respect, two major findings are that firms focus on either IR or FX 
speculation, and that the initial exposure of frequent FX-speculators is bigger compared to non- 
and sometimes speculators. Parallel to the recommendations for extended disclosures concerning 
the management of interest rate risks, the AMF provides similar guidelines for the reporting of 
FX risk management activities (Hecht & Lampenius, 2018; Hecht, 2018). By combining both 
datasets, we can, similar to Géczy et al. (2007), jointly analyze the IR and FX risk activities of our 
sample firms. We merge our IR-dataset with the FX-dataset of Hecht (2018) and find that 37 
firms are identical in both samples.  
We address the findings of Géczy et al. (2007) based on the survey outcome of 1998 with our 
empirically observed data between 2010 and 2015. First, Géczy et al. (2007) identify overall 13 
frequent speculators and find that firms tend to focus on either FX or IR speculation. In 
particular, they document that two-third (six out nine firms) of their identified FX-speculators 
cannot be characterized as frequent IR-speculators, and conclude that firm specialize in either 
FX or IR speculation. Following the classification scheme of the previous section 4.4.2 into 
marginal, temporary or frequent speculator, we identify overall 21 frequent speculators (of which 
7 [17] for FX [IR]), where 57 percent [82 percent] of the frequent FX [IR] speculators cannot be 
described as such for the other risk category. Altogether, we observe that 26 of the 37 firms (70 
percent) change their classification and only 11 (30 percent) stick to the same behavior. In total, 
the analysis of our quantitative data shows that a firm that speculates with currency derivatives 
does not necessarily speculate with interest rate derivatives.  
Second, Géczy et al. (2007) analyze the size of the exposure of frequent speculators compared to 
non- and sometimes speculators. They document that firms that frequently speculate with FX 
derivatives have a significantly higher exposure than firms that do not or only sometimes 
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speculate with FX derivatives, where they measure exposure as the percentage of operating 
revenues and costs denominated in foreign currencies. In an IR-setting, they do not find such a 
pattern. We also address this outcome with our combined FX- and IR dataset using the exposure 
before hedging stated in the registration documents. Contrary to the survey findings, we find that 
the exposure before hedging of frequent speculators is in absolute numbers significantly smaller 
than of marginal and temporary speculators for both FX and IR risk, where a t-test shows that 
the differences between the groups are significant at the 1 percent significance level.  
Interestingly, we observe that frequent FX-speculators have on average a negative, i.e., short 
exposure of -38.47 million Euros, whereas marginal and temporary speculators exhibit a positive, 
i.e., long exposure of 48.37 and 83.14 million Euros, respectively. A contrarian differentiation is 
visible for the floating interest rate exposure: While the average exposure before hedging of 
frequent speculators is long (182.21 million Euros), the average exposure of marginal and 
temporary speculators is short with -401.83 and -253.74 million Euros, respectively. A possible 
interpretation is that frequent FX-speculators try to reduce their payments on liabilities with risk-
increasing activities, while frequent IR-speculators use their floating-rate assets (mainly cash and 
cash equivalents) for speculative purposes. For the fixed interest rate exposure, the average 
exposure before hedging is short for frequent, marginal and temporary speculators (-844.50, -
2907.68 and -1805.90 million Euros, respectively).  
4.4.4 Speculation and Hedge Accounting 
Another aspect that is associated with speculation is hedge accounting (HA). This accounting 
practice allows both underlying positions and related hedges to be treated as one item in order to 
offset their gains and losses in financial statements. We report our results on the relation 
between speculation and hedge accounting, which has not been well studied in the literature. To 
our knowledge, Hecht (2018) was the first to analyze potential correlations of the accounting 
policy with speculation. His motivation to examine this relationship was based on ambiguous 
statements in annual corporate disclosures, where speculation is explicitly regarded as part of the 
hedging policy but hedge accounting requirements would not be met. In his FX setting, Hecht 
(2018) finds that firms that do not apply hedge accounting are more likely to speculate more than 
firms that apply hedge accounting. He points out that this relationship is a mere indication and it 
cannot be regarded as necessary or sufficient condition for the evidence of speculation.   
To examine the relationship between speculation and hedge accounting in the realm of IR risk 
management, we conduct a similar analysis. Survey evidence from the U.S. as well as Germany 
together with Switzerland indicates that 25 percent and 28 percent of the corporate sample firms 
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refrain from the application of hedge accounting, respectively (Glaum & Klöcker, 2011; 
Kawaller, 2002). Hecht (2018) shows in an FX-environment that in France 26 percent of the 
firms do not apply hedge accounting. For our present IR-dataset, we find that 21 percent (12 out 
of 56) of our non-financial sample firms can be characterized as non-HA-adopters. We introduce 
a dummy variable ‘hedge accounting’ that takes the value of one if a firm applies hedge 
accounting and zero otherwise. Since IAS 39 can restrict the designation of derivative 
instruments and contexts as hedging relationships, we classify a firm as hedge accounting user if 
it predominantly applies hedge accounting. In a logit regression analysis with robust standard 
errors, the ‘hedge accounting’ variable represents the dependent variable, and as independent 
variable, we include the ‘speculation ratio’, i.e., the value-weighted proportion of speculation per 
firm. Similar to section 4.4.3, the ‘speculation ratio’ ranges from zero to one, where a value of 0.3 
indicates that a firm speculates with 30 percent of its overall IR exposure. According to Glaum & 
Klöcker (2011), we further control for firm size, growth opportunities and leverage. We use the 
logarithm of total assets (log (total assets)) for size, and capital expenditures over total revenues 
(capex ratio) for growth opportunities.71 Following Glaum & Klöcker (2011), we employ the 
debt ratio (total liabilities over total assets) as approximation for leverage.72  
 
                                                 
71  We use the capex ratio as proxy for growth opportunities due to its greater availability in the databases for 
our sample firm compared to the alternative R&D ratio. The outcome with the R&D ratio is very similar 
and only contains fewer observations. 
72  Since the variables ‘hedge accounting’ and ‘speculation ratio’ remain constant per firm over time, we drop 
all duplicated values to rely on one observation per firm to not bias the results. For the control variables 
such as firm size or growth opportunities, we use the latest reporting data of the sample period, i.e., 2015. 
Due to non-availability of data for capital expenditures, we lose two firms.  
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Table 21: Hedge Accounting – Logistic Regression  
This table reports the logistic regression results of the application of hedge accounting as a function of firm 
characteristics with robust standard errors. The dependent variable ‘hedge accounting’ takes the value of one if a 
firm applies hedge accounting and zero otherwise. The independent variables are defined as follows: The 
‘speculation ratio’ measures the value-weighted proportion of speculation per firm on a metric scale from 0 to 1, 
where 0 [1] indicates risk management [speculation] with a firm’s total IR exposure. Log (total assets) is the 
logarithm of total assets, the capex ratio divides the capital expenditures by total revenues and the debt ratio 
captures total liabilities in relation to total assets. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 
percent level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 14.     
Dependent Variable Independent Variables  Coef.      p-value 
Hedge accounting Speculation ratio -7.708 0.024** 
 Log (total assets) 2.333 0.000*** 
 Capex ratio -0.022 0.996 
 Debt ratio -2.002 0.631 
 Constant -9.855 0.001*** 
Observations  54  
Pseudo R-squared  0.546  
 
As show in Table 21, the extent of speculation is associated with the application of the hedge 
accounting. In detail, we find that a one-unit increase in the variable ‘speculation ratio’ correlates 
with a decrease of 7.71 in the relative log odds of being a HA-user compared to a non-HA-user, 
significant at the 5 percent threshold. In other words, firms that do not apply hedge accounting 
are more likely to speculate more than firms that apply hedge accounting. This negative 
relationship between speculation and the probability of applying hedge accounting confirms the 
findings of Hecht (2018) in an IR-environment. We emphasize again that this link to hedge 
accounting is not a necessary or sufficient condition for speculation. Further, we observe a 
statistically significant correlation between firm size and hedge accounting. We find that firms 
that do not apply hedge accounting are presumably smaller than hedge accounting users, 
significant at the 1 percent level. This pattern is in line with Glaum & Klöcker (2011) who also 
associate the usage of hedge accounting with bigger firm size.  
4.5 Conclusion 
We approach the complexity caused by two different subcategories of interest rate risk with the 
new degree of granularity of our hand-collected dataset. This unprecedented level of detail 
provides actually reported data on IR exposure before and after hedging, separately for fixed- 
and floating-rate positions. We find – especially for floating-rate positions – that assets are an 
integral part of the interest rate exposure of our non-financial sample firms, who mainly swap 
from fixed- to floating-rate positions in the short-to medium-term. Further, based on the 
advanced disclosures on IR exposure before and after hedging, we calculate firm-, year-, 
maturity-, and currency-specific hedge ratios. Our unique findings indicate that 63 percent of IR 
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firm exposure are managed using risk-decreasing strategies and 37 percent are managed using 
risk-increasing/-constant strategies, where firms appear to have a higher risk appetite in the long-
term.  
Following the extant literature’s designation in ‘hedging’ [‘speculation’] for risk-decreasing risk-
increasing/-constant strategies, we find that IR-speculators possess less growth opportunities 
and higher short- and long-term liquidity. According to the survey outcome of Géczy, Minton, & 
Schrand (2007), we combine the IR-dataset with the FX-dataset of Hecht (2018) to empirically 
examine potential interrelations between both risk types. We find that IR-speculators do not 
necessarily speculate with FX-derivatives and that the exposure of frequent speculators is 
significantly lower for both IR and FX risk. Moreover, for frequent FX-speculators we 
document a short exposure, while non-frequent speculators have a long exposure. In contrast, 
the floating-rate exposure of frequent IR-speculators is long, while non-frequent speculators 
exhibit a short exposure. This indicates that frequent FX-speculators could try to decrease their 
payments on liabilities with risk-increasing activities, while frequent IR-speculators use their 
floating-rate assets for speculative transactions.  
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4.7 Appendix 
Appendix 12: Examples of Reported IR Information from Registration Documents 
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Appendix 13: Hedge Ratio Properties 
This table illustrates properties of the hedge ratio ( HR ) and contains a numerical illustration to demonstrate the 
combination of the hedging instruments (numerator) and FX exposure before hedging (denominator) in the hedge 
ratio using the column references introduced in Table 16. For illustrative purposes we assume as base scenario a 
firm with an exposure before hedging of 100 units, i.e.,  100bE . That firm can now take one out of six 
fundamentally different positions that differ in the amount of hedging instruments ( H ) and the resulting exposure 
after hedging ( E a ), where two of the six positions result in a decrease in risk, two in an increase in risk and two 
keep the risk at a constant level. Further, it illustrates the hedge ratio range given the six fundamentally different 
positions.  
Hedge Ratio Range: 
 Risk-
increasing 
strategy 
 Risk-
decreasing 
strategy 
Risk-
decreasing 
strategy 
 Risk-
increasing 
strategy 
 Risk-
constant 
strategy 
Risk-
constant 
strategy 
Exposure Before Hedging [c] 100  100 100  100  100 100 
Hedging Instruments [d] -250  -150 -50  50  -200 0 
Exposure After Hedging [e] -150  -50 50  150  -100 100 
Hedge Ratio (HR = [d] / [c]) -2.5  -1.5 -0.5  0.5  -2 0 
HR: 
 
 
 
Appendix 14: Definition of Variables 
Variables Description of variables 
Capex ratio Capital Expenditures / Total Revenues  
Debt ratio  Total Liabilities / Total Assets 
Debt ratio long-term Total Long-Term Debt / Total Assets 
b
tE  
Exposure before hedging in t  
HR  Hedge ratio with Ebt t tHR H  percentage of FX exposure covered by 
financial instruments 
tH  Hedging instruments in t  indicated by derivative instruments 
reported 
Interest coverage (Pretax Income + Interest Expense) / Interest Expense 
Log (mkt value) Log (Com. Shares Outstanding * Closing Share Price End of Year) 
Quick ratio (Cash + Short-Term Investments) / Total Current Liabilities) 
R&D ratio R&D Expense / Total Revenues 
Speculation ratio 
This variable measures the value-weighted proportion of speculation 
per firm on a metric scale from 0 to 1, where 0 [1] indicates 100 
percent hedging [speculation] with a firm’s total IR exposure.  
 
Currency Codes: 
AUD Australian dollar                                              GBP             Pound sterling                                           
BRL Brazilian real                                                    INR             Indian rupee 
CAD  Canadian dollar                                                JPY Japanese yen 
CNY Chinese renminbi                                            THB  Thai baht 
EUR Euro                                                                USD United States dollar 
 
∞ -2 0 -1 -∞ 
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5 Conclusion 
Contemporary corporate risk management with its diverse facets and categories commonly 
involves the usage of derivative instruments. Most of the relevant empirical literature originates 
from commodity risk management, even though the most important risk categories in terms of 
derivative usage are FX and IR risk. Empirical evidence in these areas is rare and often relies on 
alternative indicators of derivative usage due to a limited availability of adequate data. We close 
this gap in the literature and introduce two innovative datasets – one for FX and one for IR risk 
– from the unexplored regulatory environment in France. Based on an unprecedented data 
granularity with advanced exposure and derivative usage information, we examine the 
preeminent topics on the relevance and the determinants (together with the identification) of 
speculative activities in corporate FX and IR risk management in three empirical papers.  
Chapter 2 focuses on how firms manage their FX exposure. Regarding the composition of FX 
exposure, we find the exposure before hedging to be predominantly long, i.e., driven by FX-
receivables and forecasted FX-sales, which is on average [median] hedged to about 90 [49] 
percent with mostly short derivative instruments. 
Regarding the relevance of speculative elements, we evaluate whether firms decrease, increase or 
keep their FX exposure stable with derivative instruments and find that about 61 percent of the 
taken currency positions can be classified as risk-decreasing and about 39 percent as risk-
increasing/-constant. Instead of solely evaluating the number of occurrences, we further relate 
the exposure before hedging per currency position to overall firm exposure and find that 
approximately 80 percent of total FX exposure are managed using risk-decreasing strategies and 
20 percent of total firm exposure are managed using risk-increasing/-constant strategies.  
We further address the documented impact of prior outcomes on hedging decisions with the 
informational advantage of our FX dataset. We find supportive evidence that in response to 
benchmark losses, management hedges significantly more of its exposure and adjusts the hedge 
ratio closer to its benchmark. In addition, we analyze whether the impact of prior hedging 
outcomes is subject to the choice of risk-decreasing vs. risk-increasing strategies. With our 
finding that previous benchmark losses are only considered in risk-increasing strategies, where 
the exposure is again decreased following prior benchmark losses, but not in risk-decreasing 
strategies, we complement the growing literature on the relevance of prior hedging outcomes.   
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In chapter 3, we first examine whether the advanced disclosures in FX risk management of our 
dataset enable the identification of speculation reading openly available corporate publications. 
For the first time, the detailed information on FX exposures before and after hedging with 
corresponding hedged amounts allows for the calculation of firm-, currency-, and year-specific 
hedge ratios to quantitatively identify speculation as activity that increases or keeps currency-
specific FX exposure constant reading public corporate disclosures.  
As anecdotal evidence suggests, this identification of speculation entails several advantages, such 
as raising the inhibition threshold to engage in speculative activities, providing a new 
informational base for share- and stakeholders as well as enabling unprecedented benchmarking 
and competitor analyses for the corporate environment.  
In a qualitative analysis, we find that the application of hedge accounting correlates with the 
extent of corporate speculation. This connection, however, is not a necessary or sufficient 
condition, but only an indication for speculation. 
Further, we examine the determining factors of speculative activities and find that frequent 
speculators are smaller, possess more growth opportunities and have lower internal resources. 
While several theories for speculative behavior have been tested empirically several times, our 
findings indicate unprecedented empirical evidence for the convexity theories in an FX 
environment.  
Chapter 4 examines how firms manage their IR exposure with the differing subcategories of 
cash flow and fair value risk. When analyzing the structure of the interest rate exposure, we find 
that assets are a significant component, especially for floating-rate positions. Further, the 
advanced IR risk reporting includes IR exposure data before and after hedging separated for 
different maturities. We observe that our sample firms use derivative transactions to swap from 
fixed- to floating-rate positions mainly in the short-to medium-term. 
Similar to FX risk, we evaluate the relevance and determinants of speculation in IR risk 
management. We observe that speculative elements are more pronounced in IR compared to FX 
risk management when finding that 63 percent of IR firm exposure are managed using risk-
decreasing strategies, whereas 37 percent are managed using risk-increasing/-constant strategies.  
Contrary to the results in the FX setting, we observe frequent IR-speculators to have less growth 
opportunities and higher short- and long-term liquidity. We finally combine the FX and IR 
dataset to examine potential interactions. We find that firms seem to specialize in either FX or 
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IR speculation and that the exposure of frequent speculators is significantly smaller for both risk 
categories.  
In summary, we provide unprecedented empirical evidence on speculative elements in corporate 
risk management that adds the perspectives of FX and IR risk to the growing discussion and 
literature. As a useful extension to our analyses, future research could examine whether, in 
addition to firm characteristics, managerial characteristics on executive level influence the 
observed risk management behavior. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
